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Word from the Ambassador
WORD FROM THE AMBASSADOR
Dear readers,
Th e world today is characterized by increasingly multipolar communica-
tion, where the ideas and agendas of respective players interact and overlap 
on the global stage. In no arena is this more evident than in politics. Th e 
transatlantic interaction between European countries and the United States 
is a prime example. Americans value the long-standing partnership with our 
European allies. Th e Transatlantic ties between our cultures are far more 
varied and far deeper than the requisite communication between nations. 
Although our governments’ policies may not always align, our concern for the 
welfare and views of all elements of society – be they political, economic or 
individual – remains constant.
I am therefore very pleased to see this substantial year-long research 
project conducted by Europeum. Th e U.S. Embassy in Prague is happy to 
help publish its contents in this book. We hope you ﬁ nd it enlightening.
Richard W. Graber
Ambassador of the USA
in the Czech Republic

Overview of Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe
OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE:
Cleavages and Foreign Policy Attitudes
Th e object of this study is the foreign policy agenda, orientation, and behav-
iour of political parties in selected Central and Eastern European countries. 
More speciﬁ cally, the authors assess the position of major political parties in six 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have recently become members of 
the European Union (2004 in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Hungary; 2007 in the case of Bulgaria and Romania) vis-à-vis the United 
States. Th e attention was not devoted to the examination of particular issues 
in bilateral relations between the countries at stake and the United States, but 
mainly to topics that became somehow contentious in a wider international 
context, where US policy diverged from that of the other international actors, 
notably some EU member states. 
Th e reason why we selected to examine the attitudes from the new member 
states of the EU is given by their recent accession to the European Union. In the 
previous studies that we examined, inter alia, what is likely to be the behaviour 
of the new EU members in shaping (or not shaping) EU foreign and security 
policy (Král and Pachta 2005). Th e experience of previous accessions, as well as 
the accession process itself, suggests that the acceding countries are by nature 
reshaping their foreign policies in a process known as “Europeanisation.” Th is 
is explicable in terms of the necessary alignment of the foreign policies of the 
acceding countries along with the common positions of the EU within the 
framework of the CFSP, adjusting the framework of foreign policy-making to 
the EU requirements, necessity to engage in more foreign policy issues than the 
traditional priorities of the individual countries would dictate, etc. In a sense, 
this adjustment in the area of foreign policy was not less important that in other 
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policy areas, despite the low amount of “acquis”¹ in this ﬁ eld that might sug-
gest the opposite. Th e whole process of the “Europeanisation” of the acceding 
countries’ foreign policy was facilitated by the fact that there was a wide national 
consensus that the EU accession itself was the foremost foreign policy goal, 
although we can still see diﬀ ering degrees of this consensus among individual 
countries. What is, however, also very important in this context is that all the 
countries surveyed were trying to achieve another foreign policy goal, which 
was integration into NATO. For all the countries surveyed, these two goals were 
seen as complementary, not competing. In the Central European discourses, 
the description of the primary foreign policy goal was integration into “Euro-
Atlantic” structures,² which basically meant the twin goal of acceding both to 
the EU and NATO without hierarchy, i.e. putting one of the objectives ahead of 
the other. In addition, for most of the countries covered in this study, these twin 
goals of EU and NATO accession were not achieved at the same moment, with 
the exception of Slovakia. 
Th e existence of these twin goals plays a crucial role in examining the Trans-
atlantic dimension of the foreign policy adjustment. It was one of the key factors 
in describing the foreign policy of the EU accession countries as ‘Atlanticist.’ 
Precisely because NATO and EU accession were viewed as complementary and 
equally important throughout 1990’s, it was diﬃ  cult for the political elites that 
supported the both processes to recognise possible controversies between them. 
Th us, there was a large degree of stability in the behaviour of foreign policy dur-
ing the course of the 1990’s that would presumably continue even after accession 
to the EU. In reality, however, cleavages had already started to appear before the 
countries joined the EU; although, to an external observer, they were not always 
overly visible. 
Th e key question that must be asked, therefore, is whether a foreign policy 
consensus exists even after the twin goals of Euro-Atlantic integration have 
been achieved. In this respect, it is the political parties that come into the play. 
With the changing governments in Central and Eastern European countries, the 
examination of their foreign policy agendas, including their relationship to the 
United States, might change as well. Th e research, thus, builds on a premise that, 
as the new member states integrate more deeply into the European Union after 
the accession, it is likely that we will see similar cleavages in the relationship 
vis-à-vis the United States that we see in Western Europe. 
1) By the term ‘acquis,’ we refer to the binding instruments adopted by the European Union applicable inter alia to its member states. 
2)  With the exception of the position of the BSP in Bulgaria and the PSD in Romania until the mid 1990’s, when these post-communist 
parties made a policy U-turn. 
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Th e basic premise or hypothesis is that, in a Western European typology of 
political parties, there is a distinction in foreign policy behaviour from the right 
and left-wing parties. It is also reﬂ ected with the main issue in question of this 
paper – the relationship and attitudes towards the United States. While the 
right-wing parties tend to align more with the foreign policy goals, objectives, 
and means of the United States, this applies to a far lesser degree to their left-
wing counterparts. As we see in the previous section, this is a simpliﬁ ed premise; 
nevertheless, at least in the case of some countries, this description is largely 
accepted and was used as a starting point for a comparison with the situation in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
One challenge that must be tackled at the beginning is the speciﬁ city of par-
tisan systems in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of diﬀ erent histories and 
transformation processes. As we will shortly explain, diﬀ erent cleavages endure 
that determine the partisan scale in the new EU member states, making the 
political scene diﬀ erent from Western Europe. Nevertheless, as the transforma-
tion process is in the ﬁ nal phase (or nominally considered to be completed) and 
as those countries integrate more deeply into the EU, it is assumed that their 
partisan systems will also move more closely towards the traditional cleavages 
existent in the majority of Western European party systems, which is already 
quite visible in some countries (the Czech Republic or Hungary), while it might 
still take longer in others.
As for the methodology employed, the authors examined, primarily, the 
positions of those political parties represented in Parliament during the critical 
period when the issues determined as case studies were debated and discussed. 
Th e review of a party’s positions relied on three main sources: ﬁ rstly, the oﬃ  cial 
documents of the party, such as election manifestos or long-term party pro-
grammes (complemented with desk research monitoring the statements of party 
members in the media) and self-placement of political parties on the political 
spectrum; secondly, the approach relied on questionnaires that were developed 
and sent to the surveyed parties’ representatives, especially to those identiﬁ ed as 
important foreign policy experts whose positions are instrumental for the overall 
approach of the respective political parties (however, it must be acknowledged 
that the response rate was very low, thus putting into question the relevance of 
this too); ﬁ nally, the authors also relied on interviews with leading foreign policy 
experts in individual countries, who can often provide a very good account of the 
partisan positions on the foreign policy issues examined and give the researchers 
the possibility to cross-check the credibility of the assessments and suﬃ  cient 
representativeness of these foreign policy experts. 
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Right – Left Cleavage as a Variable in the 
Political Parties’ Foreign Policy Positions
Th e basic cleavage along which the positions of the political parties were 
examined was the one dividing the right-wing parties from those of the left-
wing, described by classical conﬂ ict lines proposed by Stein Rokkan (namely, 
the socio-economic cleavage of owners vs. employees or centre vs. periphery 
[Lipset and Rokkan 1967]). Although its applicability to transforming socie-
ties in Central and Eastern Europe is disputed by many political scientists, it 
is, nevertheless, the most inﬂ uential classiﬁ cation developed thus far, and, as 
such, is a good starting point for this research. It is useful to illustrate how this 
cleavage translates into the foreign policy attitudes of political parties. Th e 
division suggests that right-wing parties, when formulating a foreign policy 
agenda, put an emphasis on two issues: security and defence of what they 
believe are universal values (democracy, rule of law, fundamental human rights 
and freedoms). As they also largely believe that, when the universal basic prin-
ciples they project through their foreign policy are at stake (for instance, the 
security of the country or that of the ‘international community’ in general), it is 
necessary to deploy force to achieve these goals because they are universal and 
unalienable. Th is largely explains their tolerance for the use of hard power and 
scepticism towards dealing with countries or regimes that are not based on the 
same values and principles. Moreover, they are more suspicious that, when hard 
power should be deployed to protect these fundamental principles, the approval 
of a wider international community (particularly, the United Nations and its 
Security Council) is always necessary. Th is is explained by distrust towards such 
communities where decisions are also being taken by countries that disregard 
these universal principles. Th is viewpoint, portrayed in more philosophical 
terms, could mean that right-wing parties do not believe that all the humans 
are good in their nature, and that this opinion, in the international arena, is also 
applicable to states and regimes. 
In the context of this paper, the position towards the United States plays an 
important role as well. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the European right-
wing parties saw the United States as the protector of these universal principles. 
One can also claim that they embraced the idea of a unipolar world more 
easily, although exceptions obviously exist here. Because the United States 
represented the values and principles that the West was ﬁ ghting for during the 
Cold War, they assume that Europe, which stands for the same values, should 
align itself with the United States in pursuing the worldwide application of 
Overview of Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe
these universal principles. Th e image of the United States among the European 
right-wing parties is generally more positive than among their left-wing coun-
terparts. One point that certainly plays a role is that the European right-wing 
parties, many of whom are derived from Christian-democratic rules, view the 
“West,” i.e. Europe and the United States, as a community built around the 
values of Christianity. 
Left-wing parties, on the other hand, build their foreign policy presumptions 
on foreign policy relativism. Despite the fact that – at least in Western Europe – 
they believe in the same universal values as well as in their inalienability, they 
do not necessarily share a common view on how to project them. Th ey believe 
that the way for the international community to embrace these same values 
is through diﬀ erent means, which can generally be described as engagement. 
Th is would be explicable in terms of economic co-operation, dialogue, and the 
power of diplomacy and persuasion, rather than coercion. For this reason, the 
European left- wing parties do not share the same distrust towards the inter-
national community because they believe that it is within the realm of where 
international institutions (particularly, the United Nations, but international 
organizations, in general) where democratic countries – or the West – should 
act. Th us, the overall perception of what we can call a post World War II nor-
mative international order, including the role of the UN and international law, 
is much more positive. 
In terms of relations with the United States, the positions of the European 
left-wing parties also diverge from their right-wing counterparts. Firstly, they 
view more negatively the notion of US hegemony – not only of their military, 
but also of economic and cultural dominance. Th ey, unlike the right-wing par-
ties, do not necessarily believe that Europe and the US even share the same 
values, often pointing out issues such as the execution of capital punishment 
in the US that is banned in Europe, the abuse of human rights by US opera-
tions worldwide, the role that religion (especially Christianity) plays in society 
(building on the idea of a secular Europe versus a religious America), and more 
emphasis on solidarity in Europe, as opposed to the individualistic behaviour 
of the Americans or the allegedly irresponsible attitude of the US to global 
challenges such as climate change or international criminal justice. Th ey often 
like to point out opinion polls, showing that Europeans and Americans look 
very diﬀ erently at the role of international organisations, the use of force in 
international relations, or the justiﬁ cation of war. Th is all leads to the presump-
tion that a unipolar world, dominated by the United States, who diverge from 
Europeans in their views of handling global problems, and, moreover, project 
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their view of the world in a manner not acceptable to many Europeans, is not 
a good solution. Here ﬁ ts the idea of a multi-polar world, where Europe, as well 
as other possible sources of power, would balance out and tame the excessively 
unilateral and militaristic view of solving world’s problems that is represented 
and pushed for by the United States. 
One can obviously suggest that this is a simplistic description of the division 
between the right and left-wing parties in terms of foreign policy and relations 
with the USA in Western Europe. Even the former EU-15 represents a large 
variety of countries with political parties that might not ﬁ t this discourse. If we 
take, for instance, only the ‘Big Th ree’ in the EU (i.e. Germany, France, and the 
UK), we will see that it is only with Germany that this system ﬁ ts. In France, the 
right-wing is associated with de Gaulle and parties claiming his legacy (currently 
the UMP); one can hardly assert that the afore-mentioned description of foreign 
policy and pro-US positions applies to the French right, although the situation 
has clearly changed with Sarkozy. Similarly, the UK, despite some diﬀ erences 
between Labour and the Conservatives along the lines we suggest, cherishes its 
special relationship with the United States, which is clearly demonstrated on 
its close alignment between the foreign policy of the two countries, regardless 
of which party is in power. Th us, the right-left division is most clearly dem-
onstrated in the German example, where the CDU position tends to be more 
pro-American, while the SPD position is more sceptical of the US alignment. 
Th is leads us to the ﬁ rst presumption that even the older members of the EU, 
in some cases, demonstrate a certain consensus on foreign policy across the 
political spectrum and that party divisions, albeit existent, are not so important 
in the overall continuity of national foreign policy. 
Similarly, we can question the foreign policy consensus in the United States 
itself. For those who follow the 2008 election, the diﬀ erence between Demo-
crats and Republicans on many foreign policy issues (and, most notably, the 
row over future engagements in Iraq, but also a number of other issues such 
as dealing with Iraq, Syria, Iran, the International Criminal Court etc.) cannot 
be more evident. On the other hand, one can also see an alignment on certain 
issues – such as the ‘securitisation’ of foreign policy after 9/11 or the belief in 
projecting presumably universal values. Still, on many occasions, we have seen 
that the relationship between the EU and the USA depends very much on who 
holds the presidency in the US. For the purpose of this paper, it was necessary 
to build on a certain simpliﬁ cation and generalization to be able to examine the 
changes of attitudes of Central and Eastern European states and their political 
parties towards the United States. 
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Party Cleavages Speciﬁ c for Central and Eastern 
Europe – The Legacy of Transformation³ 
Analyzing the political parties positions on Transatlantic policy issues 
in Central and Eastern Europe poses additional challenges. Th is is largely 
due to the legacy of the fall of communism and transformation, nominally 
completed by the accession to the European Union and admission to other 
‘Western club’ organizations such as the WTO or the OECD, but enduring 
in reality. Th is results in the emergence of political parties that do not exhibit 
the same stability as their Western European counterparts; perhaps even 
more importantly, the cleavages determining the placement of political par-
ties along the conﬂ ict lines in Western Europe, as concisely described and 
analyzed by Rokkan, are not entirely applicable to the region. Th e political 
scientists mention at least three diﬀ erent cleavages characteristic of the 
transforming political system: the cleavage arising from the controversy over 
the nature of the regime, the socio-economic transformation cleavage, and 
the national conﬂ ict line. 
Th e ﬁ rst of these arises as a direct consequence of regime change and 
the links of various political actors to the former regime (communism). Th is 
line, albeit falling in importance after the establishment of free elections and 
continuing transformation during the 1990’s, is still evident in some countries 
of the region, notably Poland and Hungary, while in other countries, such 
as the Czech Republic, is less important. Th is cleavage is associated mainly 
with the antagonism of ex-communist formations and their anti-communist 
counterparts (such as former dissidents emerging into political formations 
during the free elections after the fall of communism) and translating itself 
into controversies over the residual problems of communism such as lustra-
tions (the exclusion of former prominent ﬁ gures from holding public oﬃ  ces) 
and settling the crimes of communism (including the restitution of property 
rights, punishment, and documentation of communist crimes, etc.). Despite 
the diminishing importance of this cleavage, we have seen that it endured 
strongly, for instance, in Poland between 2005 and 2007 where the ruling 
Law and Justice Party (PiS) built a large bulk of its electoral programme and 
government agenda around issues pertinent to this conﬂ ict line. As far as the 
substance of this paper is concerned, this cleavage can translate into foreign 
policy agenda as well. For instance, the parties claiming a legacy in the ﬁ ght 
3) This introductory account of the cleavages in the new member states draws mainly on the paper of Vít Hloušek and Lubomír 
Kopeček on Cleavages in Contemporary Czech and Slovak Politics published in 2005 (Hloušek and Kopeček 2005). 
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against communism are more likely to align more closely with the United 
States, appreciating its pivotal role in defeating communism and standing for 
the same principles of personal freedom and justice that they were ﬁ ghting 
for, in addition to having an understanding for their worldwide projection. 
Th e socio-economic transformation conﬂ ict line describes the right-left 
division in the most similar terms to the original Rokkan analysis, but is more 
closely linked to the economic and social eﬀ ects of transformation following 
the fall of communism. It builds on the assumption that there are winners 
and losers in the transformation process, whose positions do not necessar-
ily result from the same preconditions as the owners-employees cleavage 
described by Rokkan, but are rather seen as a result of the somewhat chaotic 
process of privatisation and the uncertainty over property rights characteris-
tics during the ﬁ rst years of economic transformation, gradually translating 
into arguments over the degree of state intervention in the economy, the 
level of liberalisation, and so on. As the process of economic and democratic 
institutionalisation proceeds and ﬁ nally takes ground ﬁ rmly, it is likely that 
this cleavage will transform itself into the traditional socio-economic conﬂ ict 
line deﬁ ned by Rokkan. Th is means that the parties that favour a more rapid 
transition to a market economy and its liberalisation are more likely to evolve 
into what we know as conservative/liberal parties in Western Europe, while 
those who are in favour of a more careful approach that underlines the social 
consequences of transformation will develop into socialist parties of a West-
ern European style. From the point of view of the importance of this conﬂ ict 
line for foreign policy, it is not quite clear. However, due to the assumed 
convergence towards the right-left division present in Western Europe, the 
foreign policy positions of the political parties might develop along a similar 
pattern. In fact, this paper, to a large extent, builds on this premise. 
Th e third conﬂ ict line speciﬁ c for the transforming countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe is the nationalist conﬂ ict line. Th is one is particularly 
important in the region discussed due to the complicated history and mutual 
grievances among the various nationalities and minority groups that tend to 
mobilise voters along with the socio-economic consequences of transforma-
tion. Th is conﬂ ict line can have various modiﬁ cations in diﬀ erent countries 
throughout the region; however, generally speaking, it was, at a certain stage, 
present in all the countries discussed. Th e various modalities of the national-
ist conﬂ ict line include cleavages arising from the existence of a strong ethnic 
minority or a particular cultural group or region, or the existence of parties 
building their discourse on traditional historical grievances and hostility 
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towards their neighbours, as well as the more fundamental question of state 
building based on civic principle as opposed to that of ethnic or regional 
principles. While this cleavage can certainly also be found in Western Europe, 
its importance in the context in transforming the societies of Central and 
Eastern European countries is more important due to the cumulative impact 
of other cleavages, such as the socio-economic impacts of transformation, 
that have a higher potential for polarising a society (by blaming “the other” 
for failures in transformation). Th e relevance of this conﬂ ict line for foreign 
policy is likely to be evident on a case-by-case basis. For instance, some 
parties representing ethnic minorities might have taken diﬀ erent positions 
on an issue where a minority issue is at stake in a diﬀ erent country. Such is 
the case of the Hungarian coalition party in Slovakia (SMK) that, as the only 
party represented in the Slovak Parliament, supported the recognition of 
Kosovo, as it was considered a just cause of a minority that was suppressed 
by a majority. On the other hand, the other parties viewed recognition as 
a dangerous precedent that could lead to irredentist ambitions of the Hungar-
ian minority in Slovakia; a very similar situation was encountered amongst 
the Hungarian parties in Romania. 
One additional cleavage that could be mentioned is the consequence of 
European integration. As such, it is neither completely attributable to the 
speciﬁ cs of the region (as we can also ﬁ nd it in Western Europe) nor – like 
the previous examples – is a result of regime change. Nevertheless, it has 
particular repercussions in the region compared to most Western European 
countries, resulting from a relatively quick integration with an already closely 
integrated entity (the European Union) and requiring a large degree of shar-
ing sovereignty. While in Western Europe, the transition to supranational 
decision-making was an ongoing process, where within Central and Eastern 
Europe it took place in practically only a few years. Th e implications of this 
cleavage on foreign policy are, arguably, the most crucial, albeit not attached 
to any particular issue. While those political parties in favour of sharing 
sovereignty with other countries in order to create a stronger entity are likely 
to be willing to do so even in the foreign policy arena (as consensus builders 
rather than free riders), those parties that are sceptical of sharing sovereignty 
are most likely to voice their concerns exactly in the area of foreign policy 
which is the least “communitarized” in the EU. Such parties, thus, might pre-
fer to adopt a free rider position, arguing that they are not willing to sacriﬁ ce 
their national interest for the sake of consensus building in order to meet an 
imaginative ‘European’ interest. 
 Overview of Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe
Th erefore, the classiﬁ cation of the political parties along the right-left 
axis in Central and Eastern Europe is more complicated as it is not always 
sure which of the conﬂ ict lines is dominant. In some cases, more cleav-
ages are present that complicate the political scene further. For instance, 
in Poland, the socio-economic transformational cleavage certainly exists, 
but so does the enduring conﬂ ict line on the nature of the regime, driving 
a further division between the parties on the right (the PiS versus the PO – 
Civic Platform), as well as a souverainist cleavage dividing Eurosceptic 
parties such as the LPR or Self-Defence. Similarly, the national conﬂ ict 
line is hugely divisive for the political parties on the Slovak right. Th e 
comparison of the positions of political parties vis-à-vis the United States 
is easier in those countries where the socio-economic transformation 
cleavage prevails because such party systems are more stable and clearly 
converging with the political landscape in Western Europe. Bearing these 
diﬀ erences in mind, one can nevertheless assume that, as the transforma-
tion draws to its ﬁ nal phase and the political scene in Central and Eastern 
Europe comes to resemble that of Western Europe, the division along the 
right-left axis will clearly emerge, causing the existing political parties to 
be classiﬁ ed in this way. 
Assessing the Political Parties’ Atlanticism
In order to be able to assess the degree of the political parties’ support of 
the United States, it is useful to draw such an analysis on a number of case 
studies that have become important issues in Transatlantic relations during 
recent years, and where the position of the United States and the European 
Union, or some of its members, has diverged. Th is can give a clearer indi-
cation of whether the party prefers to side with the US position (a sing of 
Atlanticism), or whether it prefers another position. 
However, the research of the parties’ behaviour across Central and 
Eastern Europe showed that the picture can be much more complex than 
labelling parties Atlanticist, according to the assessment, as whether or not 
they support the US. Th e fact that a party does not align with the US position 
does not always indicate that it is anti-American. Th is has to do with the 
problem of deﬁ ning an antipole of Atlanticism. As Petr Drulák points out in 
his article in the Czech daily Lidové noviny, the diﬀ erentiation in terms of the 
political elites’ attitudes might go beyond mere pro- or anti-Americanism (cf. 
Drulák 2006). We can envisage at least three diﬀ erent modiﬁ cations of how 
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a party’s position can be interpreted when it does not support the United 
States on a particular problem. For instance, a party might prefer to adopt 
a position built purely on the interests of a given state that does not align 
to the position of the United States or any other important actor (e.g. the 
EU), which could be called a souverainist approach. Th e other possibility 
represents a position that aligns to a solution facilitated by an international 
organisation (particularly, the United Nations, but also, for instance, the 
EU-US consensus with other countries on board) – the internationalist 
approach. Th e third scenario that can be envisaged for countries and parties 
at stake represents an alignment with a mainstream opinion of the European 
Union, even at the cost of being alienated from the United States. Th is would 
represent the Europeanist position. It is not always possible to draw a clear 
dividing line between these positions. For instance, the Altanticist approach 
could be souverainist as well, just because a particular party believes that it 
is in the national interest to support the United States. On other occasions, 
the Atlanticist and internationalist approach can correlate when a party 
supports a US move that is backed by the wider international community 
(including the European Union). Th us, it poses certain problems to deﬁ ne an 
antipole to Atlanticism. Most likely, the only sensible approach is to examine 
Atlanticism on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a variety of other 
actors on the international scene and assessing the position of a particular 
country in this light.
In fact, the political parties across Central and Eastern Europe that we 
are examining tend to exhibit diﬀ erent patterns in attitudes towards the 
US, as well as towards issues where alignment or non-alignment with the 
US is at stake. In practice, we ﬁ nd all the afore-mentioned positions of the 
parties’ positions across the region. Th e souverainist attitude, being critical 
of the role of the US, but also suspicious of other actors (such as the EU) 
includes, particularly, the FIDESZ in Hungary, the LPR and Self-Defence in 
Poland, part of the ODS in the Czech Republic, but also the Czech Com-
munist party (KSČM) or the Slovak National Party in Slovakia. Clearly, 
both the extremes of the right and the left throughout the region tend to 
be souverainist or isolationist. Th ey put more emphasis on the national 
interest and national positions. However, most of these parties are not what 
can be classiﬁ ed as mainstream; thus, they have only a marginal inﬂ uence 
on government positions (with the exception of the FIDESZ, which is the 
dominant right-wing force in Hungary), although many of them were or 
are present in ruling coalitions. 
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An additional problem that arises is the lack of coherence of a party position 
on some issues. Generally, across Central and Eastern Europe, foreign policy 
does not dominate the political parties’ programmes. General direction might 
often be indicated in the programmes, but is no required in order to give clear 
guidance on how the party would act in concrete situations. When such a situ-
ation emerges, the statements from party members might be uncoordinated 
or even contradictory. Secondly, in some countries, as it was found out, the 
message for the domestic electorate often diﬀ ers from that of the actual policy. 
Th is is very much true in countries where foreign policy does not play a strong 
role in politics, such as in Hungary. 
The Government vs. Opposition Problem
Closely linked to the issue of the internal coherence and consistency of 
partisan positions is the fact that parties often behave diﬀ erently when they are 
in opposition from when they participate from a position of power within the 
government. In the opposition, the parties can often articulate their positions 
more freely than when they are in power. Th is is especially applicable to issues 
of foreign policy. Even the strongest supporters of the USA in the international 
arena are forced to take a more ‘Europeanized’ approach when in power, simply 
because they must deal with their EU counterparts far more often than with 
anyone else on the international scene. Th e shift is fairly visible in the case of the 
Czech ODS party in 2006 (or, at least, a part of it); a similar trend can appear in 
with the FIDESZ in Hungary (being rather sceptical of both the US and the EU); 
however, in the case of the Polish PiS, we have seen very little Europeanization 
when the party was the senior coalition member. Th is trend can, nevertheless, 
work the other way round as well. For instance, the Czech Social Democrats, 
when in power, took a rather moderate position towards the US on Iraq, as well 
as towards the missile defence plans of the US administration. Th e research 
suggests that what we can often see is a discrepancy between party members 
holding executive posts and the wider partisan base. Th e members of the cabi-
net are exposed to many pressures that the legislators or other party members 
are not, such as inter-party bargaining in ruling coalitions or pressures arising 
from the administration that strive to ensure the consistency and continuity 
of foreign policy. In addition, the fact, by nature, that we see coalition rather 
than one-colour governments in the electoral systems in Central and Eastern 
Europe, also forces the political parties to moderate their rhetoric on foreign 
policy issues. In some cases, it even happens in the opposition. For instance, 
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in 2008, the Slovak opposition parties were reluctant to vote for the Lisbon 
Treaty in order to blackmail the government over the controversial press law. 
Finally, they were very critical of the Hungarian party SMK, who voted with 
the government, enabling it to get the ratiﬁ cation act through the parliament, 
accusing it of ‘betrayal.’ On the other hand, the case of Slovakia, particularly, 
shows that the parties’ positions on foreign policy do not necessarily have to 
change when the party enters the government – rather, it is an exception in the 
context of Central Europe. 
The Overall Orientation of Foreign Policy
Central and Eastern European countries also show a higher degree of internal 
diﬀ erentiation in regard to foreign policy, as well as in relation to the ‘Atlanticist’ 
consensus, than others. In Poland, for instance, there is a strong political con-
sensus on support for the United States across the political spectrum; only the 
degree of enthusiasm for support of the US might vary with diﬀ erent political 
parties in power. At the moment, the same premise holds true for Romania. In 
the other countries, the political scene is more polarised as far as the relationship 
with the USA is concerned, again to diﬀ erent degrees. Th e strong anti-American 
rhetoric could be found mainly in the parties at the extremes of the political 
spectrum, either the Left (for instance, the Czech communist party) or the right 
(the Slovak National Party, or parts of the KDH). However, it is not limited 
solely to anti-Americanism; the extremist parties often hold critical views of the 
European Union as well. Nevertheless, anti-American rhetoric can also be found 
among the parties that could be easily classiﬁ ed as part of the mainstream right, 
as an example of the FIDESZ party in Hungary shows (although, the FIDESZ 
seems to be an isolated case, with the possible explanation that the party is such 
a dominant right-wing force that it picked some elements of the usual national-
ist discourse from the parties of the far right). Th e general conclusion, how-
ever, shows that the internal diﬀ erentiation of the examined Central European 
countries divides them into two groups in terms of their overall foreign policy 
orientation. Poland and Romania exhibit a more consensual approach across 
the political spectrum concerning relations with the United States. Th e other 
countries are more ‘instinctive’ Atlanticists – their mainstream political parties 
generally acknowledge the credentials of close co-operation with the United 
States; however, their support is not unconditional and diﬀ ers along the pattern 
suggested in the original hypothesis – in a sense, that the more a party leans to 
the right, the more supportive it will be of US policies. 
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The Impact of Public Opinion
Another pattern identiﬁ ed when examining the political parties in 
Central and Eastern Europe shows that an important variable in the 
formation of the parties’ preferences, even on foreign policy issues, can 
swing with public opinion. At least two examples clearly demonstrate 
that the left wing parties are more prone to linking their foreign policy 
stances to the state of public opinion – namely the SMER in Slovakia and 
the ČSSD in the Czech Republic. In the latter case, the pattern can be 
manifested on the example of the Czech Republic’s involvement in Iraq, 
which the majority of Czechs were strongly opposed to and which was 
reﬂ ected in some oﬃ  cial justiﬁ cations for the statements of the party’s 
members. More lately, in the case of the missile defence system, the Social 
Democrats advocated calling for a referendum on the treaty that, given 
the current circumstances, would surely not lead to its approval. Similarly, 
the left-wing parties in Bulgaria, especially the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist 
Party), exploit a traditional pro-Russian sentiment in Bulgarian society by 
following policies that accommodate Russian positions to a high degree. 
In Poland, this swing, according to public opinion, was most clearly vis-
ible with the extremist parties of Self-Defence and the League of Polish 
Families (LPR), especially regarding the Polish troops’ deployment abroad, 
which the public was increasingly against. Th e right-wing parties, on the 
contrary, tend to be more cautious about public opinion in making for-
eign policy choices, even assuming that, especially when security issues 
are at stake, they must go against the will of the public (such is the case 
of the Czech ODS party’s position to the US radar and Iraq). In most 
of the countries, however, the foreign policy agenda hardly ever ﬁ gures 
into the election programmes; therefore, the question is: why should the 
politicians bother with taking public opinion into account (apart from 
extremist parties that tend to be populist by nature)? Th e explanation is 
that there are obvious exceptions when foreign policy issues have strong 
emotional or historical dimensions or when the issue touches on peoples’ 
lives – such as the debate on US bases in the respective countries, issues 
where minorities are at stake (e.g. the debate on Kosovo in Slovakia, 
Romania, and Hungary), or military deployment in faraway missions such 
as Afghanistan or Iraq – in these examples, a position consistent with 
public opinion could earn political points. 
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Conclusion
It is diﬃ  cult to make a clear-cut conclusion on the examination of the 
political parties from the six countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as far 
as their relations with the United States are concerned. What the research 
has shown quite clearly is that the countries do not form a unique block, but 
are internally diﬀ erentiated, ﬁ rstly with diﬀ erent degree of stability inside 
the party systems in the countries examined, secondly with a diﬀ erent regard 
of foreign policy and its formulation. In some cases, it is foreign policy that 
determines domestic political developments, as in the case of Bulgaria in 
the 1990’s. In other cases, such as Hungary, the system works the other way 
round – it is domestic politics that, to a large extent, determines the foreign 
policy stances of the political parties. In still other cases, foreign policy is 
a much more autonomous sphere of policy-making that, presumably, gives 
it a better chance of being consensual across the political spectrum, as the 
traditional cleavages that separate the right and the left are not so important. 
Such is the case of Poland and Romania, at least in the relation to the USA 
that was examined. On the other hand, in the case of the Czech Republic, 
where foreign policy is still a relatively autonomous sphere of policy making, 
the diﬀ erentiation is visible as we move across the political axis. 
Th e examination has, however, shown that there is indeed a diﬀ erentiation 
on foreign policy issues where relations with the USA are at stake among 
Central and Eastern European parties along the right-left axis. However, this 
diﬀ erentiation is rather uneven and dependent upon many variables.
Th e ﬁ rst set of explanation is contextual. Simply too many issues that are 
being debated in the foreign policy arena are relatively new and unsettled. 
Parties are still in search of their positions, employing diﬀ erent tools – some-
times looking to public opinion, sometimes ﬁ nding inspiration in their older 
twin parties in Western Europe, sometimes following the mainstream of their 
party group in the European Parliament. Th is shows that ‘Europeanisation’ 
will probably be even more important the longer the countries are in the 
European Union; this is a ﬁ nding that suggests a possible development in 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
Also, the stability of the political systems is very diﬀ erent. In some countries, 
such as the Czech Republic, the party system and the cleavages determining 
it clearly converge with the standard partisan divisions evident in Western 
Europe, along with largely stable electorates. In Hungary, the political scene is 
very stable and crystallised; however, it also more diﬃ  cult to classify according 
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to classical left-right cleavages. On the contrary, other countries in the region, 
for instance, Bulgaria or Poland, still show a big degree of voter volatility, 
resulting in the emergence of new parties, the disappearance of others, or an 
appeal to negative voters. In those countries where the partisan systems are 
already more similar to Western Europe, even foreign policy can be assessed 
more easily. Th e premise of the stronger Atlanticism of the right, thus, works 
perfectly in the Czech case and largely in Hungary as well, with an important 
exception of the FIDESZ party. 
Another variable that still plays an important role in the foreign policy 
formulation of the political parties (and is far less apparent than in Western 
Europe) is the visible importance of the nationalist conﬂ ict line. It determines, 
to a large extent, the pro-Americanism of some Polish political parties (such 
as the PiS or the LPR), as it is an antipole to Russia and Germany. Similarly, 
it plays a role in the FIDESZ’s nationalist rhetoric that is distrustful of both 
the USA and the EU, or, in case of Bulgarian extremist parties, due to their 
pro-Russian and anti-Turkish aﬃ  liations. 
Th e research still leaves many questions for further thinking. Although 
the basic hypothesis that the left-wing parties tend to be less pro-American 
than their right wing counterparts is generally valid, it remains to be seen in 
what ways the partisan systems in many of the countries examined evolve 
and shift. One element to bear in mind is that there might be a greater diﬀ er-
entiation of the notion of ‘Atlanticism,’ as today it involves positive attitudes 
towards both the USA and NATO, the two being ultimately linked. Here 
much again depends on developments outside the region. It is possible that, 
for some parties, bilateral relations with the USA will be more important 
after some time, as already illustrated by the policy of the PiS in Poland that 
ruled out participation in NATO as ‘not being the alliance of Polish dreams’ 
and arguing for a separate bilateral security deal with USA. Th e future of 
NATO itself might play a crucial role. It might turn into a much less relevant 
organization, causing traditionally Atlanticist parties to lose interest in it, 
which can further result in looking either towards closer links with USA or 
searching for an alternative in fostering the ESDP. On the other hand, the 
same development could increase an interest in NATO from less Atlanticist 
parties, as they might see the supposedly diminishing interest of USA in the 
Alliance as a chance for strengthening NATO’s European pillar and limiting 
American inﬂ uence therein. 
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Table 1: Parties in the Bulgarian Parliament
Term
Parties represented in the Parliament 
(number of mandates)
Governing party 
or coalition
1990 – 1991¹
(Grand National 
Assembly)
BSP• ² (list 47.2%, 97 seats, SMD 45.6%, 114 seats)
UDF (list 36.2%, 75 seats, SMD 35.9%, 69 seats)• 
BANU (list 8%, 16 seats, SMD 8.2%, 0)• 
MRF (list 6%, 12 seats, SMD 5.4%, 11 seats) • 
Total: 400³
Voters turnout: 90.7% (average in the ﬁ rst round)
BSP⁴
1) In the 1990 elections, a mixed electoral system was used with 200 deputies elected proportionally (d’Hondt formula) and 200 
in single-member districts (SMD); two rounds were held in some constituencies. The 4% threshold was set to qualify for seats. 
Parties formed on an ethnic or religious basis were excluded from the 1990 electoral competition; this action was seen as a move 
to prevent the Turkish minority from organising its party. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), however, succeeded in 
being recognized as the civil rights movement and won the mandates. Of the forty different political associations/parties that 
stood in the elections, only four cleared the 4% threshold. 
2) Since 1991, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (Bălgarska Socialističeska Partija, BSP), formerly the Bulgarian Communist Party, 
contested each election as a part of coalition: with the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union Alexander Stambolijski 1899 (Bălgarski 
Zemedelski Naroden Săjuz Aleksandăr Stambolijski 1899) in 1991; with Political Club Ecoglasnost, the Bulgarian Social Democratic 
Party (Bălgarska Socialdemokratcheska Partija), and the Political Movement Social Democrats (Političesko Dviženie Socialdemokrati) 
in 1994; with the coalition of the Democratic Left in 1997; and with the Coalition for Bulgaria in 2001 (as well as in 2005, see 
bellow). The United Democratic Forces (Obedineni demokratični sili, UDF) was formed as a rather loose grouping in December 
1989 by ten political groups; it split in 1992 (UDF-L and UDF-C). It was formally constituted as a single party in February 1997 (the 
MRF refused to join); the principal UDF members were: Political Club Ecoglasnost in 1990–1991; the Bulgarian Social Democratic 
Party (Bălgarska Socialdemokratcheska Partija), the Democratic Party (Demokratičeska Partija), the People’s Union, the Bulgarian 
Social Democratic Union and the Christian Democratic Movement in 1996–1997. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) 
descended from the leading pre-war agrarian party. After 1990, the party split into several groups, each claiming the name; 
the party has never re-united again. The main group stood in the 1991 elections (BANU-United); in the current Parliament, the 
agrarian party splinters are represented in centre-left Coalition for Bulgaria, as well as in centre-right coalitions UDF and BPU. 
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi, MRF) represents the Turkish minority; the 1997 elections 
were contested in coalition with the Green Party, BANU-Nikola Petkov, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria Confederation; in 2001 these 
groups stood in the elections in alliance with the Liberal Union and Euroroma. 
3) Five seats were won by independent candidates; 1 remaining seat belonged to the Fatherland Party of Labour, which never cleared 
the 4% threshold again. 
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Table 1: Parties in the Bulgarian Parliament
Term
Parties represented in the Parliament 
(number of mandates)
Governing party 
or coalition
1991 – 1994
(National Assembly⁵,
Narodno Subranie)
UDF (34.4%, 110 seats) • 
BSP (33.1%, 106 seats)• 
MRF (7.5%, 24 seats)• 
Total: 240
Voters turnout: 83.9%
UDF - MRF
1994 – 1997
BSP (43.5%, 125 seats)• 
UDF (24.2%, 69 seats • 
MRF (5.4%, 15 seats)• 
People’s Union• ⁶ (6.5%, 18 seats)
Bulgarian Business Block• ⁷ (4.7%, 13 seats)
Total: 240
Voters turnout: 75.2%
BSP
1997⁸–2001
UDF (52.3%, 137 seats) • 
BSP ( 22.1%, 58 seats)• 
MRF (7.6%, 19 seats)• 
Euroleft Coalition• ⁹ (5.5%, 14 seats)
Bulgarian Business Block (4.9%, 12 seats) • 
Total: 240
Voters turnout: 58.9%
UDF¹⁰
2001–2005
NMSII• ¹¹ (42.7%, 120 seats)
UDF (18.2%, 51 seats) • 
BSP (17.1%, 48 seats)• 
MRF (7.5%, 21 seats)• 
Total: 240
Voters turnout: 66.6%
NMSII - MRF¹²
2005–(2009)
BSP (Coalition for Bulgaria• ¹³, 34%, 82 seats)
NMSII (21.8%, 53 seats)• 
MRF• ¹⁴ (14.1%, 34 seats)
ATAKA• ¹⁵ (8.9%, 21 seats)
UDF• ¹⁶ (8.4%, 20 seats)
DSB• ¹⁷ (7.1%, 17 seats)
BPU• ¹⁸ (5.7%, 13 seats)
Total: 240
Voters turnout: 55.7%¹⁹
BSP-NMSII 
(NMSP²⁰) - MRF
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4) Following the 1990 elections, Bulgaria had an (appointed) socialist President (Petar Mladenov), a socialist government (under 
Andrei Lukanov), and a slight socialist majority in the Assembly. The results of the elections produced a political deadlock. The 
BSP was incapable of assuming responsibility for governing the country, while the UDF was not willing to co-operate with the BSP. 
The result was a period of protests and demonstrations ending in a general strike. In addition, the BSP had difficulties obtaining 
the two-thirds majority needed for many legislative decisions and was finally brought down. After the collapse of the socialist 
parliament, a new round of negotiations followed between the BSP and the UDF; it resulted in the creation of a temporary 
government, with deputies from each of the three main parties; its main task was to oversee the drafting and introduction of 
the new constitution (introduced on 13 July 1991). New elections were held in October 1991 (Buschek 2007:12).
5) The National Assembly is a one-chamber parliament that consists of 240 Members of Parliament elected directly every four years 
through a system of proportional representation in 31 districts with 4–14 seats. A party or coalition must achieve a minimum 
of 4% of the vote in order to enter the Assembly.
6) The People’s Union was an alliance joining a splinter from the BANU-NP led by Anastasia Dimitrova Moser (in 2005–2009 within 
the BPU) with the Democratic Party.
7) A nationalist, rather populist party.
8) The BSP government of Zhan Videnov was unsuccessful and the BSP lost the presidential elections by a large margin in November 
1996 when the UDF candidate (Petar Stoyanov) obtained 59.7% of the votes in the second round. PM Videnov resigned in late 
December 1996. At the beginning of 1997, the country entered into a period of unprecedented protests. The BSP agreed to new 
(preliminary) elections that were held in April 1997. 
9) The Euroleft Coalition was a pro-European Union coalition including a splinter from the BSP.
10) The UDF coalition (UDF, the Popular (Peoples’) Union, and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party) won the 1997 elections with 
a considerable majority. In 1997, for the first time since 1989, a non-Communist party won an absolute majority; the UDF formed 
a government under its new leader Ivan Kostov.
11) The National Movement Simon II (Nacionalno Dvizhenie Simeon Vtori, NMSII) had not existed until eleven weeks before the 2001 
elections; the centrist party was founded by the former king of Bulgaria, Simeon II; the 2001 elections were a huge electoral 
success, leaving the party one seat short of an absolute majority.
12) The majority of Bulgarians were disappointed at first that the NMSII had liaised with the MRF instead of the UDF. The analysts 
predicted an unstable coalition with an inexperienced NMSII often cornered by the MRF. 
13) In the 2005 elections, the Coalition for Bulgaria consisted of: the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP (Bălgarska Socialističeska 
Partija), the Party of Bulgarian Social Democrats (Partija Bălgarski Socialdemokrati), the Political Movement Social Democrats 
(Političesko Dviženie Socialdemokrati), the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union Alexander Stambolijski (Bălgarski Zemedelski Naroden 
Săjuz Aleksandăr Stambolijski), the Civil Union of Roma (Graždansko Obedinenie Roma), the Movement for Social Humanism 
(Dviženie za Socialen Humanizăm), the Green Party of Bulgaria (Zelena Partija na Bălgarija), and the Communist Party of Bulgaria 
(Komunističeska Partija na Balgarija).
14) The unexpectedly good result for the MRF was probably caused by the emergence of Coalition Ataka on the political landscape, 
which mobilized MRF voters (Savkova 2005: 10).
15) In the 2005 elections, the coalition of the National Union Attack (Ataka) (Nacionalno Obedinenie Ataka) consisted of the National 
Movement for the Salvation of the Fatherland (Nacionalno Dviženie za Spasenie na Otečestvoto), the Bulgarian National Patriotic 
Party (Bălgarska Nacionalna-Patriotična Partija), and the Union of Patriotic Forces and Militaries of the Reserve Defence (Săjuz 
na Patriotičnite Sili i Voinite ot Zapasa Zaštita). Securing 21 seats in Parliament, the results for Ataka were one of the surprises of 
2005 elections. 
16) In the 2005 elections, the Coalition of United Democratic Forces, UDF (Obedineni demokratični sili) consisted of the Union of 
Democratic Forces (Săjuz na Demokratičnite Sili), the Democratic Party (Demokratičeska Partija), the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s 
Union-United (Bălgarski Zemedelski Naroden Săjuz-Obedinen), the George’s Day Movement (Dviženie Gergiovden), and the 
Movement for an Equal Public Model (Dviženie za ravnopraven model DROM).
17) Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB) split from the UDF in 2003; the party was led by former Prime Minister Ivan Kostov. 
18) In the 2005 elections, the Coalition of the Bulgarian People’s Union, BPU (Bălgarski Naroden Săjuz) consited of the Bulgarian 
Agrarian People’s Union-People’s Union (Bălgarski Zemedelski Naroden Săjuz-Naroden Săjuz), the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization-Bulgarian National Movement (Vătrešna Makedonska Revoljucionna Organizacija-Bălgarsko Nacionalno 
Dviženie), and the Union of Free Democrats (Săjuz na svobodnite demokrati). All three parties had previously been part of the UDF 
or its coalition.
19) It was the lowest turnout since 1989; some argue that the main reason were the pre-election polls, which indicated the BSP 
(Coalition for Bulgaria) to be an unchallengeable leader; these polls had a drop-out effect on voters (Savkova 2005: 7) 
20) In June 2007, the party changed its name to the National Movement for Stability and Progress.
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Table 2: Presidential Election²¹
Election year Candidates in the second round President-elect
1992
Zhelyu Zhelev (UDF, 52.8%)• 
Velko Valkanov (BSP, 47.2%)• 
Zhelyu Zhelev 
1996
Petar Stoyanov (UDF, 59.7 %)• 
Ivan Marazov (BSP, 40.3)• 
Petar Stoyanov
2001
Georgi Parvanov (BSP, 54.1%)• 
Petar Stoyanov (Ind.• ²², 45.9%)
Georgi Parvanov 
2006
Georgi Parvanov (BSP, 76%)• 
Volen Siderov (Ataka, 24%)• 
Georgi Parvanov
Table 3: European Parliament Elections (May 2007)²³
Party²⁴ EP Group Number of mandates
GERB²⁵ EPP–ED 5 (21.68%)
Platform of European Socialists²⁶ PES 5 (21.41%)
MRF ELDR 4 (20.26)
Ataka ITS²⁷ 3 (14.2%)
NMSII 1 (6.27%)
Total: 18
Voters turnout: 28.69%
21) According to the 1991 constitution, the Bulgarian president is elected directly for a five-year term with the right to one re-election. 
If no candidate achieves an absolute majority in the first round, the two leading candidates shall compete in a second ballot. The 
president servers as the head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces; he chairs the Consultative Council for National 
Security. He has no legislative initiative, but possesses the right to initiate a Constitutional amendment. He can return legislation 
for further debate to the parliament; the parliament can override the President’s veto by a majority vote from all MPs.
22) Backed by the UDF and the NMSII
23) The breakdown of Bulgarian observers in the European Parliament by party was as follows: Coalition for Bulgaria (mainly 
BSP) – 6MEPs, NMSII – 4MEPs, MRF – 3MEPs, UDF – 2MEPs, DSB – 1MEP, BPU – 1MEP, Ataka – 1MEP
24) In total, 11 parties, three coalitions, and two independent candidates stood in the first European Parliament elections in Bulgaria.
25) Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) is the new party that was established by the Mayor of Sofia, Boiko 
Borisov, in December 2006, involving many people originally involved in the UDF, the DSB and the BPU; for example, elected 
MEP Nickolay Mladenov was originally a member of the UDF, but ran for GERB in the European Parliament elections; the UDF is 
also willing to cooperate with GERB. 
26) Coalition of the BSP and the Movement for Social Humanism
27) The newly-formed political group (after the Bulgarian and Romanian EP elections) in the European Parliament – Identity, Tradition, 
Sovereignty (ITS) – consisted of 23 members of right-wing and nationalist parties. A common political charter of the group was 
signed in January 2007. After couple of statements from Alessandra Mussolini that Romanian ITS members found insulting, the 
Greater Romania Party withdrew from ITS, disqualifying it as a political group in the EP; it ceased to exist in November 2007. 
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Th e process of transition to democracy after 1989 has been rather slow 
in Bulgaria compared to other Central and Eastern European countries; the 
political change took the form of negotiated reform with most of the com-
munist elites preserving their power either in the domain of politics²⁸ (the 
governing communist party changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP) early in 1990) or business. Th e former regime had not been contested 
by any strong anticommunist movements; the street demonstrations in Soﬁ a 
in November 1989 were led by diﬀ erent groups, which later on formed the 
fragmented Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Th e UDF²⁹ stood against 
the BSP in the ﬁ rst elections. Th e (ideological) bipolarization of the political 
spectrum reached its peak after the 1991 elections, when the UDF formed 
a government with the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF), and determined the political landscape for several of the following 
years. Th e BSP was prone to compromise in order to prevent the UDF from 
radical ‘de-communization’; this ‘de-communization’ was namely understood 
as removing the former representatives of the regime from the state bureauc-
racy (Karasimeonov 2004: 421). After the 1994 elections, the BSP took power, 
preventing more radical parts of the UDF to follow their policy of total ‘de-
communization’ and shifting Bulgarian foreign policy; however, its inability 
to improve the economic situation of the country led to unprecedented street 
protests and pre-term elections in 1997 with the UDF Coalition winning and 
forming a new government.
Th e UDF government achieved some major reforms (social policy, civil 
service), ﬁ nancial stability,³⁰ and, in the foreign policy ﬁ eld, advanced the 
prospect of EU and NATO membership. On the other hand, it was los-
ing public support due to accusations of corruption, new nepotism, and 
favouring its close economic groupings (Karasimeonov 2004: 425). Th e 
elections of 2001 were labelled a radical change (Karasimeonov 2004: 433; 
28) The most visible leader, Todor Zhivkov, the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Central Committee (1954–1989) 
and president of Bulgaria (1971–1989) was arrested in 1990, convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to seven years in prison 
in 1992. However, he was put under house arrest and lived in high comfort. After the Bulgarian Supreme Court acquitted him in 
1996, he was reinstated in 1998 as a member of the BSP. 
29) The UDF consisted of three major groups (Karasimeonov 2004: 419): historical parties led by some of the surviving members and 
leaders of the pre-communist era, Ecoglasnost, the trade union of Podkrepa, and the Club for Glasnost and Democracy – the 
“dissidents“ and newly created parties or organizations (Republican party, Christian democrats). Also, UDF supporters were divided 
into “conservatives” (referring to the pre-communist era) and “modernists” (who pleaded for the Westernization of Bulgarian 
society). 
30) The UDF coalition introduced a very ambitious four-year programme called “Bulgaria 2001.” It was obvious that a real economic 
restructuring could no longer be avoided. One of the first measures was the establishment of a currency board in July 1997, 
linking the exchange rate of the lev to the Deutsche Mark (from 1999 to the euro). Thereafter, the economy began to stabilise 
and inflation dropped. 
 The Case Studies: Bulgaria – Věra Řiháčková
Buschek 2007: 11) in the Bulgarian party system. Indeed, the rise of the 
National Movement Simeon II (NMSII), which was established roughly 
three month before the elections, represents the end of bipolarity in the 
political spectrum of Bulgaria and a challenge to the UDF monopoly of 
representing a democratic alternative. Despite its ambitious programme, 
the NMSII-led coalition was not able to deliver results (namely, economic 
ones). Already, the presidential elections of November 2001 revealed a drop 
in support for the NMSII; BSP leader Georgi Parvanov defeated Petar Stoy-
anov, the candidate favoured by PM Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and the 
UDF, gaining 53 of the vote. In the foreign policy ﬁ eld, it was announced 
at the December 2002 EU summit in Copenhagen that both Bulgaria and 
Romania could expect EU accession in 2007 and, in November 2002 at the 
NATO summit in Prague, Bulgaria was one of seven countries invited to 
join the Alliance. Th e ‘nature of the regime’ cleavage has been fading away 
since the 2001 elections, giving way to new socio-economic cleavage. After 
the 2005 general elections, a new three-party centre-left coalition govern-
ment under BSP leader Sergey Stanischev was established; an agreement 
between the Coalition of Bulgaria, the NMSII, and the MRF was signed 
on 16 August 2005. Th e 2005 general elections, with the lowest turnout 
since 1990, brought a couple of surprising results; the current Assembly is 
comprised of seven parties and coalitions, which is the most fragmented 
conﬁ guration since the beginning of the transition period (Savkova 2005: 
1); the number of votes for the MRF almost doubled, probably due to the 
mobilization of its voters by Ataka pre-election polls’ results; the establish-
ment of Ataka as the fourth major party in the National Assembly could 
be surprising but, in fact, had been expected by some analysts for some 
time (Karasimeonov 2004: 438). In the following presidential elections of 
October 2006, incumbent President Georgi Parvanov ran against Ataka 
leader Volen Siderov in the second round and was re-elected.
Th e European Parliament elections that were held in May 2007 proved 
that the traditional right was in crisis; its poor result was also caused by 
low voter turnout, especially in Soﬁ a; the UDF (4.74) and the DSB (4.35) 
failed to make the 5.66 threshold necessary to win even a single seat in 
the European Parliament. Due to the results, Ivan Kostov, leader of the 
DSB and Petar Stoyanov, leader of the UDF, announced their resignations. 
GERB, the newly established centre-right party, won the elections by 
a small margin, appealing to the electorate from both the traditional right, 
NMSII, and the BSP.³¹
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Left and Right
Generally, the political spectrum in Bulgaria, especially after the year 2000, 
has been characterized by high levels of fragmentation and volatility from 
the electorate, allowing for new parties to emerge and score in the general 
(as well as local and European) elections, creating an unconsolidated party 
system. Th e experts (Karasimeonov 2004: 439; author’s interviews) usually 
explain the trend of new rising political entities by the unﬁ nished transition, 
as well as economic and social problems and challenges that were not met 
by the established ruling parties. Th e society has not adapted to the new 
realities (socio-economic conﬂ ict lines), with a signiﬁ cant group of ‘losers’ in 
the transformation process (Karasimeonov 2004: 439) inﬂ uencing the elec-
tions’ results unpredictably over the long run.³² A relatively high number of 
political parties in Bulgaria could be also supported by a tradition of forming 
election coalitions that are usually comprised of more than three political 
subjects, whereas mergers of political parties occurring rather seldom.
Until the 2001 elections, the ‘nature of the regime’ cleavage and the ‘nature 
of transformation’ conﬂ ict lines were deﬁ ning the left-right division; the party 
system was bipolar with smaller parties clustering around the BSP on the 
left and the UDF on the right; the MRF was an exception due to its speciﬁ c 
31) In the last municipal elections (November 2007), the BSP gained the best positions in the local government, while GERB formed 
the largest electoral base; the electoral attitudes after the local elections still favour GERB; it has a distinctly larger support 
than the BSP (18%) reaching 26% support if the parliamentary elections were held by the end of 2007 (Petrova 2007). On 
the other hand, the GERB electorate is extremely heterogeneous. Voters from diverse socio-economic status declare their 
readiness to vote for it. According to Alpha Research, one third of the current GERB electorate voted previously for regional 
and/or business formations, 25% for UDF or DSB, and a fifth for NMSII. The BSP electorate seem to be more stable; the party 
generates support mainly in smaller towns and among the more traditional groups of supporters, i.e. the older generations, 
retirees, and people with a lower socio-economic status. However, these groups are the most vulnerable to unfavourable 
economic trends and are the main source for discontent towards the social policies of the current BSP-led government. That is 
also why the level of support for BSP dropped to 18%. The last local elections did not change the trend of the erosion of the 
‘traditional’ right; the representation of the UDF and the DSB in local government is very limited both in terms of the number 
of seats and municipalities in which they managed to gain seats. Currently, their electoral potential on the national scale does 
not exceed the minimum of 1.9% of the total number of voters for the UDF and 1.6% for the DSB. Also, the NMSII experienced 
a strong electoral decay in the local elections. The public opinion polls show that the NMSII reached only 1.9% support, with 
the electoral base formed predominantly by old people from the big cities. Its success on many occasions stemmed from the 
fact that it stood in the elections in collations. Ataka ended the local election winning about 5% of the seats, but the party 
focused only on approximately one third of the municipalities. The MRF expanded its number of seats with about 30%, as well 
as the share of municipalities in which it is represented. On a national scale, there is neither an increase of the public support, 
nor the enlargement of its electoral base. The party support moves around 7%. 
32) Those who do not benefit from the transition (the ‘losers’ of transformation) tend to support protest parties and populist move-
ments in the longer run; the success of the NMSII or GERB demonstrates that the established post-communist parties were not 
able to respond to the demands of this (mixed) social group; according to Karasimeonov (Karasimeonov 2004: 437), as much as 
40% of the population can be characterized as transformation ‘losers’. 
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agenda. With the 2001 elections and the emergence of the centrist NMSII, 
the socio-economic conﬂ ict line started gaining more ground.³³
Th e left part of the political spectrum seemed to be more stable; the BSP 
has been turning into a catchall party. A visible trend towards modernisation 
also started roughly in 2002 with the election of Sergey Stanishev, a pragmatist 
stating that there was a need to adopt the party to new circumstances, as the 
party leader. Th e BSP has been dominating the centre-left election coalition 
(the Coalition for Strong Bulgaria), as well as the current ruling coalition.³⁴ Th e 
major post-1989 party on the right, the UDF, experienced a serious internal 
crisis after the 2001 elections and a split of both its elites and its electorate 
(with the splinter DSB continuing to follow the anti-communist rhetoric in the 
current Assembly).³⁵ Th ree important and completely new entities emerged 
over the course of 2001–2007 in the centre and far right which challenged the 
established parties successfully in the elections to the General Assembly as well 
as to the European Parliament: the National Movement Simeon II, Coalition 
Ataka, and the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB).
When coming into power, the NMSII was not a full-ﬂ edged party, miss-
ing a territorial organisation, an internal organizational structure, and the 
processes of legitimately empowering its members.³⁶ Also, the ideological 
identity of the (then) new party was not clear enough – it declared to be 
centre-right and liberal; although the election programme contained many 
liberal elements, it tasted of populism (lowering taxes and presenting a 0 
budget deﬁ cit at once). Th e movement experienced a split before the 2005 
elections; the New Time party, scoring 5.5 in the pre-2005 elections polls, 
was organized around a part of the NMSII leadership, which was not satisﬁ ed 
with Simeon’s authoritarian style of management. New Time, at the end, did 
not cross the 4 threshold in the 2005 elections. In June 2007, the NMSII 
changed its name to the National Movement for Stability and Progress 
(NMSP). In fall 2007, another group split oﬀ  from the party after an inter-
nal dissent over its liberal roots, forming the faction of the Bulgarian New 
Democracy (BND), involving 14 MPs (amounting later to 17) who joined the 
opposition bench in the Assembly. Th e faction has not decided yet whether 
33) According to Karasimeonov, the 2001 elections began ‘the second party system’ with newly defined conflict lines (Karasimeonov 
2004: 440). 
34) President Georgi Parvanov (BSP) is following rather cautious policies; at a certain time, there was a rumour that he planned to 
establish a new centre-left party. However, he denied such intentions. In fact, there is a certain understanding between President 
Parvanov and PM Stanishev on promoting the ‘new labour’ concept. 
35) In the last local/municipal elections, the UDF and the DSB formed a coalition. 
36) NMSII also stated before the 2001 elections that they would never form a coalition with the BSP, and they did.
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it will turn into another party, join the Citizens for European development of 
Bulgaria (GERB), or ally with the UDF.
Some analysts (Savkova 2005: 8) claim that the electoral results for the (far 
right) coalition of Ataka represented a punitive vote against the established 
political class and assumed it would not qualify for the Assembly in the next 
general elections. Meanwhile, in the European parliament elections, Ataka was 
successful, taking 3 seats out of 18. With Ataka, it seems that a new sub-cleavage 
of the socio-economic conﬂ ict line is emerging, which has much to do with 
globalization and fears of increased challenges to Bulgarian society, bringing 
about a new type of (primarily economically motivated) nationalism, coloured 
by anti-European and anti-globalisation sentiments (Karasimeonov 2004: 436). 
Ataka is a coalition of diﬀ erent subjects that emphasise diﬀ erent elements of the 
far right agenda; its unifying mechanism is its leader, Volen Siderov.
Citizens for European development of Bulgaria (GERB) was established 
in December 2006 by Boiko Borisov, a former interior minister (2001) who 
was elected Mayor of Soﬁ a in October/November 2005 and re-elected in 
local elections in 2008, securing 52.6 of the vote.³⁷ GERB describes itself as 
a centre-right party with its main agenda in the social sphere to ﬁ ght against 
organised crime, a measure that resonates well with the electorate. Some 
argue (from the author’s interviews) that it tends to be a ‘one-man party’ 
building on Mr. Borisov’s personal popularity with a missing structure and 
voting programme, playing on the note of populism. Several analysts also 
predict the GERB will experience a similar development trajectory to the 
NMSII, following its fate of not living up to the expectations of its voters. 
However, the European Parliament elections and 2008 local elections proved 
its growing popularity; the ability to deliver functioning policies; the extent 
of party consolidation will be tested in the coming months with the general 
elections in 2009 as the major test.
Positioning of the Bulgarian Political Parties on the Right – Left Axis
BSP MRF NMSII GERB UDF BPU DSB Ataka
  (NMSP)
left right
37) GERB was allegedly founded with the support of several strong banks; the formal leader of the party is Mr. Tzvetan Tzvetanov. 
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With the consolidation of democracy, the Bulgarian party system has 
become more pluralized³⁸ and less polarized; the continuing fragmentation, 
especially of the centre-right part of the political spectrum would suggest that 
the stable parties’ identities, as well as their ability and capacity to continu-
ously appeal to the voters and solve the new challenges deﬁ ned by socio-
economic cleavage, have not developed fully as of yet.³⁹ In this regard, the 
process of the Europeanization of the political parties will play a certain role 
as well. According to the experts, a diﬀ erentiation on the basis of economic 
platforms will continue with further stratiﬁ cation of Bulgarian society with 
the left-centre-right dimension gradually gaining entrance into the European 
dimension. Th e BSP will probably need to seek legitimacy on a social policy 
basis;⁴⁰ the parties in the centre (namely, the NMSII) will be aiming at keep-
ing their balancing role and high coalition potential, although most likely 
with a considerably shrunken electorate (with the exception of the MRF) with 
the right needing to be re-established; the traditional parties are on the way 
out of the party system; the question remains of who will replace them (with 
GERB being a potential candidate to assume such a role).⁴¹
The ‘National Consensus’ and the 
Relevance of Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy issues had determined the political alignments and orienta-
tion of the political parties after 1989 and throughout the 1990s in Bulgaria; 
the diﬀ erence between the major political subjects (BSP and UDF) was 
embodied by the pro-European and integrationist tendency of the UDF and 
the pro-Russian tendency of the BSP that was most clearly mirrored in the 
debate on NATO membership. Put diﬀ erently, in Bulgaria’s case, foreign 
policy was linked to the overall political agenda of the political forces; look-
ing at the dominant political strategies of the right and left in Bulgaria up to 
mid 1990’s, to have a foreign policy position meant being able to implement 
38) Some analysts argue that all other parties but the BSP have not been influential players until recently, partly due to the lack of 
support from the influential economic groupings, which all shifted from the right to the left (the BSP attracted all resources); 
speaking about party pluralism is not accurate since most of the policy divides can be found within the BSP itself. 
39) A reform of electoral system is also being debated by the major political parties in the Assembly.
40) Despite the good results from the BSP and the MRF in the local elections, the evaluation of the government continues to be 
strongly negative (69%) with the most heavily criticized areas being social policies, healthcare, and interior affairs; one of the 
major issues in 2007 was the strike of teachers who demanded a pay rise (Petrova 2007)
41) It is not clear at the moment how long it will take the right to recover and whether the GERB will become the new political agent; 
some experts warn that the whole right could get more radicalized. It seems that the DSB has more stable electorate than the 
UDF, although by a very small margin. The party is trying to open up and attract new elites. 
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a wider political strategy. Foreign policy issues (and a pressure to comply) 
also determined the domestic political strategies of the political parties in the 
pre-accession periods. After the NATO campaign in Kosovo (an important 
moment for Bulgarian foreign policy-making), a foreign policy consensus was 
reached only in 2001–2002 when conﬂ icts over the geopolitical orientation of 
the country had gradually lost their signiﬁ cance, with the BSP acknowledging 
the necessity to join the Alliance. Th e prevailing opinion of the experts is that 
the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ foreign policy consensus is still in place and that there is 
no division on EU vs. Atlanticist policies at the moment. However, most of 
them also acknowledge that the political spectrum will be inﬂ uenced by the 
process of Europeanization and that the political parties will have to start 
adopting distinct positions based on diﬀ erent foreign policy issues, keeping 
the line of the political groups in the European Parliament more often.
After 1989, Bulgaria was rather hesitant to create a new alternative security 
policy and doctrine.⁴² At ﬁ rst, it strived to boost its military power, improve 
relations with its neighbours (especially Turkey and Greece), and establish 
new relations with the (then) Soviet Union. Although the government 
acknowledged the key role of NATO, it did not assume that Bulgaria could 
aspire for membership (Tashev 2004: 129). Bulgaria’s prime aim was to pre-
vent any further destabilization in the region, as well as its own involvement 
in the ongoing conﬂ icts in the Balkans.⁴³
Bulgaria (through the UDF government) was the ﬁ rst state to recognize 
Macedonia (FYROM) in 1991. However, their bilateral relations have 
always been strained by historical perceptions and narratives.⁴⁴ Despite the 
so-called language dispute resolution in 1999, the historical, linguistic, and 
cultural battle has aimed at the reaﬃ  rmation of one’s history and identity at 
42) Bulgaria at that time was against the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (BSP); the security perception in the country was also 
influenced by the start of Yugoslavia disintegration, which brought about unfamiliar threats and risks, also impacting its policy 
towards minorities. 
43) According to Tashev (Tashev 2004: 128), it is also an explanation for Bulgaria for being the last EU associated member to send 
troops into various peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. 
44) Bulgaria only recognized the Macedonian state in 1991, not the nation or its language. For Bulgarians (as well as some other 
nationalities in the region – Greece, for example, insists that Macedonians are in fact Slavophone Greeks; the Serbs also suggested 
that Macedonia is a part of southern Serbia and that, thus, Macedonians are of Serbian origin), Macedonia is rather a geographical 
term and the Macedonians are the ‘lost Bulgarians.’ As President Parvanov stated, “We have always supported Macedonia in its 
efforts to secure peace and stability. However, when it comes to history, and we have a common history, I think there is a line to 
be drawn beyond which our own history cannot be stolen by anyone else. However, I would say that these issues are best left to 
historians. We should put our efforts together and look ahead towards the future. Let us collaborate in that direction. Bulgaria 
is making progress already and hopefully the future Macedonia will also join the European Union. This will be the best solution 
to the issues which have accumulated over the past decades, and which may still be outstanding.” (Euro news 2006) 
 The Case Studies: Bulgaria – Věra Řiháčková
the expense of the other’s.⁴⁵ To counter the separatist aspirations from the 
diﬀ erent groups of the Macedonian minority,⁴⁶ the Bulgarian policy of deny-
ing of the existence of a distinct Macedonian minority on its territory was 
carried out. Legal steps against unwanted Macedonian entities in Bulgaria 
were taken on the basis that their activities pose a threat to national security. 
Eventually, Bulgaria was even brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights, which ruled against Bulgaria in 2003, forcing her to acknowledge 
the Macedonian minority (Kojouharov 2004: 286); the ruling was a blow to 
the Bulgarian policy of not allowing the Macedonian subjects to act, tacitly 
or openly supported by all political parties. Th e ambiguity of the relations 
with Macedonia translates into the policy of supporting Macedonian EU 
aspirations. In 2006, Bulgarian foreign minister Ivaylo Kalﬁ n (nominated 
by the BSP, non-partisan) stated that his country would not uncondition-
ally support the EU integration of Macedonia. Other politicians, including 
President Georgi Parvanov, have issued more cautious statements. Except for 
the Ataka representatives, none has played the EU membership denial card 
towards Macedonia openly as of yet.
Despite her moderate eﬀ orts to seek security guarantees in the West, 
Bulgaria tried to re-establish the security links with Russia, unlike other 
CEE countries.⁴⁷ Th e former ruler of the Soviet block was not considered 
a threat, namely security-wise (Tashev 2004: 130). Russia is an enigmatic 
issue of Bulgarian foreign policy, as well as of the party politics in the country; 
there has been also a crucial variable of almost 100 dependence on the 
import of oil from Russia, as well as very close business links.⁴⁸ During the 
Cold War, Bulgaria was considered the closest ally of Soviet Union, having 
no Russian troops on its territory.⁴⁹ From a historical perspective, which is 
formative for societal attitudes as well, Russia was perceived as a country 
that restored the Bulgarian nation and state after the wars with the Ottoman 
Empire (Tashev 2004: 130). In contrast to other CEE countries, Russia has 
45) Bulgaria recognized the Macedonian language in return for Macedonia’s affirmation that it would not interfere in Bulgaria’s 
domestic affairs (Kojouharov 2004: 282). The official ethnic composition of the Bulgarian population (last population census 
from March 2001) is as follows: 83.9% Bulgarians, 9.4% ethnic Turks, 4.8% the Roma ethnic groups, 0.9% others – including 
the remaining ethnicities, 1.0% have not stated their self-identification (Buschek 2007: 5).
46) Especially OMO-Ilinden, prohibited in February 2000.
47) Bulgaria signed an enhanced Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Relations with Russia during the visit of Boris Yeltsin 
in Sofia in August 1992.
48) Some analysts see a trend of Russia abandoning a direct opposition to Bulgaria’s move towards Euro-Atlantic structures and 
replacing it by establishing powerful business lobbies, penetrating the economy of the country (Tashev 2004: 142). 
49) However, the country has had Russian missiles on its territory in the past. However, the last SS-20 missiles were destructed during 
the summer of 2002. 
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been seen rather positively by the public; the policy moves of the current 
Russian representation meet only very limited interest in the public (like the 
energy crisis in Ukraine and Russian ‘pipeline’ diplomacy). It is also rather 
rare for the political right to play the anti-Russian card openly in the public 
political discourse. Some experts warn that the pro-Western and pro-Russian 
cleavage (namely within the BSP) plays a role⁵⁰ when dealing with energy 
security-related issues, with the clash to be rather over economic interests. 
Bulgaria is involved in EU eﬀ orts to diversify the oil and gas import routes; 
there is Nabucco gas pipeline project aimed at importing gas from the Cas-
pian Sea region (and by-passing Russia), to which Bulgaria has been assigned. 
Besides the Nabucco deal, which is still just on paper, Bulgaria is involved in 
two pipeline projects in the region: the Bourgas-Vlore pipeline deal (signed 
in January 2007) and the Russia-backed Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline – 
an agreement with Russia and Turkey has already been signed⁵¹ and the 
300 km long pipeline should be built by the end of 2009.⁵² Th e Bulgarian 
political right (UDF, DSB) has expressed concerns over the deal, stating that 
the Burgas-Alexandorpoulos pipeline will only increase the dependency on 
Russia. Th e parties on the right are explicitly in favour of a European com-
mon energy policy that would also give Bulgaria more power to negotiate 
new deals on oil and gas imports from Russia; the current agreement with 
Gazprom expires in 2010. Th e BSP-led government that signed the agreement 
on the Burgas-Alexandorpoulos pipeline is generally against such a move or 
any reliance on the EU common policy despite supporting publicly the com-
mon energy policy (president Parvanov); the BSP wants to re-negotiate the 
deal with Russia soon. Generally, the left (BSP) sees Bulgaria as the energy 
regional centre for the Balkans and a transit hub for the gas and oil imports 
50) According to experts, within the BSP, the issue is much reduced to business but the party’s elite, which has been the previous 
communist elite of the country, have institutional and personal contacts with Russia and some of them went to the business, so 
it is much easier for the BSP to maintain this legacy than for other parties; but other parties (NMSII), have particular business 
affinities with Russia as well. 
51) A history of the Project dates back to the mid 1990s. A joint protocol for preparing the pipeline construction was signed by the 
three countries in January 2005 with a political memorandum following in April 2005. The final intergovernmental agreement 
was signed in March 2007 in Athens. 
52) In 2006, the EU recommended that Bulgaria diversify her energy sources. A report entitled ‘The EU’s Energy Security Policy in the 
Black Sea Region’ envisaged the creation of new infrastructure and transport corridors that would help diversify suppliers and 
delivery routes for fuel arriving via the Caspian and the Black Sea. The document discussed important EU projects such as the 
Nabucco gas pipeline, which would skirt Russia, transporting Caspian oil via Turkey and Bulgaria. All three projects, at differing 
stages of development, are competing to attract large investors eager to solve congestion problems in the Bosphorus. The 
Bulgarian politicians (but also other politicians in the region, including in Hungary, for example) claim all projects (including 
the Constanta-Trieste pipeline) are viable and deny that there is competition between them. Experts say that at least one of the 
two projects crossing Bulgaria seems to be doomed.
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(like other countries in the region that see themselves similarly, namely Hun-
gary); it also claims that the issue of energy security and resources cannot be 
resolved without Russia. Another factor in the energy security debate is the 
issue of nuclear energy; on the basis of the EU Accession Agreement, Bulgaria 
is obliged to close down two blocks of the Kozloduj nuclear power plant due 
to the unsatisfactory state of its installation – a move opposed by the public 
and some political parties (Ataka). Th e idea to commission the building of 
a new facility gained ground, welcomed by all political parties including the 
right (UDF, DSB), which argued that a new plant would decrease the coun-
try’s dependence on crude imports. Th e BSP-led government signed a deal 
with Russia to build a second nuclear power plant in Bulgaria, in Belene, with 
100 of the nuclear fuel and 75 of the spare parts and equipment imported 
from Russia (Gazprom).
Th e emerging civil society and the political parties on the right were 
very active in promoting Atlanticist policy; the Atlantic club, a pro-NATO 
lobbying NGO, had already formed in 1990 around Solomon Passy, a UDF 
Member of the Grand National Assembly. In 1993, the UDF government 
started to seek NATO membership. When the BSP came into power⁵³ in 
1994, the discussion became very politicized; the BSP refused to follow the 
membership-seeking policy, causing relations with the Alliance to be put 
on hold. In July 1995, the BSP-led government approved a National Security 
Concept that identiﬁ es international and domestic factors of determining 
national security (Tashev 2004: 131), focusing on the traditional (mostly 
regional), hard security threats (territorial demands⁵⁴, civil wars, asymmetry 
in international security guarantees, and military power of the neighbouring 
states). A commitment to seeking NATO membership was not mentioned as 
a priority in the document; it stated that only if the Alliance was transformed 
(involving Russia, a position NATO from Vancouver to Vladivostok), Bulgaria 
could seek membership. Th e UDF, in parallel, promoted the need to join 
NATO (and the EU) as a primary goal, consistent with Bulgaria’s quest for 
both economic and security guarantees. In 1996, the BSP-led government 
concluded that Bulgaria did not want to pursue NATO membership.
With the Kostov government (UDF, 1997), the Bulgarian foreign policy 
position changed by 180 degrees; in April 1998, a new National Security Con-
53) In 1993, the parliament with the UDF-MRF majority passed a declaration on the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the country; 
the Partnership for Peace Framework Document was signed in February 1994 before the BSP took power. 
54) Although not declared by any country in the region; the BSP government and part of society somehow assumed them 
(Tashev 2004: 131).
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cept was approved,⁵⁵ reﬂ ecting a policy U-turn. Th e document recognizes 
the inability of the country to ensure its security on its own, also identify-
ing, besides hard security threats, economical and environmental factors 
as potential threats to its stability (Tashev 2004: 132). It concluded that the 
limited national resources, globalization and a need for multilateral solutions 
prompted the country to pursue integration to the EU and NATO. Th e BSP 
strongly opposed NATO membership, at least until 2000, but was not able 
to develop a security alternative while in opposition.
Th e 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo was a decisive factor in Bulgarian 
foreign policy; the government’s cooperation with NATO forces, namely 
the permission to use Bulgarian air space – a favour denied to Russia by the 
Bulgarian leadership, enhanced Bulgaria’s standing within the international 
debate on her NATO membership signiﬁ cantly. With the end of air strikes, 
the cooperation with NATO did not end; Bulgaria was involved in the main-
tenance of multinational forces in post-war Kosovo and the following conﬂ ict 
in Macedonia; Bulgaria also received further security guarantees (Tashev 
2004: 134). In March 2001, the government concurred to sign an agreement 
allowing NATO forces to use Bulgarian territory and to establish a military 
base in case of another crisis in the region (Tashev 2004: 134). Surprisingly, 
the BSP did not oppose the agreement in the Assembly, although during the 
Kosovo crisis the BSP position was aggressively anti-NATO; Georgi Parvanov 
(then, the BSP leader) wrote supporting letters to Slobodan Milosevic during 
the strikes.⁵⁶
Th e BSP position on NATO membership was changing gradually.⁵⁷ 
According to the experts, Georgi Parvanov was not the type of strong leader 
who could impose his decisions on changing the course of foreign policy 
upon the party. He had to strive for a balance between the diﬀ erent BSP 
fractions and mediate between groups that were not so much ideologically, 
but rather, economically divided. Th e pro-Western lobby in the BSP, pro-
moting primarily the EU accession, acknowledged that Bulgaria could be an 
asset for the EU⁵⁸ only as a NATO member. Th ey adopted an instrumental 
55) The application for NATO membership was already tabled by the interim government of Stefan Sofyianski in 1997. 
56) Also, the Bulgarian public felt strongly about anti-strikes (see below). The UDF was the only party promoting the NATO policy 
in Kosovo. 
57) Some analysts claim that it was also happening due to the influence of the German SPD (besides the decisive tendency towards 
modernizing and legitimizing the party on the new basis from within). 
58) On the contrary to NATO, the BSP was always favourable towards EU membership; to a large extent, it was very important for the 
BSP-led government to maintain a certain speed of the process of integration into the EU since it was one of the preconditions 
of their ability to manage the transition process.
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approach to NATO membership;⁵⁹ the party also wanted to attain a new 
face before the 2001 elections. Although the BSP shifted its position towards 
NATO membership, it remained the only party in the Assembly demanding 
a referendum on NATO accession. When Bulgaria got the oﬃ  cial invitation 
to join the Alliance at the Prague summit in November 2002, the BSP even 
dropped the referendum condition. Bulgaria joined NATO in April 2004; all 
Bulgarian political parties (except Ataka) assert that the inﬂ uence of Euro-
pean countries in NATO is important, especially following the accession of 
the CEE countries.
Th e NMSII-led government continued in the foreign policy line of the 
previous government with a consistent commitment to the EU and NATO 
membership. Th e 9/11 Terrorist Attacks did not bring about any immedi-
ate change in re-deﬁ ning the ﬁ eld of security threats in Bulgaria; strategic 
security thinking and risks assessment changes only took place in 2004;⁶⁰ 
on the other hand, the changing posture of the USA after 9/11 had a positive 
impact on Bulgarian NATO aspirations (Tashev 2004: 136). Th e coalition 
government continued implementing the army reforms that had already been 
started by the previous UDF-led government – not only was the structure 
of the military budget changed, but the policy was deﬁ ned on the basis of 
detailed threat assessment; however, some experts claim that the reform 
went only half way through and that there was no real pressure to reform.⁶¹ 
Later, Bulgaria sent a unit to participate in the UN mission in Afghanistan; 
the engagement in Afghanistan was a matter of consensus from all relevant 
political parties at that time.
During the Iraq crisis, Bulgaria was in a peculiar position, holding a non-
permanent post in the UN Security Council (2002–2003). As such, it was 
59) Some analysts claim that the change was partly caused by the shifts in the party’s financing structure, with the pro-Western 
fraction gradually taking over a larger portion of the funding – “the financial revolution caused the BSP foreign policy shift; 
it was not an ideological battle but rather vested interests,” which would partly explain why the official debate on the policy 
change was so short and uncontroversial. Among the other variables that possibly influenced the policy change are: BSP doubts 
about the electoral stability, the outcome of the 2001 elections (the party further lost support), the demography of the voters 
(not favourable), and the international isolation of the party. For the sake of appeasing the pro-Russian fraction of the party, the 
BSP leaders allegedly consulted the policy shift with Moscow (with the same happening in case of engagement in Afghanistan 
and Iraq). Part of the BSP electorate could never accept NATO membership, some claiming that it is also the reason why Ataka 
emerged (besides the fact that its electorate also couldn’t bear with the market economy). 
60) The new government did not change the National Security Concept; the cyclical strategic National Defence Review was initiated. 
Only in March 2004 did the national Assembly approve the Political Framework of National Defence Review that identified new 
security risks and threats (terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of WMD, etc.) (Tashev 2004: 137). 
61) For example, there was no special budget allocation for missions abroad. Simeon entoured himself mostly with people who 
stayed in touch with him when abroad; as a result, his HR policy was often questioned. At the same time, Solomon Passy a strong 
Atlanticist, but also a pro-Russian energy minister, was overseeing his government; on the other hand, he put limits on the amount 
of pro–Russian influence on his party.
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forced to state openly its pro-American position, which complicated its 
relationships with some European countries. Th e French leadership espe-
cially was openly critical towards Bulgaria, with President Jacques Chirac 
warning the Bulgarian government that the country was endangering its 
prospect of EU membership in February 2003 (Tashev 2004: 138). Although 
the Bulgarian political parties were uniﬁ ed on not giving in to the French 
discourse, a political consensus on the Iraq issue was not present. During the 
vote on the participation in the operation in Iraq (with Bulgaria providing 
the over-ﬂ ights rights, bases, and non-combatant troops) in the Assembly 
on February 7, 2003, the BSP MPs abstained from voting. Th e government 
(NMSII-MRF), backed by the UDF, stated that Bulgaria was part of the coali-
tion of the willing; meanwhile, President Parvanov, backed by BSP, insisted 
that the parliament’s decision of February 7 on Bulgaria’s participation did 
not make it part of the coalition of the willing. Like in other CEE countries, 
the Iraq crisis revealed the heterogeneous positions within the declared for-
eign policy consensus among the political parties (Tashev 2004: 139).⁶² Th e 
BSP, like other social democratic parties in the region, called for a speciﬁ c UN 
mandate for the operations in Iraq. Despite the public opinion of opposition 
to the war in Iraq, the BSP did not score many political points over its posi-
tion; participation in the BSP-called anti-war demonstrations in Soﬁ a did not 
appeal to the citizens as much as expected (Tashev 2004: 139). Overall, the 
Iraq issue did not change much in the political discourse in the country; the 
media have been following the Bulgarian involvement, the personal stories, 
and, naturally, the casualties. Bulgaria sent 500 troops to support the opera-
tions, staged in Karbala, and, quite often, engaged in ﬁ ghting. Th e number 
of casualties reached 13 by the end of 2007, with one soldier killed in friendly 
ﬁ re in February 2005, a story much publicized in the Bulgarian media. In 
response, the debate on the Bulgarian involvement in Iraq was re-heated with 
60 of Bulgarians supporting the troops withdrawal, demanding an oﬃ  cial 
United States apology for the incident. President Parvanov stated that he 
would see the end of 2005 as the horizon for withdrawal (with the number of 
troops being gradually downsized to 100–150) and demanded a new concept 
of the mission to be adopted by the Assembly. All political parties but Ataka 
agree that the diﬃ  culties encountered on the ground in Iraq are not likely to 
lead to a policy change towards the United States in Bulgaria.
62) President Parvanov opposed the official position of the Bulgarian government; before the beginning of the combat operations, 
he even made a speech in the Assembly, stating that he was not accepting the war (Tashev 2004: 139). 
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Th e BSP gradually changed the country’s position towards Bulgarian 
engagement in Iraq. Although, in terms of conviction, the party policy has 
not changed (the stance has been negative), the BSP (when it came into 
power in 2005) had to adjust its political position to the real situation, the 
power balance, and, later, to the real US presence in the country (the bases); 
no Bulgarian government could be openly critical towards the issue due to 
country’s commitments. Th e BSP-led government chose another strategy; on 
February 22, 2005, a new decision was adopted by the Assembly on Bulgarian 
participation in Iraq, following UN Security Council Resolution 1637, extend-
ing the mandate for Iraq multinational forces until the end of 2006; redeﬁ n-
ing the mission as humanitarian, the new task was to guard a refugee camp 
in Ashraf. A new concept of the mission and the review of the framework 
regulating missions abroad was agreed to by the Assembly as asked for by 
the President after the BSP had become the ruling party. Th e new PM, Sergey 
Stanishev, supported the President’s thesis that the level of engagement in 
the future must be adequate to Bulgaria’s capacities. Th e public debate on 
troop withdrawal is still under way; the last decision against the complete 
withdrawal was taken in May 2007. Although the BSP took several steps 
towards weakening the Bulgarian presence in Iraq, its position is again rather 
ambiguous. Other political parties, present in the Assembly during the time 
of crisis and from that time on, have been generally supportive towards US 
policies and the Bulgarian military engagement in Iraq, with the exception 
of the NMSII, whose representatives, later in the debate, spoke on the behalf 
of the BSP (which was, according to experts, rather reluctant to debate its 
position on the issue of the troops withdrawal). 
As a country adjacent to volatile regions, Simeon’s government lobbied for 
and concluded a bilateral agreement with the USA to host the US military 
bases on its territory in order to enhance its ties with the US; the sugges-
tions to host the US military on Bulgarian soil were allegedly heard in 2003. 
Th e ‘Defence Cooperation Agreement’⁶³ was signed by Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice and Bulgarian foreign minister Ivaylo Kalﬁ n (BSP) during 
an informal gathering of NATO foreign ministers in Soﬁ a on April 24, 2006. 
Th e 10-year agreement allows for the stationing of 2,500 troops at Bezmer 
Air base (considered to be of the highest strategic importance), the Novo Selo 
63) A similar agreement was concluded with Romania with military units stationed to both countries create the Joint Task Force East. 
The issue of US military bases was another element of the Bulgarian-Romanian rivalry puzzle. In January 2006, the mayor of 
a village close to Novo Selo, Emil Enchev, told the Bulgarian newspaper Standart that “the Government should hurry up with the 
negotiations. I think we are very slow and the Romanians have already taken the lead.” He said that an opinion poll he conducted 
in the village showed that over 70% of its people wanted a US military base (Slavcheva 2006).
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army training range, and the Graf Ignatievo Airport (to be used for logistical 
support). Th e bases serve as a point of quick deployment, as well as training 
facilities, for conﬂ ict zones of a military, peacekeeping, or humanitarian 
nature in the Balkans, Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea; the bases 
are used jointly with Bulgarian military personnel. After several supporting 
statements,⁶⁴ the BSP-led government managed to twist the discussion on 
the US bases in the country and re-focus it on the economic beneﬁ ts the 
bases would bring.⁶⁵ Only Ataka, which started a campaign against the 
bases, pointed out the security issues and the increase of the risk of Bulgaria 
becoming a target of a terrorist operation as an argument in the public debate. 
Several Ataka MPs proposed an anti-US force deployment bill⁶⁶ in February 
2006; the bill itself was rejected almost unanimously (with only 18 MPs voting 
for it); when unsuccessful, Ataka demanded referendum on the issue.
Th e debate on the Guantanamo Bay base or other external aspects of the 
US war on terror was missing in Bulgaria; the public became more interested 
in ﬂ ights with detainees and special renditions. According to the experts, the 
politicians said Bulgaria was lucky to avoid this debate because Bulgarian 
airports were not used for the ﬂ ights. Also, the International Criminal 
Court issue has been hardly mentioned in the public and political discourse 
within the country.
According to experts, it is rather seldom that a party or politicians would 
have any policy or strong opinion on the NATO versus/and ESDP issue. Policy 
formulation on the issue is not digested by the political parties; the issues are 
usually dealt with on an ad hoc basis. It is argued that Bulgarian politicians 
don’t feel compelled to deﬁ ne their positions on the issue due to the late date of 
EU accession; the country only entered the EU on January 1, 2007 and did not 
64) On November 4, 2005, PM Minister Sergey Stanishev said: “I would like to also note that the strategic partnership with the US is 
defined for Bulgaria by our NATO commitments, as well as the agenda of the transatlantic dialogue. … The issue of the shared 
military facilities in Bulgaria comes also within the context of our bilateral strategic partnership. We believe the proposals for 
transformation of the military forces and the US command in Europe, including the establishment of a rotating brigade stationed 
in Bulgaria and Romania, address adequately the new risks and threats to the security as well as Bulgaria’s interests and the need 
for stronger cooperation.” On May 21, 2006, Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov called the Defence Cooperation Agreement with 
the US “a strategic investment in the security of our country…” (Embassy of the United States in Sofia 2008).
65) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Dimitar Tsanchev stated: “We think that in the economy, the joint use of these military facilities 
will lead to an increase in the confidence in our country on behalf of investors and improve the general investment climate in 
our country.” (BBC 2006) Because of their relatively small size, the bases in Bulgaria are unlikely to generate the kind of economic 
benefits that the traditionally larger bases have. 
66) The text of the proposed bill stated: “The deployment of US military bases directly violates the sovereignty of Bulgaria”; that such 
bases “can be used to strike against third countries”; that “their presence increases the risk of terrorist acts against Bulgarian 
citizens and civilian and military facilities”; and that “possibilities exist to test and use new types of armament and ammunition, 
which may include depleted uranium.” (Slavcheva 2006) 
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take part in deﬁ ning the ESDP. Only general appeals on a need of cooperation 
between NATO and the ESDP were expressed by the main parties. Th e lack 
of an explicit policy on the CFSP/ESDP appears to have begun to be replaced 
by the adoption of the majority view of the parties (fractions) in the European 
Parliament where the Bulgarian political parties engage. Generally, the issue 
is not being discussed in public. As to the EU agenda in general, the political 
parties revolve around EU structural funds and how to use them. Th ere was 
also almost no reﬂ ection or debate on the developments related to the EU 
Constitutional Treaty (CT); all parties were in favour of its ratiﬁ cation. Bulgar-
ian political parties have been generally more relaxed on EU membership (in 
comparison to NATO).⁶⁷ After the country’s accession, Bulgarian politicians 
and institutions don’t consider themselves as having a say in the EU – but they 
were used to thinking of performing in the ways necessary in order to comply. 
According to the experts, it will take some time to change their positions – to 
change a mentality of being a good member and not saying what Bulgaria 
stands for in the EU.
On the issue of Turkish EU membership, it seems that the opinion 
spectrum does not copy the right-left cleavage assumption thus far. Th e 
oﬃ  cial position of any Bulgarian government was that Turkish membership 
would be a positive step, based on fulﬁ lling certain pre-conditions. Turkey is 
a neighbour, a big and powerful country; because there is a Turkish minority 
in the country, any ruling Bulgarian political party cannot aﬀ ord to oppose 
Turkish EU membership oﬃ  cially. However, the parties that are not in the 
government provide diﬀ erent attitudes; there are political positions, espe-
cially on the right, which are very conditional and even negative towards 
Turkish membership (DSB).⁶⁸
Th e regional dimension has been important for Bulgarian foreign 
policy-making during the whole post-1989 period with the instability of 
the Western Balkans as one of the major security risks to the country and 
with the geographical position also close to the Caucasus and Middle East. 
Th e accession to the Euro-Atlantic structure underlined Bulgaria’s position 
on the periphery of the community. Bulgaria has a rather proactive, but 
cautious, approach towards the Balkans; one of the experts interviewed 
claimed that if he was to identify the real Bulgarian foreign policy, he would 
67) In 2002, Bulgaria received the statute of full market economy; in May 2005, the Treaty of Accession to the EU was signed; the 
following Candidate Country Report from October 2005 criticized heavily the shape of the country. Despite the criticism, the 
country entered the EU as of January 1st, 2007 as scheduled. Some experts say that, after the accession, the ruling political 
parties do not feel as much pressure to comply as in the pre-accession period and that it could harm reform efforts. 
68) According to Transatlantic Trends (GMF 2007), only 45% of Bulgarians think Turkey will join the EU. 
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put it as the Balkans. On the Kosovo issue, Bulgaria is not an active sup-
porter of its independence, adopting a rather wait-and-see attitude.⁶⁹ Th ese 
policy stands are a matter of consensus among the political parties with the 
BSP-led government involving all political parties represented in the parlia-
ment (joint meetings of the parliamentary committees on national security 
and foreign policy) in an eﬀ ort to craft a long-term national strategy over 
Kosovo. Despite political declarations, the diplomatic service has never 
attempted to develop a more proactive approach towards the Black Sea 
Region. Although Bulgaria and Romania are trying to pick up the Black Sea 
Region agenda in the EU after their accession, no joint steps or strategies 
have been implemented thus far.⁷⁰ As for the other foreign policy issues, 
historical experience and links play a role.⁷¹
In some areas, Bulgaria is not determined to seek any initiatives given its 
lack of expertise or resources – although it is generally favourable towards 
involvement in the envisaged missions,⁷² it is less willing to develop dip-
lomatic initiatives (Africa, Middle East). Th ere is not much public debate 
on the Middle East; the political discourse is limited to the statements 
declaring a support to the peace process and a need for further negotiations. 
Almost no comments are made on the US or EU stances on the develop-
ment of the region.
Although the need to integrate with the rest of Europe and other Euro-
Atlantic structures was self-evident, as in Hungary, people generally tended 
to underestimate the integration into these structures at the beginning, 
focusing instead on the neighbourhood close by, namely the Balkans, as 
a source of external threats and instability. Meanwhile, public attitudes 
towards EU accession (level of the accession approval) reached a relatively 
high level of support from the outset.⁷³ As for NATO membership, the 
69) Bulgaria takes part in KFOR and UNMIK; it will contribute also to the new EU EULEX mission. 
70) Under the UDF government, regular meetings with Ukraine representatives were held; Greece and Turkey were also involved. 
71) According to some experts, the human capital in the field of foreign policy is still linked to the pre-1989 division of competences 
among the countries of the former Soviet Block – Bulgaria’s regional specialization at that time was Arab countries. However, 
the public debate on the Middle East, for example, is missing. 
72) Bulgaria, for example, was already engaged in UNIFIL mission, sending one ship to the coast guarding operation in 
September 2006. 
73) According to a local polling and research agency (Alpha Research) the level of EU membership approval revolved around 75% in 
2007 (Alpha Research 2008). However, looking at the Eurobarometer 68 results, only 52% (another 3% drop from Eurobarometer 
67) of Bulgarians think that EU membership is a good thing; the same number thinks that Bulgaria actually benefited from 
EU membership. Like in other CEE countries after the accession, the positive perception of the EU is waning. Although most 
Bulgarians think that the EU should solve primarily the issue of crime and energy security, the membership expectations are 
linked to economic benefits and raising living and social standards. With regard to the fact that Bulgaria now remains the only 
EU country where most of the people are dissatisfied with their life, the decreasing numbers are understandable. 
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public support remained more modest for a long time and split along 
party lines, with a large portion of the undecided and manifestations of 
resentment towards Russia. In 1996, 7 of BSP voters favoured NATO 
membership and 42 opposed it; meanwhile, 57 of the UDF electorate 
was in favour of joining NATO and 8 against (Karasimeonov 2004: 139). 
A strong security link to the development of the Balkans and the public 
assessment of the role of NATO there had also inﬂ uenced the development 
of the public opinion. Bulgarians perceived the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo 
diﬀ erently (Zilberman and Webber 2003) – during the former, they felt 
rather hopeless; during the latter, although they felt threatened, they also 
acknowledged in the polls that they felt protected by NATO. In parallel, the 
majority of Bulgarians disapproved of the NATO military intervention in 
Kosovo; on the other hand, a majority also supported the decision of Ivan 
Kostov’s government (UDF) to grant access to Bulgarian air space to NATO 
aircraft, declining the earlier Russian demand. In 2001, a majority level of 
support for NATO membership was recorded and sustained further on 
roughly between 50–60 (Alpha Research 2008). At the end of 2001, 62 
of Bulgarians thought that only NATO could guarantee the security of their 
country.⁷⁴ According to the experts, strong public support towards NATO, 
which emerged in 2000–2001, was caused by the decline in the proportion 
of those who had no opinion on the issue, as well as due to the policy shift 
of the BSP with some of its voters accepting the membership choice as 
a pragmatic move. NATO support is still distributed along the party lines 
to a certain extent, with the electorates of the UDF, BSP, NMSII, and MRF 
having rather positive stances towards the Alliance. At the same time, the 
Bulgarian public was rather cautious on the issue of Bulgarian participation 
in military and peacekeeping operations; peace-enforcing actions were sup-
ported by only 13–14 of the population in 2001. Th e biggest support (61) 
was given to humanitarian operations.
In the last general elections, European issues were neither debated in 
the campaign nor a factor for distinguishing the political subjects to the 
voters and forming their electoral behaviour (probably with the exception 
of Ataka). Th e model of political partisanship with the voters, using the 
political parties in order to form their opinions on European issues, has 
not emerged yet in Bulgaria, also due to the prevailing foreign policy con-
74) According to Alpha Research data the 9/11 events did not affect pro-NATO attitudes in Bulgaria; according to the monthly data 
of the Gallup Bulgaria, support for NATO membership was registered as high as: 52% (August 2001), 52% (September 2001), 
51% (October 2001), 48% (November 2001), and 54% (December 2001) (Zilberman and Webber 2003). 
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sensus on the accession in the last few years. According to Alpha Research 
(Alpha Research 2008), the level of EU membership approval revolved 
around 75 in 2007. However, looking at the Eurobarometer 68 results, 
only 52 (another 3 drop from Eurobarometer 67) of Bulgarians think 
that EU membership is a good thing; the same portion of people think that 
Bulgaria actually beneﬁ ted from EU membership. Like in the other CEE 
countries just after the EU accession, the positive perception of the EU 
was waning. Th e unconditional support for the integration of the country 
into the EU has been replaced by more sceptical attitudes; the tendencies 
towards adopting such an attitude were already present during the debate 
on decommissioning the four reactors of the Kozlodui nuclear plant (part 
of the Bulgarian Treaty of Accession, Energy Chapter) when the BSP turned 
this debate into a major issue and demanded a referendum in 2004.⁷⁵
Within the debate on two US bases being opened in Bulgaria, the public 
was generally unfavourable at ﬁ rst because of the rising security risk (from 
a terrorist attack) – an issue voiced namely by Ataka. Th e political parties 
on the right reframed the discourse, focusing on the economic beneﬁ ts; 
the BSP, being a ruling party with foreign policy responsibilities, cautiously 
followed suit. As to the general public perception of the USA, the leader-
ship of George W. Bush is perceived rather negatively, as well as the war 
in Iraq – only 2 of Bulgarians approved of the use of force without a U.N. 
mandate and only 10 with a U.N. mandate (Tashev 2004); meanwhile, the 
US as such is seen more favourably (GMF 2007). Some experts state a thor-
ough sociological survey on security threat perception is needed, involving 
both external and internal threat and risk perception; a rationalization of 
the threats should follow, as well as an assessment and explanation on how 
missions abroad come into the picture, for example. It seems that public 
support towards a new security and strategic orientation for the country is 
highly volatile; in the case of engagements abroad, the public often fails (as 
in Iraq) to see the connection to domestic security and refuses to embrace 
and legitimize the policy of the government.
75) In an opinion poll in February 2004, 46% of respondents said that keeping the reactors was more important than joining the EU, 
while only 30% took the opposite view. 
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Positions of the Bulgarian Political Parties⁷⁶
Th e foreign policy of the political parties is created by a mixture of politi-
cians and experts; it seems that the political parties on the right have always 
had broader resources (both in government and in opposition), attracting 
personalities from the civil society sector, universities, and business organiza-
tions to a larger extent than the left.
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
Th e BSP is the dominating force of the ruling government in Bulgaria 
(2005–2009), a post-communist party that managed to promote itself as 
a reformed entity. Its foreign policy shifts on NATO membership⁷⁷ and on 
the country’s engagement in the Iraq war are described above. It has always 
maintained a pro-EU attitude and has (at least from a certain fraction of the 
party) displayed an aﬃ  nity towards Russia, its foreign policy, and economic 
interests. Th e party discourse on transatlantic relations (relations with the 
US) is framed by the term ‘strategic partnership’ and deﬁ ned on the basis of 
the country’s obligations stemming from NATO membership, as well as the 
agenda of transatlantic dialogue (within the EU): “Our alliance-based, bilat-
eral relations are taking the form of an intensive dialogue,” states PM Sergey 
Stanishev (Stanishev 2005). Th e BSP approach towards NATO membership 
has been instrumental; according to some experts, the BSP adopts a ‘two-
level game’ strategy when dealing with NATO issues, being very cooperative 
at NATO meetings, but following public opinion when implementing the 
agreed agenda back home, adopting a more relaxed attitude towards the 
commitments it has made.⁷⁸ Th e foreign minister in the current government 
(BSP-nominated but not a party member), Mr. Ivaylo Kalﬁ n, is a professional, 
francophone diplomat, chosen on the merits of loyalty (especially towards 
president Parvanov); according to the experts, he is following a strategy that 
is not a routine strategy of the BSP.
76) The following interpretations of positions of Bulgarian political parties have been based mainly on official party documents (e.g. 
elections programmes, manifestos), daily press, and interviews with party representatives and experts. In some cases, it was not 
possible to interview a party representative and the data on some particular parties are missing. 
77) The indicator of BSP position on NATO membership has been the development of the party position towards Serbia and former 
Yugoslavia; position of Georgi Parvanov during the Kosovo crisis was aggressively anti-NATO. After the crisis, it was Georgi Parvanov 
who initiated a cautious shift towards pro-NATO stance in the party; the anti-NATO wing was louder during the debate; the voice 
of the anti-NATO group was a university professor and MP Andrei Pantev.
78) Similarly, with the EU during the late pre-accession period, the BSP-led government wanted to be popular with the EU but also 
with the domestic population, sometimes leading to ambiguous positions like in the case of the Kozloduj nuclear plant. 
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After the shift of BSP foreign policy priorities, the party embarked upon 
a strategy of not voicing their foreign policy positions if not overly necessary, 
avoiding public discussion on the issues. Th e BSP also tends to be rather 
permissive on some statements made by Russian politicians; a point much 
criticized, especially in connection to the government’s energy policy, by the 
parties on the right.⁷⁹
According to the BSP, not only should the US military presence in Europe 
be reduced out of a need to move those forces elsewhere, but the European 
part of NATO should also be able to take up more responsibility; the EU 
should also be able to deploy military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian 
missions anywhere in the world. On the other hand, the BSP lobbied for 
placing the US bases on Bulgarian territory after the big reshuﬄ  ing of US 
forces in Europe; given the strategic position of the country, the US decided 
to conclude a bilateral agreement with Bulgaria. Th e jointly-run military 
facilities in Bulgaria (Novo Selo and Bezmer airﬁ eld) were legitimized by 
the party as an obligation the country has as a NATO member even though 
the cooperation runs on the basis of bilateral agreement. Th e opponents of 
the decision within the BSP, the anti-NATO fraction, disclosed that it is not 
a NATO commitment and that even some of the NATO members do not 
support this decision from the Bulgarian government.
According to the general party statements, the CFSP and ESDP cannot be 
seen as an alternative to NATO; rather, NATO is seen as a solid ground on 
which the ESDP should be built. Th e EU and NATO, in close cooperation, 
should be an ultimate security guarantor in Europe; on the other hand, EU 
battlegroups should be given priority over NATO tasks in the future; there 
is also a positive attitude towards creating a European army.
Th e BSP wanted to keep a foreign policy consensus; however, before the 
2005 elections, it promised to pull Bulgarian troops out of Iraq by the end of 
the year. When coming into power after the 2005 elections, the party posi-
tion changed (see above). PM Sergei Stanischev was generally for sending 
troops; with the changing concept of the mission, the BSP accommodated 
new a position towards the country’s engagement in Iraq.
Even though the BSP has made no explicit statements against the Guan-
tanamo Bay Base, it does not see it as a necessary tool for ﬁ ghting terrorism. 
Th e CIA ﬂ ights are also seen as a procedure which could have been avoided.
79) Russian President Vladimir Putin made a statement in Brussels that Bulgaria would be a fifth column of Russia in the EU before 
the EU accession; neither president Parvanov nor PM Stanishev made any statements in reaction to it.
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Although the party takes a rather cautious approach towards develop-
ments in the Middle East, the BSP-led government of Sergey Stanishev 
proposed the Druzki Frigate (Daring) to be a part of the naval component of 
UNIFIL in Lebanon in September 2006. Th e frigate, the ﬁ rst Bulgarian ship 
meeting NATO standards, took part in NATO operation Active Endeavour 
in the Mediterranean and served in UNIFIL for two months.
Th e stability of Bulgaria’s close neighbourhood is seen as a priority. Besides 
the Western Balkans, the BSP declares a need for a more active policy 
towards the Black Sea and Caucasus Regions. It sees Bulgaria as an anchor of 
stability in the region and a promoter of Western norms. As potential risks, 
the BSP regards the developments in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ser-
bia, and Macedonia as threats to the stability of the region; as for the Kosovo 
issue, PM Sergey Stanishev stated that the current unclear status cannot be 
prolonged forever, but that he was against unilateral steps and supportive 
towards the involvement of Russia. Th e BSP would also like to intensify rela-
tions and cooperation with Ukraine and Russia; the relations should be based 
on a pragmatic approach of economic partnership and should not clash with 
European and Transatlantic priorities. 
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)
Founded in December 1989, the MRF is a centrist party (centre-left) with 
high coalition potential. In order not to be seen only as an ethnic party,⁸⁰ the 
MRF now labels itself ‘liberal’ and has become a member of Liberal Interna-
tional (LI). Th e MRF was rather reluctant to show any foreign policy posi-
tions after 1989; however, its position changed around 1997 with the adoption 
of an openly pro-Atlantic and pro-NATO attitude, forming a wide majority 
on foreign policy issues with the right during the Kostov government; the 
MRF position was also important for the BSP in this regard. Th e MRF also 
did not give in to BSP propositions to pull military personnel out of Iraq 
right after the 2005 elections. Th e MRF has always taken a positive attitude 
towards EU membership. Naturally, it favours Turkish membership in the 
EU.⁸¹ Th e experts say MRF foreign policy positions are very conventional; 
80) Although the concept of the ‘Multi-ethnic model’ is still in the centre of its election programme, some experts claim that the MRF 
is very much related to Ankara; it is a very centralized party, monopolistic in terms of mobilizing Turkish and Muslim voters, and 
has been, most of the time, part of the government; it also enjoys the reputation of a very corrupt political party. 
81) Provided that Turkey unofficially but, in effect, strongly supports the MRF also reflects the issue of Turkish membership to the 
extent to which the behaviour of the MRF in Bulgarian politics is regarded (and interpreted) by some experts as a preliminary 
image of how Turkey will behave in the EU. 
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the party does not see foreign policy as an area of speciﬁ c interest, focusing 
rather on domestic aﬀ airs.
The National Movement for Stability 
and Progress (NMSP, former NMSII)
During the 2001–2005 election periods, the governing coalition of the 
NMSII and MRF was successful outside Bulgaria in advancing the foreign 
policy towards NATO and EU membership; the party is pro-NATO and 
pro-EU.⁸² In a 2005 debate on Iraq after the friendly-ﬁ re incident, the NMSII 
advocated a redeﬁ nition of the task of the Bulgarian troops in Iraq to be based 
on thorough analysis. Th e NMSII was in favour of keeping the mission at least 
until the end of 2005, supporting, in the end, a turn towards a redeﬁ nition of 
activities (the training of local forces).
Th e current party documents call for an active stand vis-à-vis NATO and 
EU; it follows the motto ‘enlargement equals security,’ a phrase that should be 
read in two ways – to secure Bulgarian borders (as they are the EU external 
borders) and to support further EU enlargement (although not explicitly 
stating whom and whether in the long or short term). It also speaks of the 
‘return’ of Bulgaria to the Balkans as an EU member, meaning that the coun-
try should enhance its cooperation and contribute more signiﬁ cantly to the 
transformation of the Balkans (into a peninsula of stability). It sees Bulgaria 
as a gate between Europe and Asia; the country should facilitate an active 
cooperation with the Asian countries, which would grant access to their mar-
kets and sources of energy. Energy diplomacy is seen as a top issue on the EU 
agenda; there is a need for new projects that could break old dependencies 
(on Russia). Th e primary component of Bulgarian energy policy should be an 
eﬀ ort to conclude the overall European energy policy since a uniﬁ ed stand of 
the EU member states would better secure policy outcomes.
Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)
GERB was founded in autumn 2005; it positions itself as a centre-right 
party. In the foreign policy ﬁ eld, GERB has been balancing between pro-EU 
attitudes (namely, in connection to the Structural Funds) and its ‘own (i.e. 
national) interests’ (namely, on the issue of the Kozloduj nuclear plant). After 
82) Bulgaria became a member of NATO in 2004 and signed the EU accession treaty in April 2005; therefore, the country became 
a NATO member under the NMSII-led government. The current Bulgarian Commissioner, Meglena Kuneva, is from NMSII. 
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the European Parliament elections, it became a member of the EPP-ED group. 
Th e party states a pro-Atlantic attitude; on the other hand, some of its leader-
ship (Boiko Borisov) declare that they have very good relations with people 
from Russian security circles.
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)
Th e UDF was formed as a centre-right democratic and market-oriented 
party; full consolidation of the party took place only in 1997. It was in power 
twice – in 1991–1992 with the Dimitrov administration and in 1997–2001 with 
PM Ivan Kostov’s administration, the ﬁ rst Bulgarian government to complete 
a full term in oﬃ  ce after 1989. Besides economic reforms, the accession talks 
with the European Union were launched under the UDF government. In 
2001–2005, the UDF supported the foreign policy line of the NMSII, i.e. the 
NATO and EU membership.⁸³ For the UDF, NATO membership was never 
instrumental; it was a substantial element of Bulgarian foreign policy.
Th e UDF supported the US-led operations in Iraq in 2003. It was against 
pulling out military troops from Iraq; after the friendly-ﬁ re incident in 2005, 
the UDF promoted that a sub-committee in the Assembly be created in 
order to issue a comprehensive report on the implementation of the National 
Assembly’s resolution on Bulgaria’s military involvement in Iraq, including its 
equipment, training, and deployment.
Th e UDF would like to see independent EU military missions only in 
Europe and Africa, and US or NATO-led operations preferably anywhere 
except for Europe. It also supports the instalment of new US bases in CEE 
countries, including on Bulgarian soil, and even a special US facility for 
the interrogation of terrorist suspects; in parallel, the Europeans should be 
able to take over more responsibility for the common defence and shore up 
the European part of NATO. Th e EU should be also more active in Central 
Asia as a geopolitical sphere of its interest. NATO, in cooperation with the 
EU, should be an ultimate security guarantor in Europe, with progressive 
development of the ESDP seen as needed. As to EU expansion, the UDF is 
a partisan of further EU enlargement, including Turkey.
83) Before the failure in the European parliament election, the UDF suggested that it would join the Movement for European Reform 
(MER); MER was a suggested alliance of Britain’s Conservatives and the Czech Civic Democrats; however, looking at the Bulgarian 
political parties’ spectrum, it would make for a rather DSB-like profile; indeed, former DSB leader Petar Stojanov suggested that the 
party join MER; however, the DSB members refused. The UDF was recommended by the EPP-ED political bureau for membership 
suspension; nevertheless, since no UDF candidate was elected into the EP, the issue lost significance. 
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Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB)
Th e DSB deﬁ nes itself as a right-of-centre party with liberal economic dis-
course; established in 2004 as a UDF splinter,⁸⁴ its main diﬀ erence to the UDF 
is strong anti-communism and criticism towards the BSP.⁸⁵ Th e DSB also 
challenges the MRF monopoly over the ethnic minority vote, promoting the 
re-deﬁ nition of the ‘Bulgarian ethnic model’ on the basis of the principle of 
citizenship (and EU citizenship). Th ere are major experts and foreign policy 
ﬁ gures in the DSB; the party is strongly pro-Atlantic. Meanwhile, the UDF 
is moderately pro-Turkish on EU accession; even though the DSB has chal-
lenged Turkish EU membership, the position has not been stated explicitly 
thus far. Th e DSB was trying to position itself as a more nationalist party (like 
the Czech ODS); they followed a sovereignty discourse, not following eve-
rything that the EU says – for example, on the issue of the Kozloduj nuclear 
power station, the DSB stated that Bulgaria should have not agreed so easily; 
a slight tendency towards becoming a eurosceptic party has been present.
In the debate on US bases in Bulgaria, the DSB experienced problems 
due to certain anti-American feelings that exist among its electorate; the 
DSB supported the US bases, but had to use the strategy of reframing the 
issue to economic connotations. Otherwise, the DSB supports the preserva-
tion of a strong transatlantic link and pro-US policies (i.e., CIA ﬂ ights in 
Europe were necessary; it welcomes the US presence in Central Asia due to 
favourable energy security consequences); the DSB states that independent 
EU military missions should be only complementary to US eﬀ orts; when 
the EU decides to act, its steps should be consulted with NATO and the 
US; concerning the very missions, there should be a division of labour and 
complementarity among the transatlantic allies. Further development of the 
ESDP is welcomed by the DSB, but not on the cost of undermining NATO 
activities; EU battlegroups should also act only on the condition of US and 
NATO consent and move towards creating a European army is unfavourable, 
unless coordinated closely with NATO.
84) The experts say the DSB and the UDF dislike each other more than they dislike the BSP; the UDF split because of strong personalities. 
The DSB is more conservative than the UDF, including on foreign policy issues. It is a cadre party with a stable electoral support 
(around 3%). It seems that after the disastrous results in the last (European and local) elections, the party is trying to take up 
more centrist and moderate position and to regain some of their votes; people still have some emotional connection to them as 
the former anti-communist leaders.
85) The DSB website (about us section) states: “The main political opponent [of DSB] is the Bulgarian Socialist Party (former 
Communists) because the latter is a party of the leftist political experiments, of populism and of reckless government.” DSB 
politicians have also been very critical towards the BSP over its energy security policy, stating that Bulgaria acts as a Trojan horse 
of Russian interest in the EU (namely because of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline).
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As for the Iraq crisis, the party representatives supported the actions, 
arguing a need for regime change in 2003, though doubting the timing and 
conduct of the operation. Th e DSB has been supportive towards the engage-
ment the Bulgarian troops in Iraq, but warned of possible complications and 
casualties and criticized the lack of real discussion in the Assembly (after the 
2005 elections and the redeﬁ nition of the concept of engagement).
The Bulgarian People’s Union (BPU)
Th e BPU is a complicated coalition of three smaller parties – the Agrarians, 
the Union of Free Democrats of former Soﬁ a mayor Stefan Soﬁ yanski, and 
the Revolutionary Internal Macedonian Organization (IMRO).⁸⁶ 
According to a party representative, there is no will to ﬁ nance the European 
defence, and thus, the US involvement (military missions) is welcomed eve-
rywhere and preferable to the concept of independent EU military missions. 
On the other hand, the US military presence in Europe should be reduced 
because it is not necessary anymore; new bases in CEE countries should be 
built because of their geopolitical strategic position. Th e Guantanamo Bay 
Base is regarded as an appropriate facility – endorsed by the argument that 
security is costly in terms of political capital; CIA ﬂ ights in Europe were 
a necessary undertaking in order to secure vital information. Th e party is also 
favourable to increasing the US presence in Central Asia because it would 
have favourable consequences in regard to energy security.⁸⁷ On the other 
hand, the party welcomed the establishment of the permanent International 
Criminal Court. Th e BPU (or at least the Agrarian party) was supporting the 
US-led operation in Iraq and also the Bulgarian engagement within those 
operations. According to the BPU, the ESDP should develop further only if 
legitimized by the population of the EU member states; NATO should remain 
the ultimate guarantor of European security.
Ataka
Coalition Ataka was formed two months before the 2005 elections. It 
presents a programme that is virtually in opposition to the foreign policy 
consensus reached under the previous government, i.e. against the involve-
86) Registered in 1996, the IMRO was the only significant right-wing entity in Bulgarian politics until the emergence of Ataka. 
IMRO has 5 MPs in the current Assembly. 
87) … And “anything that limits Putin is fine.” The party is also very critical of strong Russian interference with Bulgarian politics. 
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ment in Iraq, anti-US (against US bases on Bulgarian territory), anti-NATO, 
and also against some features of Bulgaria’s EU membership (a criticism on 
closing down the Kozloduj nuclear plant). Th e coalition calls for ‘a Bulgaria 
for the Bulgarians’ and proposes harsh policies on ethnic minorities. In 
order to promote their racist and anti-Semitic messages, they have launched 
their own newspaper (Ataka) and the Skat TV channel. As a diﬀ erence from 
the extremist parties in other Central European countries (perhaps only 
with the exception of Vladimir Meciar’s HZDS at certain points) that are 
appearing due to historical legacy, this hard line nationalist party is also very 
pro-Russian.
Conclusion
Bulgaria is still undergoing the process of its parties’ fragmentation; 
especially, the right side of the political spectrum is eroding with traditional 
parties (UDF, DSB) losing appeal and electorate. Unless the economic and 
social situation of the country improves signiﬁ cantly, a relatively large group 
of volatile, unpredictable voters will continue to play an important role and 
shape the outcome of the elections, changing allegiances and loyalties to 
political subjects.
In the foreign policy ﬁ eld, the picture of the Bulgarian left and right fol-
lows, more or less, the scheme of the right being rather atlanticist and the 
left taking rather pro-EU attitudes. However, there are additional dimensions: 
Bulgarian politics has always been divided between the pro-Russian left and 
the pro-Western right due to the speciﬁ c history of the country, the border 
lines, and the nature of Bulgarian political culture. Today, there is an inverted 
situation where the BSP claims to be pro-atlantic and pro-European (but of 
course much less pro-atlantic than the centre-right political parties (UDF, 
DSB, NMSII). Although the left is explicitly pro-European and similar to its 
counterparts in other EU countries, it tends to preserve good relations with 
Russia. Th e tacit foreign policy consensus also becomes weaker when dealing 
with regional agendas (including the issue of Turkish and Macedonian EU 
membership) – in these cases, it is also important if the party forms a ruling 
coalition or sits in the opposition benches. Th e extreme right follows a spe-
ciﬁ c brand of nationalism that is very much anti -Turkish and anti -Western 
and pro-Russian.
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CZECH REPUBLIC
David Král
Table 1: Parties in the Czech Parliament
Term
Parties Represented in the Parliament 
(Chamber of Deputies) – Election 
Results and Mandates
Governing Coalition
1990 – 1992
(Czech National Council)
OF 49.5% (124)
KSČ 13.2% (33)
HSD – SMS 10% (23)
KDU – 8.4% (20) 
OF
1992 – 1996
ODS/KDS – 29.7 % (76)
Levý blok (KSČM and DL) – 14.1 % (51)
ČSSD – 6.5 % (16)
LSU – 6.5 % (16)
KDU – ČSL – 6.3 % (15)
SPR – RSČ – 6% (14)
ODA – 5.9 % (14) 
HSD – SMS – 5.9 % (14)
ODS - KDS – KDU-ČSL – ODA 
1996 – 1998
ODS – 29.6% (68)
ČSSD – 26.4% (61)
KSČM – 10.3 % (22)
KDU – ČSL – 8.08 % (18)
SPR – RSČ – 8.01 % (18)
ODA – 6.36 % (13)
ODS – KDU-ČSL – ODA 
(minority government)
1998 – 2002
ČSSD – 32.3 % (74)
ODS – 27.7 % (63)
KSČM – 11% (24)
KDU – ČSL – 9 % (20)
US – 8.6 % (19)
ČSSD (minority government)
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Table 1: Parties in the Czech Parliament
Term
Parties Represented in the Parliament 
(Chamber of Deputies) – Election 
Results and Mandates
Governing Coalition
2002 – 2006
ČSSD – 30.2 % (70)
ODS – 24.5 % (58)
KSČM – 18.5 % (41)
KDU – ČSL – 14.3 % (coalition with US) (22)
US – 14.3 % (coalition with KDU-ČSL) (9)
ČSSD – KDU-ČSL - US
2006 on 
ODS – 35.38 % (81)
ČSSD – 32.32 % (74)
KSČM – 12.81 % (26)
KDU – ČSL – 7.23 % (13)
SZ – 6.29 % (6) 
ODS – KDU-ČSL - SZ
Acronyms:
ČSSD  Česká strana sociálně demokratická
(Czech Social Democratic Party)
DL Demokratická levice (Democratic Left) 
HSD – SMS  Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu 
a Slezsko (Movement for Self-Government Democracy – Union 
for Moravia and Silesia)
KDU  Křesťanská a de\mokratická unie
(Christian and Democratic Union)
KDU – ČSL  Křesťansko-demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová 
(Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party)
KDS Křesťanská demokratická strana (Christian Democratic Party)
KSČ  Komunistická strana Československa
(Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)
KSČM  Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy
(Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)
LSU  Liberálně – sociální unie (Liberal Social Union)
ODA  Občanská demokratická aliance (Civic Democratic Alliance)
ODS  Občanská demokratická strana (Civic Democratic Party)
OF  Občanské Fórum (Civic Forum)
SPR – RSČ  Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa 
(Union for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party)
SZ Strana zelených (Green Party)
US Unie Svobody (Freedom Union)
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Overview of the Czech Political Scene
Th e Czech Republic, quite exceptionally in the region, shows a relatively 
high degree of stability in regard to the political parties present on its political 
scene. Also, the standard socio-economic cleavage present in most Western 
European party systems, separating the left from the right and, based on 
a socio-economic conﬂ ict line, is clearly visible, at least between the two 
major political parties. Th e Czech political system has, during the course of 
the 1990’s, crystallized with one dominant party on the political right – the 
Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) and one strong 
player on the left – the Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně 
demokratická, ČSSD). Th is recalls the system of two Western European 
neighbours of the Czech Republic – Germany and Austria – who also have 
one dominant right wing party (CDU, ÖVP), as well as one on the left (SPD, 
SPÖ). However, drawing parallels might be a bit misleading here, as there are 
obvious, substantial diﬀ erences between the ODS and the respective German 
and Austrian parties. Probably, the most signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence is that both 
the CDU and the ÖVP draw a lot of their ideological inspiration from the 
Christian-democratic movement, which is absent in the case of the Czech 
ODS – the party has a secular proﬁ le,¹ thus making these parties more like 
their Czech Christian Democratic twin – the KDU-ČSL, which is, however, 
a weaker player on the Czech scene. 
Th e situation is somewhat more complicated regarding the smaller parties. 
However, at least two of them have asserted themselves as stable factors on 
the Czech political map – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
(Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM) and the Christian-Democratic 
Union – the Czechoslovak Peoples’ Party (Křesťansko-demokratická unie – 
Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL). Th ey are both characterized by 
a relatively stable electorate, drawing their support (in the former case) from 
negative voters dissatisﬁ ed with general direction of politics after 1989 and (in 
the latter case) more traditional, country-based, Catholic voters. 
To understand the nature of the Czech political system as it currently exists, 
one must look back to the beginnings of the country’s transformation and the 
“Velvet revolution” of 1989, as this is where one can see the most signiﬁ cant 
roots of the cleavages and conﬂ ict lines determining the emergence of the 
1) This is true even though the party had previously absorbed the Christian Democratic Party (KDS), a party also based on the Christian 
movement. However, this stream in the party is marginal and more vocal on social rather than economic or foreign policy issues, 
as demonstrated, for instance, in the debate on registered partnership. 
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country’s respective political parties. Th e nature-of-the-regime conﬂ ict line, 
present in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe to varying degrees 
until now, was really signiﬁ cant only in the ﬁ rst “free” elections in June 1990 fol-
lowing the collapse of communism. Th ese elections can simply be described as 
a contest of the advocates of a pluralist democracy, gathered in a wide platform 
called the Civic Forum/Public against violence (Občanské forum/Veřejnost 
proti násilí) towards the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ). It was 
a contest on the attitude of the Czech (or more precisely, the Czecho-Slovak) 
public towards the Communist era (Hloušek and Kopeček 2005) and resulted 
in an overwhelming victory for the anti-communist camp with more than 50 
of the votes. In the following years, the nature-of-the-regime conﬂ ict line was 
signiﬁ cant only in terms of the assertion of the Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM) as a full-ﬂ edged 
successor to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, never clearly denounc-
ing the legacy of the Communist era. Th is resulted into an unwritten agreement 
on the ostracization and political isolation of the party by the other party actors 
(Hloušek and Kopeček 2005). 
Th e socio-economic transformation conﬂ ict line thus became the dominant 
cleavage of the Czech transformation following the end of the communist 
regime and was instrumental in the emergence of what can be viewed as a sys-
tem with two major political parties, one on the left and one on the right. Th e 
ODS, led by the charismatic ﬁ gure of Václav Klaus, emerged as the victorious 
party in the 1992 elections, championing the swift introduction of free market 
principles, as well as rapid privatisation, into the Czech economy. Th e Social 
Democratic party (ČSSD), since 1993 headed by another charismatic leader, 
Miloš Zeman, built a lot of its agenda on the criticism of the way the ODS-led 
government handled the economic transformation, particularly privatisation, 
and for neglecting the socio-economic impact of the swift shift to a market 
economy. Moreover, there is one signiﬁ cant, structural diﬀ erence between the 
two parties – while the ODS presents itself as a “new” party, without recalling 
any legacy of the inter-war period of the democratic Czechoslovakia, in addi-
tion to building its image on transformation and modernisation, the ČSSD 
openly declares its inspiration and legacy from the social-democratic move-
ment and the predecessor parties existent throughout the Czech lands².
Despite this, other conﬂ ict lines were also present in the Czech political 
milieu that helped the establishment of smaller parties, some of them more 
2) Such as the Czecho-Slavonic Social Democratic Party in Austria, Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers’ Party (in the interwar 
period – the so-called “First Republic” ), or the Czechoslovak Social Democracy existent shortly after WWII.
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important than others at diﬀ erent stages of the transformation. For instance, 
the conﬂ ict line between Church-State was signiﬁ cant for the existence of con-
fessional parties in Western Europe and helped the emergence of the Christian 
Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL). Although this party has stable support, due 
to the traditional secularism of Czech society, however, it never managed to 
become a major political force because its electorate was limited to a group of 
strongly religious Catholic voters (Hloušek and Kopeček 2005). Similarly, the 
national conﬂ ict line played a role in the emergence of minor political group-
ings requiring more political and cultural autonomy for historical regions 
of Moravia and Silesia. Nevertheless, the inﬂ uence of these groups grossly 
diminished after 1992 elections. 
Th e axiological (i.e. value based) conﬂ ict line, in the Czech case, follows 
very much along a socio-economic cleavage line and separates the parties 
with a more etatistic approach to the economy (the left) from the parties with 
a more liberal approach. Certain signs of this cleavage can, however, be tracked 
in social terms where, through the course of the 1990’s, there were attempts 
to establish parties with liberal economic and social agendas, distinguishing 
themselves from the social and rather conservative ODS and the even more 
conservative KDU-ČSL. Examples of this can be seen in parties such as the 
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the Freedom Union (Unie svobody, US – 
a split-oﬀ  from the ODS that originated in 1998), or the Democratic Union; 
the latter two parties merged into one party in 2001. However, none of these 
parties asserted themselves as a permanent player on the Czech political scene, 
despite the fact that, for instance, the Freedom Union (US) was part of the 
ruling coalition during 2002 – 2006. For this reason, we do not analyze this 
party’s positions because, as in most of the issues dealt with in this paper, their 
position bore little to no political weight. It is, however, mentioned, as there is 
still at least a theoretical chance of its resurgence in the future. 
Th e failure to create a strong economically and socially liberal political party 
has left a certain gap in the centre of the Czech political spectrum (although it 
could be ﬁ lled by the KDU-ČSL, this party only appeals to a limited electorate, 
as was explained), thus opening the ﬂ oor for other potential cleavage lines. 
At the moment, a new conﬂ ict line that is appearing is the materialist – post-
materialist conﬂ ict line, illustrated by the resurgence of the Green Party (Strana 
zelených, SZ). Although this party has existed since the early 1990’s, due to the 
dominance of the socio-economic line of transformation, it could appeal to 
a very limited number of voters. With the Czech Republic growing increasingly 
rich at the beginning of 21st century, the situation has changed substantively, 
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making it easier to appeal to voters, tackling issues such as sustainable develop-
ment, global environmental problems, and alternative energy sources, among 
others. In regard to foreign policy, which is the subject matter of this analysis, 
the Greens have come up with new unorthodox topics not tackled thus far so 
explicitly by the other parties (see further). It is, however, not clear whether 
the Green Party will be able to sustain its support and whether its fate will be 
diﬀ erent from those smaller parties that tried to ﬁ ll the gap in the political 
centre and provide an alternative to the originating two-party system. Despite 
the fact that it entered Parliament only in 2006 and even became part of the 
ruling coalition, current opinion polls suggest their preferences to be higher 
than those of the KDU-ČSL, a well-established veteran of the Czech politics.³ 
Moreover, there is a signiﬁ cant internal dispute in the Green party whether to 
follow a more pragmatic or programme-based approach, which might result in 
the further signiﬁ cant weakening of the party ahead of the next general election. 
In any case, this is not to say that the Green Party has replaced or removed the 
liberal Freedom Union (US); their programme is quite diﬀ erent; a large part of 
the party is economically closer to the Social Democrats than to the ODS. 
To summarize, the Czech political scene is currently quite legible for an out-
side observer in terms of the right-left division applied to Western European 
party systems, with one dominant party on the right (ODS), another dominant 
party (ČSSD) and one smaller party (KSČM) on the left, plus one smaller party 
in the centre-right (KDU-ČSL). Th ere is arguably still room for another smaller 
party in the political centre; it still remains to be seem whether such a party will 
establish itself ﬁ rmly in the Czech political spectrum and which conﬂ ict line 
will diﬀ erentiate it from the other party actors – it seems that it will be either 
an axiological or a materialist vs. post-materialist cleavage. 
Positioning of the Czech Political Parties on the Right – Left Axis
KSČM ČSSD SZ KDU-ČSL US ODS
left right
3) Cf. the June 2008 opinion poll of CVVM on party preferences (CVVM 2008c). In this poll, the preferences of the Green Party are at 
7,5% while those of the KDU-ČSL are only at 5,5 %. 
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Abbreviations/acronyms:
KSČM  Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
(Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy)
ČSSD  Czech Social Democratic Party 
(Česká strana sociálně-demokratická)
SZ Green Party (Strana zelených)
KDU-ČSL  Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party 
(Křesťansko-demokratická unie – československá strana lidová)
US Freedom Union (Unie svobody)
ODS Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana)
National Consensus and Relevance of Foreign Policy
Broadly speaking, there was a consensus on major foreign policy issues 
during the course of 1990’s that was – as well as in the other countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe – determined by the imperative of integration 
into Euro-Altantic structures, namely NATO and the EU. Only one political 
party – the Communist Party (KSČM) – diverged signiﬁ cantly from this 
consensus, denying membership in both organizations and exhibiting an 
especially strong distaste for NATO. Th is attitude can be largely explained 
by the appeal of the KSČM to negative voters, generally dissatisﬁ ed with the 
way things were going after the collapse of communism. Th e party tried to 
portray the desire of politicians to join the two main organisations as a way of 
general deterioration. Th e communist party, which, as we already mentioned, 
never distanced itself from the legacy of communist Czechoslovakia and the 
rule of its predecessor, the Czechoslovak Communist Party, clearly saw the 
reorientation of the Czech foreign policy as a negative sign by which the 
Czech Republic would be ﬁ nally absorbed into western capitalist structures. 
Due to its isolation, the consensus on the Czech political scene can, therefore, 
be more precisely described as a “consensus minus one.” 
Th e motto of “Back to Europe” became the main slogan describing the 
overall orientation of Czech foreign policy during the 1990’s. Th is often led 
the Czech Republic to neglect other aspects of foreign policy for practically 
the entire period, such as regional co-operation or the “Eastern” policy. Th e 
aim of the Czech Republic was to prove its “western” credentials, integrate 
into NATO and the EU as quickly as possible, and assert itself ﬁ rmly on the 
geopolitical map of Europe as part of the Euroatlantic structures, not as an 
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ex-Soviet satellite. One can recall the reluctance of Václav Klaus at the time 
of his premiership towards the Visegrád co-operation, perhaps fearing that 
it would jeopardize the more important goal of integration with the EU and 
NATO. In Klaus’s thinking, the Czech Republic was in the best position 
among Central European countries to join the Euro-Atlantic organisations 
swiftly, thus justifying the rejection of its co-operation with other Central 
European partners on the way to the EU.⁴ In 1996, one of the main ODS 
election billboards in its election campaign portrayed the Czech ﬂ ag along 
with those of the other advanced nations, reminding the Czech voters that 
their country was the ﬁ rst ex-communist country to join the OECD (in 1995) 
under the ODS-led government. Contrary to that, it is quite surprising that 
the Czech Republic was among the last countries in the region to submit an 
application to join the EU, only in January 1996.
After achieving the main goals of foreign policy in 1999 and 2004 (acces-
sion to NATO and the EU, respectively), Czech foreign policy found itself in 
a kind of vacuum. While most of the other countries of the region tried to 
keep other priorities to their foreign policy (such as Eastern policy in the case 
of Poland or neighbourhood relations in the case of Hungary), Czech diplo-
macy had to deﬁ ne new areas to prioritise and pursue in the international 
arena. Arguably, this process is still underway. However, there are clear signs 
that the Czech Republic has managed to ﬁ nd such areas, visible namely in the 
rediscovery of the ‘Eastern’ policy, Transatlantic co-operation or democracy 
assistance and promotion in third-world countries. Moreover, the resurgence 
of the Green Party could push new dimensions onto Czech foreign policy, 
such as a stronger emphasis on global problems like the environment, energy, 
development aid, or sustainable development. However, it still remains to be 
seen whether these new priorities will generate a strong, cross-party consen-
sus, as the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration did. 
Views of the US, the EU, and NATO 
Apart from the goal of integration into the EU and NATO, bilateral 
relations with the United States played an important role in Czech foreign 
policy-thinking following the fall of communism. Unlike relations with 
major Western European countries such as Germany, France, or the United 
4) The Visegrád co-operation was founded precisely with the goal of co-operating in achieving membership in NATO and the EU. The 
first presidential summit took place in 1991 in Visegrád, Hungary. The Visegrád Three turned into the Visegrád Four (V4) after the 
division of Czechoslovakia in 1993. 
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Kingdom, relations with the USA are not burdened by any historical griev-
ances.⁵ Th e United States was perceived, primarily by post-communist 
elites, as a champion in the ﬁ ght for freedom and democracy throughout 
the Cold War; it is mainly thanks to them that the victory of liberal western 
democracy was achieved, at least in Central Europe. An important element 
in the strongly pro-US attitudes of the Czech governments throughout the 
early 1990’s was the ﬁ gure of the ﬁ rst president of post-1989 Czechoslova-
kia (and the Czech Republic), Václav Havel, who emphasized the shared 
values of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic (Řiháčková 2005) and 
was a very good personal friend with prominent American politicians 
of the era, especially Bill Clinton and his Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright, the latter being of Czech origin. In the foreign policy arena, the 
positive attitudes towards the United States were reﬂ ected by the Czech 
(and Czechoslovak) support of the US during the First Gulf War in 1991, as 
well as during the US intervention in former Yugoslavia in 1995. However, 
there was a nuanced sign of change after the ﬁ rst ČSSD government took 
oﬃ  ce. In 1998, during his ﬁ rst public appearance after his inauguration 
as Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, social democrat Jan Kavan stated that he 
‘would not like to see the Czech Republic as a Trojan horse of the United 
States in Europe’ (a statement that creates an interesting comparison with 
later references in Süddeutsche Zeitung that label Poland in the same 
way), followed by his support for European defence capabilities (Řiháčková 
2005). Although one cannot describe this as a U-turn in the Czech Repub-
lic’s relationship with the United States, it shows an interesting shift and 
indicates that the country might not support the United States automati-
cally and that it can be confronted with other choices, such as the position 
of the European Union. Th is trend has fully demonstrated itself during the 
Iraq crisis and even more so during the negotiations on the missile defence 
treaty, as will be illustrated later. Still, it does not designate any major rift 
in mutual relations. 
Recently, the main problem that has strained bilateral relations with the 
United States was the inclusion of the Czech Republic into the US Visa 
Waver Programme. However, at the moment, even this matter seems to be 
largely settled due to the respective congressional amendment adopted in 
5) In relation to Germany, the legacy of WWII is still present among many Czechs, which was illustrated throughout the 1990’s by 
controversies over, for example, the so-called Beneš decrees, authorising the removal of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia 
after WWII. In relation to France and the UK, what is viewed as a betrayal of Czechoslovakia in Munich Agreement in 1938 is 
recalled by some politicians, recently, for instance by the Vice-Premier for the EU, Alexandr Vondra. 
 The Case Studies: Czech Republic – David Král
2007 that increased the permissible refusal rate for visa applicants to 10, 
a threshold comfortably met by the Czech Republic. At the moment, the 
only technical strain of this programme seems to be on the part of the US;⁶ 
stipulations can result in a slight delay in enrolment in the programme; in 
any case, the visa-free regime should be granted by the end of 2008. An 
important point is also that the Czech government decided to embark on 
bilateral negotiations with the US administration on the visa issues, being 
the ﬁ rst country to sign the Memorandum that paves the way to inclusion 
in the programme. Th is happened at a cost of harsh criticism from both the 
European Commission, as well as some ‘old’ member states, who feared that 
this Czech freelancing might undermine the common European approach, 
and that the Czechs would be willing to make concessions to the US 
administration (for instance, regarding the transfer of passengers’ data to 
US authorities or the deployment of air marshals) that would subsequently 
be extended to countries currently on the programme as well. 
As far as Czech attitudes towards NATO are concerned, they seemed to 
be rather problematic soon after the Czech accession, but were arguably 
healed at a later stage to a considerable degree. Despite the fact that all the 
political parties, apart from the Communists, have consistently supported 
the country’s membership in NATO, when practical issues were at stake 
after the accession, the Czech position proved rather awkward, to say the 
least. Firstly, the Czechs were exhibiting relatively low support for NATO 
membership compared to the other candidates, as well as low awareness in 
terms of the rights and responsibilities attached to the Alliance (Řiháčková 
2005). Th is is attributable to several factors – the fact that NATO was for 
years portrayed as “the enemy,” which led to sceptical positions, especially 
among older people, but also the fact that the political elites were reluctant 
to launch a wide public debate, fearing that it would be tricky to discuss 
security issues publicly, as well as what they view as Czech paciﬁ sm and 
mistrust towards military alliances. Th e second important moment high-
lighting the ambivalent attitudes concerns the political representation and 
its attitudes during the Kosovo air strike that occurred only a few weeks 
after the Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999. Th e political scene was 
split – President Václav Havel and two smaller parliamentary parties – the 
6) The respective congressional amendment authorised the Secretary for Homeland Security to introduce an Electronic System for 
Travel Authorization (ESTA), requiring travellers from visa waiver countries to the USA to register with US authorities at least 72 
hours prior to departure. Although the introduction of the system was announced in June 2008 by Homeland Security Secretary 
Michael Chertoff, the system will be operational only towards the end of 2008. 
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Freedom Union and the Christian Democrats – supported the operation 
without hesitation; the minority Social Democrats in the government 
cautiously expressed support, but with many internal reservations; the 
Communists were against the operation. However, what came as a large 
surprise was the position of Václav Klaus, at the time, leader of the ODS and 
speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the Parliament), 
who criticised the strike, claiming that it would not produce a long-term 
solution. Th is ambiguous position, with diﬀ erences going not only between 
the government and the opposition, but also across various political actors, 
became somewhat symptomatic for Czech attitudes towards various 
foreign policy issues where NATO, EU, and US interests are at stake, not 
least regarding the Iraqi crisis and missile defence. In any case, hesitant 
support of the NATO operation in Yugoslavia shortly after entering the 
alliance signalled serious doubts about Czech loyalty and responsibility and 
left a certain strain on the country’s relationship with the US, which was 
unproblematic until then. Some analysts go so far as to claim that NATO 
created a serious problem for itself by accepting the Czech Republic in 
the ﬁ rst, a move that could take a long time and much eﬀ ort to remedy 
(Pečina 1999). 
Th e following period, particularly post 9/11, already gives a very diﬀ erent 
picture. Th e Czech Republic was the ﬁ rst country behind the Iron Curtain 
to host the NATO summit (in November 2002), largely thanks to the per-
sonal engagement of President Havel and the former Ambassador to the 
US and special envoy for the summit, Alexandr Vondra. Th e perception 
of paciﬁ st Czechs also changed with the active involvement of the Czech 
Republic in the stabilisation of Kosovo as part of KFOR – the NATO mili-
tary mission, which, to date, has been the largest Czech military presence 
abroad,⁷ as well as the NATO operation Essential Harvest in Macedonia 
(Stýskalíková 2004) that included the deployment of over 120 Czech troops. 
Czechs also participate in the International Stabilisation Assistance Force 
(ISAF), a NATO operation in Afghanistan during which they have increased 
their deployment since the beginning of the operation. Th e overall number 
of Czech soldiers in various NATO operations in 2008 has amounted to 
800, thus meeting the NATO requirements of having 8 of deployable 
troops in foreign missions and helping substantially in repairing the Czech 
reputation vis-à-vis the Alliance. Th e image of the army has also changed 
7) As of June 2008, the Czech Republic has 473 troops in Kosovo as part of the 11th contingent, deployed in the Multi-national Task 
Force Centre (MNTF-C), currently under Finnish command. 
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dramatically among the Czech people due to its professionalization and 
extremely positive reﬂ ection of its performance during the 2002 ﬂ oods. 
Today, the opinion polls show that the army is the most trusted institution 
among all law enforcement institutions.⁸ Still, NATO remains the least 
popular organization compared to the EU and the UN.⁹ 
As far as attitudes towards the European Union are concerned, they seem 
to be highly complicated due to the rather polarised position of the political 
parties. Apart from the Communists, who oppose the membership in the 
Union as such (but by far not as strongly as membership in NATO), the 
other parties have supported it, albeit with diﬀ erent degrees of enthusiasm. 
For Václav Klaus and his followers within the ODS, membership in the EU 
has always been merely a ‘marriage of convenience,’ simply acknowledging 
the fact that there was no viable alternative for the Czech Republic. Th e 
Social Democrats, and smaller parties such as the KDU-ČSL, the Freedom 
Union, or, more recently, the Green Party, take a much more positive and 
constructive approach to the EU, striving to contribute to the progres-
sive framing of the Union’s policies, including its foreign policy. It seems 
that, for the ODS particularly, the progress in the EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) poses substantial problems, as it deprives the 
country of much leverage in external relations. For this reason, leading ODS 
ﬁ gures have been consistently opposed to ‘more Europe’ in foreign policy, 
including an increased scope of majority voting, instead preferring loser 
alliances (such as NATO) where consensus is a rule and the member states 
have more room to manoeuvre. Th is is in sharp contrast to the position of 
most other democratic parties¹⁰, who support the progressive framing of 
the CFSP, including its security and defence dimension known as the ESDP 
(European Security and Defence Policy). 
Let us now explore in more detail how the country’s position towards the 
USA, the EU, and NATO ﬁ t into the key issues with which Czech foreign 
policy has been confronted over the past few years, from the point of view 
of the parties represented on the Czech political scene.
8) For instance, a CVVM poll from May 2007 shows that more than 60% of Czechs trust the Army, while only 50% trust the courts 
and the police (CVVM 2007).
9) Cf. the opinion poll conducted by CVVM in March 2008 (CVVM 2008a).
10) The idiom ‘democratic parties’ in the Czech discourse usually refers to the parliamentary parties with the exceptions of Communists. 
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US Military Presence in Europe and Missile Defence 
Th e election manifestos and other strategic party documents of the 
parliamentary political parties in the Czech Republic rarely contain direct 
references to the desirability of an American military presence in Europe. 
Th e ODS is the most explicit example in this sense. Th e election programme 
of the ODS for the 2006 parliamentary elections, called ‘Společně pro lepší 
život (Together for a Better Life),’ in its section relating to foreign policy 
(written by Jan Zahradil, ODS leader in the European Parliament) high-
lights that an ‘American engagement in Europe in the NATO framework 
is the best guarantee of the general interests of Euro-Atlantic civilisation 
and, in the long-term, a necessary pre-condition of European security and 
stability.’ (ODS 2006) Th e position document from the shadow govern-
ment of the ODS from 2003 puts it even more clearly, stating that ‘the US 
military presence in Europe is absolutely essential’ (ODS 2003a) and that 
only a transatlantic link is a guarantee of our civilisation. It furthermore 
explicitly argues for the active participation of the Czech Republic in the 
NATO missile defence system. Th e long-term programme of the ČSSD 
contains a relatively extensive chapter on foreign, security, and defence 
policies (ČSSD 2005), however, without any speciﬁ c reference to the US 
military presence in Europe. Moreover, most of the references in the party 
programme put a strong emphasis on European security and defence policy 
that can be viewed as a sign of wishful emancipation from the US being the 
main security provider, even for the Czech Republic. Th ere is no speciﬁ c 
reference to the matter in the election manifesto of the KDU-ČSL either, 
apart from the acknowledgement of a dominant role for the USA in NATO 
(KDU-ČSL 2006), and no direct reference in the Green Party programme 
(Strana zelených 2006), apart from the claim that European forces should 
replace NATO in Europe (see further). Th e Communist Party refuses the 
US military presence implicitly, calling for the ‘abolishment of all foreign 
military bases and the prohibition of their construction’ in its 2006–10 
election manifesto (KSČM 2006).
Th is conspicuous silence from the Czech parties’ documents (particularly, 
the ČSSD) is surprising, not least because the Czech Republic is currently 
confronted with a very delicate issue in ratifying the missile defence treaty 
with the United States and hosting the US radar system. Th e debate that has 
evolved around the issue from 2007 until the present reveals much more 
about the position of the individual parties and their key representatives than 
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the party programmes to which we were referring. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the situation is clearest with the political parties on the edge of the Czech 
political spectrum. 
Th e ODS overwhelmingly supports the conclusion of the missile defence 
treaty with the USA, its ratiﬁ cation, and the installation of radar in the Czech 
Republic. It can be explained partly by the fact that the ODS-led govern-
ment negotiated the missile defence treaty, and thus one would expect that 
it would defend its position. However, there does not have to be a guarantee 
from the majority of the party siding with the government, as is shown by 
the example of another important document negotiated by ODS-led govern-
ment – the Lisbon Treaty. But in the case of the missile defence, the ODS is 
united behind Prime Minister Topolánek, the Vice-Premier Vondra, and chief 
negotiator Pojar in supporting the installation. Despite the overwhelming 
support within the party, most analysts agree that the party (and the govern-
ment as a whole, for that matter) grossly mishandled the whole debate about 
the missile defence. Firstly, the ODS failed to present convincing arguments 
about why the Czech Republic needs the installation. Due to the lack of such 
arguments present in the public discourse, it is more diﬃ  cult to analyze what 
the main reasons are for the ODS strongly supporting the radar base. Prime 
Minister Topolánek admitted that, apart from the defence from ballistic mis-
siles itself, one of the reasons is ‘strengthening the link to the United States.’ 
On the very left of the Czech political scene, the Communist Party refuses 
the missile defence treaty and the location of radar on Czech soil. Th e party 
acknowledges its support to all the activities undertaken by diﬀ erent actors 
to undermine any activities leading to eventual installation. 
It is interesting to note that the positions of both political parties go along 
with the preferences of their respective electorates. Th e survey undertaken by 
the CVVM polling agency in July 2008 suggests that as many as 68 of ODS 
voters support the radar while 88  of KSČM voters refuse it (CVVM 2008b). 
Th e position of the strongest opposition party, the ČSSD, is naturally 
instrumental in the Czech debate on missile defence. Firstly, it disposes with 
a substantial voting potential in the Chamber of Deputies where the treaty 
will have to be ratiﬁ ed. It is also quite likely that, with the change in the 
government, the governmental position towards missile defence might revert, 
which explains why the ODS was quite eager to complete the negotiations as 
soon as possible and present it to the Parliament. Th e most vocal opponents 
of the radar seem to be the leader of the ČSSD, Jiří Paroubek, and his ‘shadow’ 
Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, Lubomír Zaorálek. ODS leaders often mention 
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the fact that it was during the premiership of Paroubek that the ﬁ rst delibera-
tions on the possible location of the radar started. However, Paroubek claims 
that these were purely technical consultations and that no binding decision 
was made by his government at the time¹¹. Moreover, Paroubek claims that 
the ﬁ rst steps toward including the Czech Republic in the US missile defence 
project were made in 2000 when the Vice-chairman of the Foreign Aﬀ airs 
Committee, Jiří Payne (ODS), lobbied with President Havel to explore the 
possibility of including the Czech Republic in such plans.
It is very tempting to interpret the ČSSD opposition to the radar base 
as simply following public opinion. Long-term polls show that about two 
thirds of Czechs are opposed to it, as well as 80 of ČSSD voters; the ČSSD, 
being in the opposition, thus ﬁ nds a suitable stick on the government with 
which it can win extra points in the elections, as this is one of the few foreign 
policy issues in which Czechs are interested. Th is also explains why the ČSSD 
leadership has been trying to push for a referendum on the issue, albeit 
unsuccessfully.¹² Paroubek and his followers in the ČSSD have been exploit-
ing diﬀ erent strategies to prevent the signature of the missile defence treaty, 
including the threat of launching a procedure in front of the Constitutional 
Court, connecting the signature of the treaty with the government’s vote of 
conﬁ dence in the Parliament, or writing an open letter to Condoleeza Rice, 
arguing for a reconsideration of the treaty with a view of a possible change 
of leadership both in the Czech Republic and the USA. However, one must 
look at substantive arguments deployed by the ČSSD against the radar, which 
says something about the position of the party. Th e main opposition is based 
on several premises: the treaty represents a bilateral deal that will eventually 
weaken NATO and the ESDP; it serves only the defence of US territory, not 
that of the Czech Republic or other allies; there is no imminent threat of 
a ballistic missile attack; and, last but not least, it will strongly damage the 
country’s rather uncomplicated relationship with Russia. Zaorálek, the shad-
ow Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, stated that the main reason he is opposed to 
the plan is that it excludes the European Union from any negotiations; if this 
were not the case, he might have reconsidered his position. Earlier, it was also 
signalled by Paroubek that as the missile defence treaty is a bilateral initiative, 
it would worsen relations not only with EU members, but also those within 
11) When the media revealed that in fact more consultations were taking place under the ČSSD government, Paroubek claimed that 
he was not informed on such consultations by his predecessor, Prime Minister Stanislav Gross.
12) The Social Democrats tabled a constitutional amendment in October 2007 that would have enabled a call for a referendum on 
the missile base, as well as a general constitutional act on referendum. 
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NATO. Th is points out the broader issue of the Social Democrats’ preference 
for other types of security arrangements than those relying solely on the US. 
It also remains to be seen to what extent the Social Democrats will be ﬁ nally 
united when it comes down to a parliamentary vote. Th ree ČSSD deputies 
who have visited similar a US radar base in the Marshall Islands on the invita-
tion of US government signalled that they might re-evaluate their position on 
the radar, and that they would like to start a more profound debate within the 
party. On the other hand, Paroubek claimed that these possible rebels would 
not stand as ČSSD candidates in the next elections. 
With the current constellation, the positions of the two junior coalition 
partners, the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and the Greens, is crucial. 
Th e Christian Democrats seem to be generally supportive of the radar 
base, albeit with exceptions. One of their deputies, Ludvík Hovorka, sup-
ported the opposition in pushing for a referendum on the missile defence 
treaty, and signalled that he might vote against it – a situation that might 
be tricky for the government, as it will need the coalition deputies to be 
unanimously united behind the government and its very tiny majority. In 
addition, an ambivalent signal was sent by KDU-ČSL Minister of Defence, 
Vlasta Parkanová, who claimed that, if the negotiations with Poland go 
badly, the Czech Republic should reconsider its participation in the missile 
defence system and ‘start from the scratch,’ a claim that was soon disman-
tled by Prime Minister Topolánek, chief negotiator Pojar, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Aﬀ airs. Th e general agreement of the KDU-ČSL with having 
the base is, however, conditional. Th e most important condition is that the 
radar be incorporated into the missile defence system of NATO, which was 
agreed to at the Bucharest summit in April 2008. Th e other minor objec-
tions are concerned the possible health impacts of the installation on local 
people and the jurisdiction over the US soldiers outside of the base¹³. Th e 
conditions illustrate and are consistent with the approach of the Christian 
Democrats who, in regard to security arrangements, prefer a multilateral 
approach with the close involvement of NATO especially, but possibly also 
the EU. It also conforms to the position of its previous party chairman 
and Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, Cyril Svoboda, who was, in the previous 
ČSSD-led government, the chief person beyond the consultations with the 
Americans and initially signalled a strong interest in the location of the 
radar base on the Czech territory.
13) The latter issue will be regulated in a separate treaty known as ‘SOFA’ whose negotiation has not been completed yet at the time 
of writing. 
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Th e position of the other junior coalition partner, the Green Party, is more 
complicated and divided. Th e Greens hold the powerful post of Foreign 
Minister in the current government, represented by Prince Karel Schwarzen-
berg, who – although being non-partisan – has been nominated by the 
party. Schwarzenberg has acted as a powerful advocate of missile defence 
(despite the fact that most negotiations were handled by his deputy, Tomáš 
Pojar, or Prime Minister Topolánek directly). Moreover, in case the treaty 
was not approved, he signalled that he would resign. However, the party is 
internally divided over the issue of support for the radar base. In addition to 
the Christian Democrats, the Green Party conditioned their support of the 
treaty on several factors, namely on the clause referring to the protection of 
the environment, the positive North Atlantic Council (i.e. NATO) decision, 
the common position of the EU Council, and the guarantee that the base will 
come under NATO command once the missile defence system of the Alliance 
is operational. Th e conditions show that the Greens attach much attention 
to the multilateral impact of the treaty, particularly the position of NATO 
and the EU. Th e party chairman, Martin Bursík, and vice-chairman Ondřej 
Liška were also very concerned to get the endorsement of the European 
Green Party. When a resolution tabled by the Dutch Green Party intended 
to refuse the radar system, Bursík and Liška managed to convince their 
European colleagues to give leeway for the Czech Greens to decide on its 
support. However, as the two latter conditions were not met, the Republic 
Council (the supreme body of the party) did not endorse the treaty in April 
2008 and appealed to the Green parliamentarians to vote against it. As the 
opposition from some deputies in the party is quite strong, it is possible 
that the party will remain divided when it comes to a parliamentary vote, 
complicating the ratiﬁ cation further. Th e situation is complicated with strong 
internal tensions inside the Green Party in which some of its members feel 
that leaders holding government positions like Bursík or Liška are making 
too many concessions to the ODS and diverting too much attention away 
from the Green programme. 
Th e missile defence treaty is arguably the most controversial issue con-
cerning relations with the USA since the fall of communism. It shows a visible 
lack of consensus not only amongst the two major parties that think of the 
treaty in totally opposite terms, but also within the ruling coalition. Th ere are 
also a lot of emotions involved, as hosting foreign soldiers on Czech soil again 
less then 20 years after the Russian troops left is, for many Czechs (politicians 
and citizens alike), tricky to swallow. Th e ratiﬁ cation process will be very 
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complicated and might be achieved at a cost of very personal interventions 
with deputies that are not resolutely decided yet. Th e analysis of discourse 
shows that, at the very heart of the thinking of the crucial stakeholders, there 
are not only technical issues, but much broader ones as well, such as whether 
the Czech Republic should engage in bilateral security arrangements with the 
United States, or whether it should look for a more multilateral approach, 
including particularly NATO and the EU. Th e diﬀ erence between the two 
major parties, the ODS and the ČSSD, is clearly visible. 
Relationship with NATO and ESDP
As far as support for NATO goes, it raises as we move from the left to the 
right, with the ODS being the most supportive and the Communists calling 
for its dissolution and the Czech pull-out from its membership. With the 
exception of the Communist party, the same applies the other way round 
for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – while the ODS is 
the most sceptical about the role of the EU as a security provider and would 
generally like to keep the defence policy within NATO, the ČSSD is conﬁ dent 
that a progressive development of the ESDP and a rising role of Europe in 
defence is in the interest of the Czech Republic. 
Such a straightforward conclusion deserves more explanation and analysis. 
Th e best starting point could be, again, a reference to election manifestos and 
strategic party documents, moving over to more concrete statements from 
the prominent parties’ representatives. 
As for the ODS’ position, guidance can be found in the party’s election 
programme of 2006 (ODS 2006), as well as in some older documents such 
as the shadow government’s programme of 2003 (ODS 2003c) or position 
documents on the EU Accession Treaty of 2003 (ODS 2003a). In relation to 
defence, all these documents emphasize that the ESDP must not develop as 
a substitute or competition to NATO. Th e ODS supports Europe’s capacity 
to undertake certain precisely deﬁ ned tasks without the US, however, not 
at a cost of creating duplicities with NATO. It also claims to be in favour of 
closer military co-operation within the EU; however, it is against the creation 
of the European army. In light of these documents, the Czech army’s reform, 
ensuring its interoperability with NATO missions, is the main imperative, 
with involvement in the ESDP not viewed as important and only as long as it 
does not contradict the objectives of NATO’s capabilities and defence plan-
ning. Th e ODS also rejects the collective defence clause among the European 
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Union members, believing that the EU should not evolve into a defence union. 
In the position document of 2003 (ODS 2003b), the ODS acknowledges 
the attempts to build the ESDP as a counterweight to the United States and 
NATO, namely by countries like France, Germany, or Belgium. Given the time 
when the document was adopted, it reacted primarily to an initiative from the 
afore-mentioned countries for creating a separate defence union inside the 
EU, with planning capacities independent of NATO. Th ere is also a large sus-
picion that European ambitions in defence remain merely rhetorical – in the 
view of the ODS, European countries are simply not willing to spend enough 
on defence in order to make it credible; the document highlights that only 5 of 
15 members spend more than 2 of their GDP on defence. In the document, 
Petr Nečas, one of the leading defence experts in the ODS, points to the 
defence technology gap between the USA and its European allies, including 
overall defence spending, spending on defence research, or the eﬀ ectiveness 
of military engagements. Due to this, he argues, the EU will not be able to 
replace NATO in the near future.¹⁴ One must bear in mind that the adoption 
of the ODS strategy over the ESDP also coincided with the deliberations of 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, which strived at enforcing the ESDP 
institutionally and was opposed therein by ODS representative Jan Zahradil, 
elected in 2004 as MEP. Th ere is no evidence that would suggest a substantive 
re-consideration of the ODS position since EU accession, or since the party 
formed a government after the 2006 elections. 
Despite the generally strong support for NATO, one must not overlook 
that the ODS position has not been always consistent either. As was already 
mentioned during the Kosovo air strike in 1999, Václav Klaus, chairman of 
the party at the time, came out strongly against NATO. He was not alone – 
another prominent person in the party, Miroslav Macek, dismissed the 
operation, claiming that ‘NATO needed to test new airplanes.’ (Řiháčková 
2005) One can, however, argue that the situation has changed substantially 
since then and that the ODS is currently committed to ensuring that the 
Czech Republic is viewed as a reliable member of the Alliance. 
Th e long-term programme of the ČSSD states that the party ‘attaches great 
importance to the construction of eﬀ ective foreign, security, and defence pol-
icies of the European Union, which is a necessary precondition for enhancing 
the EU’s role in the international community and an important instrument 
for crises and conﬂ ict prevention, as well as for the eﬀ ective management 
14) ‘The future of NATO and the Czech Republic’, speech delivered in a conference organized in March 2002 in Prague.
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of existing conﬂ icts (ČSSD 2005).’ Th e document goes on to state that, for 
the active participation of the Czech Republic in the ESDP, the creation of 
a coherent, internally co-ordinated, and legislatively anchored defence system 
is necessary, and that it is necessary to ensure its operativeness and complex 
preparedness in order to cover all security threats and risks, including those 
of an asymmetric character. Th e document highlights that these threats can 
be tackled only by the full participation of the Czech Republic in two key 
organisations – the EU and NATO and stipulates that this support is neces-
sary for further development of both organizations, stressing that the ESDP 
(in co-operation with NATO) should assume more responsibility in dealing 
with military and civilian crises. It also contains a reference to co-operation 
with other organisations, namely the UN and the OSCE. Th e position of the 
Social Democrats also reﬂ ects a long-term vision, which sees Czech security 
as built on two pillars, NATO and the EU. However, there is much more 
enthusiasm for a more independent role for the EU in the defence arena and 
a commitment to increasing European defence capabilities. 
Th e 2006 election manifesto of the KDU-ČSL contains a clause acknowl-
edging the dominant role of the USA in NATO; however, it also claims that, 
for possible local conﬂ icts in Europe, European operational capabilities should 
be deployable. Furthermore, the programme stresses the party’s commitment 
to building European defence capabilities, as well as fulﬁ lling the obligations 
arising from NATO membership, and the deployment of Czech troops either 
in UN, NATO or EU missions. In the section devoted to foreign policy, the 
manifesto says that the party supports the transatlantic link and, thus, will 
advocate more responsibility for European NATO members for their defence; 
however, this measure will rule out any steps leading to any kind of European 
emancipation that would weaken NATO (KDU-ČSL 2006). 
Th e Green Party’s programme considers the deepening of the ESDP as an 
indispensable part of European integration (Strana zelených 2006). It goes 
further in highlighting that a long-term goal of the party is that European 
defence capabilities replace NATO in Europe. It also calls for EU member 
states to be more assertive in their relations with the United States, includ-
ing NATO, and take more into account their interests as deﬁ ned by the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially should the US policy remain 
as unilateral and controversial as it has after 9/11. 
Th e Communist Party, in its 2006 election programme, clearly demon-
strates its negative attitude towards NATO and Czech participation within 
it. It calls for the withdrawal from NATO military structures as the ﬁ rst 
The Case Studies: Czech Republic – David Král
phase, and the dissolution of the Alliance as a long-term goal. It also calls for 
repealing the NATO security strategy of 1999, describing it as unacceptable, 
primarily due to the reference of preventive strikes outside NATO territory 
and the lack of mandates in accordance with international law (KSČM 2006). 
Although there is no direct reference to ESDP development, we could easily 
assume that the KSČM is not in favour of it either – in the long term, the 
KSČM refuses any other military involvement than that under the UN and 
in strict compliance with the UN Charter. 
Iraq
Th e Czech Republic’s involvement in Iraq, particularly during the initial 
strike against Saddam’s regime known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, illustrates 
deep partisan divisions concerning its support for the United States and the 
‘coalition of the willing.’ Moreover, it shows that divisions not only occurred 
often between political parties, but also across parties (especially with the 
ČSSD) and other constitutional actors as well. Th e result was a balanced 
position that made the crucial actors happy, albeit rather obscure for the 
outside world (and the Czech public for that matter). Nevertheless, the 
Czech Republic remains in Iraq until today,¹⁵ albeit with a limited presence. 
In addition, none of the other governments involved in in Iraq since 2003 
have pulled out of the country completely. Although a possible pullout was 
signalled in 2007 by Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg, he did so without 
specifying the timeframe.
In the wake of operations in Iraq during 2003, the ODS was in opposition. 
Its position was quite ﬁ rm in supporting President Havel’s signature of the 
so-called ‘Letter of Eight.’ Particularly, three ODS deputies were very vocal on 
the issue – the shadow Minister of Defence, Petr Nečas, the shadow Minister 
of Foreign Aﬀ airs, Jan Zahradil, and the chairman of the Defence Committee 
in the Chamber, Jan Vidím. Although the position of the ODS was critical of 
the ČSSD-led government, it was merely in a sense that its position was too 
ambivalent and inconsistent, and that the government failed to communi-
cate it to the media. However, the ODS deputies did not propose a stronger 
resolution that would authorize the Czech army to become directly involved 
15) The Czech Republic has deployed over 1,600 troops since 2003 as a part of the Multi-national Force in Iraq under Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. On 5 December 2006, the Lower Chamber of the Czech Republic’s Parliament voted to extend their country’s military 
mission in Iraq until the end of December 2007.  With the closing of the Iraqi Police Academy, the Czech Deputy Chairman of 
Defense formerly accepted the new mission for 2007, requiring the deployment of two Force Protection Platoons and three Iraqi 
Police Training teams.  The Czech Republic rotates its forces every December and June.
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in ground operations in Iraq. Generally speaking, the position of the ODS 
was not as critical as one would have expected. In fact, with the support of 
the ODS, the government managed to push most of its acts and resolutions 
on Iraq through the Parliament, including the dispatch of the Seventh ﬁ eld 
hospital to Basra. Th ere is one possible explanation for this rather ambivalent 
position of the ODS, that being the opposition to the strike by Václav Klaus. 
Klaus was elected President of the Republic shortly ahead of the attack on 
Iraq. Shortly after taking the oﬃ  ce, he expressed doubts that the strike could 
lead to a long-term solution. Allegedly, he even clashed with Craig Stapleton, 
the US ambassador in Prague, over the issue of weapons of mass destruction 
in Iraq and the inclusion of the Czech Republic on the list of the ‘coalition of 
the willing.’ Despite the fact that Klaus remained only an honorary chairman 
of the ODS, he still exercises a certain inﬂ uence over part of the party. Th us, 
the mainstream ODS was forced to deal with accommodating his position 
into the general party line. Eventually, the ODS might have been quite happy 
that the government did not adopt a more resolute position and have decided 
not to participate in the military operation.
Th e position of the ČSSD, the senior coalition party at the time of the crisis, 
was clearly the most important, but also the most divisive. Th ere were several 
cleavages, notably between the members of the cabinet (including Prime Min-
ister Špidla and Minister of Defence Tvrdík) and ČSSD parliamentarians, but 
also between the wider partisan base of the ČSSD and the members holding 
oﬃ  ce. Th e ministers of the ČSSD in the government had to balance between 
a more pro-American proposal from the MFA, advocating Czech involvement 
in the operation (plus two smaller parties supporting the US-led coalition), 
and the majority of their own party who was strongly opposed to the strike, 
including many members of Parliament. Perhaps the most vocal opponent of 
the governmental position in the Chamber was Vladimír Laštůvka, chairman 
of the Foreign Aﬀ airs Committee. In his view, the government resolution 
was still too pro-American (despite the fact that it did not ask for a mandate 
to participate in ground operations) and should have been much closer to 
that of France or Germany. Furthermore, the ČSSD party congress in March 
2003 overwhelmingly adopted the so-called anti-war resolution, initiated by 
Vladimír Laštůvka, Richard Falbr (then a senator – currently MEP), and Jan 
Kavan (senator and former Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs; at the time Chairman 
of the UN General Assembly). Th e resolution condemned the ‘war conducted 
by the USA, Great Britain, and the so-called Alliance against Iraq, which was 
initiated without the consent of the international community, and, according 
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to the Congress, is thus conducted contrary to international law’ (ČSSD 2003). 
Especially, Falbr was extremely critical of the government. In the interview 
with Právo (the leading left-wing daily), he stated: ‘It is necessary for the 
(ČSSD) congress to do it (condemn the war in Iraq). Either they are socialists 
or they are not. Either they believe in the American babble on the preventive 
war or they believe in a collective security system that has been built over dec-
ades.’ Kavan, another author of the resolution, was in an opposite position in 
1999 when, in the capacity of Foreign Minister, was forced to dismiss another 
ČSSD congress resolution condemning the NATO strike against Yugoslavia as 
‘confusing,’ thus personifying the ambivalent attitude of the Social Democrats 
to important crises such as Kosovo or Iraq (Král and Pachta 2005). On the 
contrary, Libor Rouček, the government’s spokesman and the leading ČSSD 
ﬁ gure for the European Parliament elections in 2004, was among the strongest 
opponents of the resolution and tabled his own proposal, showing apprecia-
tion for the policy pursued by the government thus far. Th us, the ambivalent 
attitude of the ČSSD ministers and the mainstream members of the party 
showed deep divisions over many important foreign policy issues at stake 
(relations to the US and the EU, the pre-emptive use of force, the role of the 
UN) and illustrates that assuming responsibility as a member of the govern-
ment might face it with the choice of alienating the executive representatives 
from its member base.
Th e position of the ČSSD became somewhat more critical of the US’ 
involvement in Iraq after the operation. In his recent blog, current party chair-
man Jiří Paroubek criticises the US (particularly, the Bush administration) for 
mismanagement in the situation in Iraq, having caused a loss of credibility 
for all of the allies. He says that ‘after six years of armed conﬂ icts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is obvious that our American allies cannot predict the develop-
ments and basically cannot master the warfare situations unless they end up 
with an immediate and deﬁ nitive success’ (Paroubek 2008). At the same time, 
however, just ahead of the 2006 parliamentary elections, Paroubek claimed 
that he would not think of terminating the Czech presence in Iraq, consisting 
in military police training for the Iraqi forces. 
As far as the position of the KDU-ČSL on Iraq goes, it basically conformed 
to its image of an Atlanticist party. It was reiterated by the fact that it was hold-
ing the key department at the time – foreign aﬀ airs. Th e Foreign Minister, Cyril 
Svoboda, expressed clear support for the coalition strike, motivated mainly by 
ideological reasons (Král and Pachta 2005). Th e Christian Democrats tended 
to see the operation as a ﬁ ght of ‘good against evil’ in defence of Christian 
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civilisation. Although Svoboda defended the stronger MFA resolution, giving 
the government leeway in deciding whether to deploy soldiers, he eventually 
agreed with the more watered-down version that was adopted by the cabinet. 
However, there was some opposition inside the party, articulated, for instance, 
by Deputy Jan Kasal who argued that terrorism could not be overcome by the 
use of force. Th us, the KDU-ČSL eventually found it comfortable to support 
the government position because it would not allow for the deployment of 
Czech troops without a new UN Security Council mandate. In addition, the 
position of the Czech Catholic Church, as well as the Vatican (which was 
anti-war), made an impact on the party’s agreement with an eventual Czech 
non-participation in the ground operations.
Of all the parliamentary parties, the KSČM adopted arguably the clearest 
position. Th e party leadership expressed an unequivocal opposition to the 
war. None of the communist deputies or senators ever supported any of the 
government’s proposals for Iraq. Th is is consistent with the party’s position 
on issues such as the Czech Republic’s membership in NATO, the Kosovo 
air campaign, or the country’s participation in Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Some party members, such as Deputy Václav Exner, explained the motives 
for intervention in ‘realpolitik’ terms such as an US attempt to gain control 
over Iraqi natural resources. Others, such as Deputy Miroslav Ransdorf (cur-
rently MEP), argued more in terms of the breach of international law. Th e 
unambiguous position of the KSČM can also be explained by strong internal 
discipline within the party, as well as a generally ‘paciﬁ st’ nature, plus a hostil-
ity towards the use of force of any kind in the international arena, especially 
without a mandate from the UN. 
External Aspects of the War on Terror
Th e Czech reaction to the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington was 
generally that of sympathy with the United States and support of their eﬀ orts 
to ﬁ ght terrorism globally. After the US invoked Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty in March 2002, it was already under the minority ČSSD govern-
ment of Prime Minister Miloš Zeman that the Czech Republic endorsed its 
participation in the global anti-terrorist operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ by 
dispatching a contingent of 250 troops to Kuwait in February 2003, replaced 
by a specialized battalion of 395 men for radiation, chemical, and biological 
weapons protection, whose territory of possible deployment was extended 
to Turkey and Israel. 
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However, in opposition to the general acknowledgement of the need to 
ﬁ ght terrorism, the Czech political parties largely diﬀ er in their assessment 
of the adequacy of the tools used by the United States abroad. Th is includes 
diﬀ erent aspects of the external war on terrorism, including alleged CIA 
ﬂ ights over European countries, the detention of terrorist suspects at 
Guantanamo Bay, or the abuse of human rights by US military while inter-
rogating alleged terrorists in other locations. 
The ODS views the threat of terrorism as one of the major threats 
to the Euro-Atlantic space, particularly after 9/11. There is an extensive 
chapter devoted to terrorism in the 2003 shadow government programme, 
pointing especially to the risks of a possible connection between the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and what Petr 
Nečas, the author of the programme, calls ‘megaterrorism’ – i.e. terrorism 
focused on great visibility brought about by huge numbers of victims. It 
argues that this kind of terrorism is actively supported by certain states 
and regimes, and that the use of military force is justifiable against the 
infrastructure of such organisations and against such states both pre-
ventively and responsively. He admits, however, that intelligence, police 
methods, and existing structures should be used primarily (ODS 2003b). 
This shows that the ODS assumes the necessity of the ‘externalization’ of 
the war on terror.
As far as more particular external aspects of the war on terror are con-
cerned, some ODS representatives have tried to play down the importance 
of reports implicating the involvement of certain European governments in 
activities linked to the CIA rendition ﬂ ights. Jan Zahradil, in an interview for 
Czech Radio – Radiožurnál in June 2006 (ČRo 2006), belittled the impor-
tance of the reports presented by the European Parliament ad-hoc committee 
investigating the CIA ﬂ ights, as well as the report of the Council of Europe 
presented by Swiss senator Dick Marty. In Zahradil’s opinion, the reports 
were too vague to prove the allegations, and in fact could not have been 
more detailed as many facts were classiﬁ ed due to national security concerns. 
He went further, suggesting that the publicity given to the investigations of 
CIA ﬂ ights actually undermined the eﬀ ectiveness of ﬁ ghting terrorism. As 
he stressed, the only important matter was whether fundamental rights 
were being breached. To date, this has not been proved by the investigation 
of either of the institutions. He also indirectly accused both the Council of 
Europe and European Parliament committees to be a priori biased against the 
US intelligence sector, which could result in a reluctance of the Americans to 
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co-operate with European intelligence services. Similarly, regarding the case 
of Guantanamo Bay, Zahradil claims that it would be counter-productive to 
push too much, at the EU level, on the United States to close the base, argu-
ing that ‘it is not worth trying to provoke a confrontation between Europe 
and America, that it is necessary to understand each other and co-operate 
because the problem we are facing is a common one.’ 
Generally, the ČSSD supports the co-operation between the EU and the 
US in the ﬁ ght against terrorism. However, the position of the ČSSD towards 
the methods used by the US is much more reserved, to say the least. Although 
the party acknowledges the importance of the problem in its long-term pro-
gramme, the statements of some of the leading politicians indicate a critique 
of the US strategy. For example, Libor Rouček, a Member of the European 
Parliament, considers the Guantanamo Bay base a place where human rights 
and the Geneva Convention are violated, and expresses his opposition to 
any possible interrogation of terrorist suspects on Czech territory. Lubomír 
Zaorálek (shadow Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs for the ČSSD) admits that the 
West, as a whole, committed serious mistakes in the ﬁ ght against terrorism 
in the aftermath of 9/11, causing further hatred and alienation (particularly 
from Muslim states) by embracing the ‘Axis of Evil’ concept of George W. 
Bush. He asserts that ‘the servile attitude to allies at a time when an eﬀ ective 
mechanism of ﬁ ghting terrorism is to be found’ has backﬁ red. According 
to Zaorálek, terrorism cannot be defeated by a military means, making it 
necessary to grasp the causes of the threats ﬁ rst, which can be interpreted as 
a criticism of the US-deployed strategy in the global war on terror. Zaorálek 
also views the war against terrorism as too much of a unilateral initiative 
from the US, a country that is not overly keen on building stable alliances, 
but rather those of a more ad-hoc nature, which is something the Czech 
Republic should not accept and strive to change.¹⁶ An eﬀ ective ﬁ ght against 
terrorism requires the involvement of more actors and the employment of 
diﬀ erent tools, not only military ones (such as prevention, legal instruments 
at international level, etc.). Importantly, he sees a crucial role for the Euro-
pean Union in this ﬁ eld, which diverges from the ODS position that sees the 
role of the EU merely in terms of sharing the best practices and exchanging 
intelligence data. 
Th e position of the KDU-ČSL is not particularly pronounced on the 
issue. From the survey undertaken among some parliamentarians of the 
16) It is consistent with some previous statements of his, such as during a debate with Jan Zahradil on the same programme in 2004, 
cf. (Prima TV 2004).
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party, it seems that as far as Guantanamo Bay goes, most of them regard 
it as an internal matter of the United States. Similarly, the CIA ﬂ ights are 
viewed as something largely inevitable. However, the party members are 
generally inclined towards enhanced co-operation of the country’s intel-
ligence services with those of the United States, but take a more reserved 
approach towards the possible location of detention facilities for terrorist 
suspects on Czech territory.¹⁷ 
In addition, the Green Party is rather reserved to the US-employed 
strategy of ﬁ ghting terrorism. Its 2006 election manifesto acknowledges 
the indivisibility of security threats, including terrorism or the prolif-
eration of WMA as demonstrated by the attacks in New York, London, 
Madrid, or Istanbul. However, it states clearly that ‘tackling these threats by 
preventive wars or cultural clashes is bad, foolish, and counter-productive’ 
(Strana zelených 2006).
As far as the KSČM goes, the party is not very pronounced on the issue. 
However, there are references in the party documents. Its 2006 election 
manifesto does mention the ﬁ ght against all forms of terrorism (including 
state terrorism) as one of the priorities of the party’s programme. However, 
it reiterates that the ﬁ ght against terrorism must be in accordance with 
international law and UN’s documents. It also refuses the justiﬁ cation of 
human rights limitations by the ﬁ ght against terrorism, as well as using 
it as a cover for diﬀ erent purposes (KSČM 2006). Th is can be indirectly 
interpreted as a strong criticism of the US policy of war on terror, particu-
larly in the context of the KSČM strictly refusing any use of force against 
any territory that is not directly mandated by the UN. Th e document 
also highlights that it is necessary to identify the roots of terrorism and 
eradicate its causes. Th is was articulated by Václav Exner, Vice-Chairman 
of the party, in his comment for TV Prima in 2004: ‘Th ere are three basic 
tendencies regarding terrorism: Firstly, extensive prevention including 
police and intelligence co-operation; Secondly, co-operation with people 
who collaborate and point to suspicious acts, but such trust between peo-
ple and the state can hardly be established; thirdly, to prevent the causes 
of terrorism by ﬁ ghting overall injustice in the world’ (Prima TV 2004). 
Th is illustrates the emphasis that the Communists put on the prevention 
and eradication of the causes of terrorism, which is more desirable than 
any other action. 
17) Questionnaires returned by KDU-ČSL parliamentarians.
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Other Foreign Policy Issues
Th ere are some other foreign policy issues where the country’s relationship 
with the US plays a role in shaping (or at least inﬂ uencing) Czech partisan 
stances. Th e following section focuses on three such issues, explaining in 
what ways they shape the parties’ views. 
The International Criminal Court
Th e Czech Republic remains the only EU member state that has not rati-
ﬁ ed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), despite the 
fact that it signed it already in April 1999. Th is puts the Czech government 
in a rather embarrassing position for at least two reasons. Th e country will 
take over the EU presidency in January 2009, obliging it to raise the ICC issue 
with third parties to try to convince them to sign up to the statute, which 
looks awkward from a country that has problems with accepting the Court’s 
jurisdiction in its own right. Secondly, by not accepting the body that pros-
ecutes the most serious crimes against humanity, it puts at doubt the Czech 
Republic’s reputation in the EU for being a staunch supporter of human 
rights and democracy in the international arena. Even though the ČSSD 
tried to present the ratiﬁ cation in the Parliament for the ﬁ rst time in 2001, it 
was removed from the agenda. Th e problems were not so much between the 
partisan divisions, but rather in the miscommunication between the govern-
ment, the MFA, and the Parliament, as the ratiﬁ cation of the Statute would, 
according to some, require a change in the Czech constitution to enable the 
extradition of Czech citizens to the ICC, limit the right of the President to 
declare amnesty, and give mercy and limit the immunity of constitutional 
actors, including parliamentarians. In some interpretations, the problem was 
already tackled by inserting Article 10a into the Czech constitution, provid-
ing for the transfer of powers to an international organisation by virtue of 
ratifying an international treaty having constitutional force. 
Apart from the internal, rather legal considerations, there are foreign policy 
implications as well. One of the key factors is the attitude of the United States, 
which was openly hostile to IIC, particularly during the 2002–03 period. Th e 
US administration, especially in the ﬁ rst term of George W. Bush, feared that 
it could become a tool for undemocratic, authoritarian regimes to blackmail 
democratic countries for petty or completely ﬁ ctive breaches of international 
law. Th e US oﬀ ence against the court took various forms, from directly threat-
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ening stopping military co-operation with countries that ratiﬁ ed the Statute 
to concluding bilateral agreements guaranteeing the immunity of US citizens 
(particularly soldiers) from extradition to the ICC (Bílková 2007). Although, in 
recent years, the US attitude towards the Court has shifted somehow from open 
hostility to tolerance, their ratiﬁ cation of the Statute is still not imminent. 
Th e unfavourable attitude of the US towards the Court played some role 
in the reluctance of the Czech parliamentarians to rubberstamp the Statute, 
particularly among ODS members. Some party members even wanted to use 
it as a bargaining chip by trading it oﬀ  for the missile defence treaty. As Hynek 
Fajmon, MEP for the ODS admitted: ‘We will give a green light to the ICC with 
scrunching teeth, as is not our priority, if the Greens do the same with the radar’ 
(ČT 2008c). Eventually, when the Senate voted on the Statute in July 2008, 10 
out of 41 ODS Senators did not support the treaty, with 6 votes against and 4 
abstentions. It is probable that the somewhat sceptical attitude of this part from 
the ODS coincided with US concerns over supranational institutions that can 
spin out of the control of democratic countries and be abused by authoritarian 
regimes to bully and blackmail the West. One can see that the ODS supported 
the ICC mainly due to pragmatic reasons, but not as an organization that could 
achieve world justice by prosecuting the most serious crimes. Nevertheless, the 
ODS was not the only party raising critical voices against the tribunal. Criti-
cal concerns were also articulated by Vlasta Parkanová, Minister of Defence 
for the KDU-ČSL. In her comment in Hospodářské noviny in October 2007 
(Parkanová 2007), she argues that the practice of establishing ad hoc tribunals, 
such as those for Rwanda or former Yugoslavia, is a better option, as a court 
with universal jurisdiction is tricky insofar as there is no clear consensus on 
what constitutes genocide or other acts punishable under the Court’s jurisdic-
tion. She also recalls the US hesitation to ratify the Statute for these reasons. 
Th is is in sharp contrast to her fellow party and the chairman of the Legislative 
Council¹⁸ of the Government, Cyril Svoboda, who dismisses Czech fears over 
the tribunal as groundless and reeking of provincialism. He acknowledges that 
the problem is that many parliamentarians ‘pretend that our justice system is 
fairer than others, thus seeing it as a big problem to extradite our citizens to 
be judged outside the Czech Republic.’ Similarly, the Green Party Minister of 
Foreign Aﬀ airs, Karel Schwarzenberg, compared the Czech attitude to a ‘skel-
eton inside the cupboard of Czech politics and the unwillingness to endorse it 
as ‘strange hesitation.’ 
18) The Legislative Council of the Government is a body that examines legal consistency and the compatibility of the legislative 
proposals of the Czech government. 
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In the case of the ICC, the diverging positions of the diﬀ erent actors were 
personal rather than partisan. Nevertheless, the sceptical attitude (notably 
of some ODS members) suggests that there is a mistrust towards certain 
international institutions, a point shared with large parts of the ﬁ rst George 
W. Bush administration.
The Recognition of Kosovo
Th e area of the Western Balkans has become, since its independence, 
traditionally very important for Czech foreign policy. However, the track 
record would not always indicate so. Th e rather ambivalent and hesitant 
attitude of the Czech Republic towards the NATO air strike against 
Milosević in 1999 has already been mentioned. Th e situation has repeated 
in February 2008 after a unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo. 
Th e Czech Republic has been very late to recognize Kosovo compared to 
the other EU member states, only ahead of those that have been signal-
ling their reluctance to recognize Kosovo for a long time (Spain, Romania, 
Slovakia). Th e government resolution to support Kosovo marked steep 
divisions across political parties, despite the fact that Kosovo was recog-
nized by both the US and major EU members shortly after its declaration 
of independence.
Th e ODS was instrumental in getting the government’s resolution adopt-
ed. However, the party was not united. One ODS minister (Petr Nečas) voted 
against the proposal in the government. Concerns were expressed by many 
ODS deputies. ‘It is not a decision of hundred to a zero. But, in the current 
circumstances, I would be slightly over ﬁ fty percent in favour,’ admitted Petr 
Tluchoř, leader of the ODS club in the Chamber. Another ODS deputy, Petr 
Bratský, admitted to being ‘slightly surprised,’ claiming that the decision was 
too rushed, and arguing that he thought it would happen only later. David 
Šeich, Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Aﬀ airs Committee, claimed: ‘Even 
I would have a problem raising my hand in favour if I were in the cabinet. 
Th is is a luxury that we have as deputies. Th e government cannot aﬀ ord it.’ 
Th e most sceptical voice, however, came again from President Klaus. ‘We 
have opened a Pandora’s box that can lead to woeful consequences. It is not 
an isolated issue that is being solved in that very part of the Balkans,’ the 
president explained during his visit to Slovakia. Later, after having accepted 
the Serbian ambassador to Prague, Mr. Vereš, he openly admitted that he 
was ashamed of the government’s decision (iDNES 2008e). 
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All the KDU-ČSL ministers in the government voted against the recogni-
tion. It is consistent with the positions of the broad feeling in the party that 
the act would disrupt traditionally good links with Serbia, who is viewed as 
a spiritual ally in the region. Th e Christian Democrats still view the region 
in terms of a conﬂ ict between Christian and Muslim worlds, although they 
do not admit it as explicitly as their Slovak counterparts. However, other 
arguments were also used. ‘To recognize independence of Kosovo now 
would be another of the steps that could lead to the future instability of an 
ethnically colourful region,’ explained Roman Línek, ﬁ rst Vice-Chairman 
of the KDU-ČSL, one day before the government discussed the issue. Th e 
party chairman, Jiří Čunek, claimed that ‘the recognition of an independent 
Kosovo is an unfortunate step,’ pointing to the doubtful protection of Serbian 
minorities and the complicated repatriation and possible discrimination of 
Kosovo Serbs. Th e MEP for the KDU-ČSL, Jan Březina, goes even further, 
warning of the further destabilisation of the Western Balkans, the threat of 
Greater Albania, and the possible breach of international law. Th is shows that 
there were several justiﬁ cations as to why the Christian Democrats adopted 
an overtly negative position. 
Th e Green Party marked a huge internal controversy as well. Despite 
the fact that the main party agent, Karel Schwarzenberg, proposed the rec-
ognition of the government and that all the Green ministers subsequently 
endorsed it, part of the party called for the retreat from the coalition. ‘Every-
body has the right to say publicly that our party has nothing to do in a coali-
tion that recognizes criminal states,’ claimed Pavel Křivka, the leader of the 
Green Party in the Pardubice region. On the other hand, the leader of the 
Green Party deputies, Kateřina Jacques, admitted that there was no obstacle 
to recognition after the elections in Serbia and expressed satisfaction that the 
Czech government had joined the European mainstream. 
Th e most critical voices regarding the recognition came from the opposi-
tion – the ČSSD and the Communists. ČSSD leader Paroubek claimed to 
consider the decision as premature, having support neither in the cabinet nor 
in the Parliament, and accused the Prime Minister of not being able to search 
out a consensus on crucial foreign policy issues. Th e party’s Vice-Chairman, 
Škromach, went even further, claiming that ‘the government, by recognizing 
Kosovo, betrayed the Czech nation.’ Other prominent Social Democrats, 
such as Jan Kavan (former Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs) or Vladimír Laštůvka 
(former Chairman of the Foreign Aﬀ airs Committee) even organized a peti-
tion not to recognize Kosovo and gathered the signatures of more than 50 
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parliamentarians under it. Th e Social Democrats signalled their opposition to 
Kosovo recognition shortly after the declaration of independence. Moreover, 
Paroubek was already renowned for quite controversial opinions on the issue 
of Kosovo in the past. As Prime Minister, he circulated the idea that one of 
the possible solutions could be dividing Kosovo along ethnic lines, a claim 
that caused a lot of embarrassment among the fellow EU governments. 
Th e Communists were likewise strictly opposed. Th e party chairman, 
Vojtěch Filip, criticised the government for having recognized an ‘illegal’ state 
which originated by the breach of international law. Th e communists even 
prepared a speciﬁ c bill that would impede the government from recognising 
Kosovo. In their argument, the step was a bad move that was contrary to 
international law, as well to the wishes of most Parliamentarians, in addition 
to general public opinion. 
Th e Kosovo case is particular and interesting in a sense due to the fact that 
the country was recognized by both the US and majority of the EU states, 
actions that played a surprisingly small role in Czech debates on the issue. 
Th is argument was raised mainly by the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Foreign Aﬀ airs. Surprisingly, however, it had very little impact on the general 
party discipline. It is diﬃ  cult to discern the reasons for such a hesitant and 
negativist position from the political representation. It was a mixture of his-
torical, religious, emotional, and legal arguments. In the case of the ODS, the 
hesitant attitude might have been also explained by the fears over a possible 
precedent in regard to a derogation from the traditional sovereignty concept 
(at least, in the case of Klaus); for the ČSSD, the stance was, to some extent, 
populist, ﬁ nding another suitable stick on the government while the party 
was in opposition, and following the generally unfavourable preferences of 
its electorate. In any case, it shows that the Czech political parties might not 
always swing with the attitudes of the big actors, let it be the US or the EU.
The Middle East Conﬂ ict
As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict goes, the ODS leadership is clearly 
taking a position supportive of Israel, thus aligning itself closely with the United 
States. Most recently, this was illustrated by a visit to Israel by Prime Minister 
Topolánek in March 2008, where he expressed support in Israel’s ﬁ ght against 
terror (ČTK 2008). ODS deputy Jan Vidím in his article ‘Th e Czech Republic 
and Israel: Chance for a New Partnership’ (Vidím 2007) argues for the Czech 
Republic ‘to positively inﬂ uence relations with Israel in international organisa-
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tions, not least in the European Union’, claiming that both countries worship 
the values of democracy and freedom. Prime Minister Topolánek admits that 
the Czech Republic’s closest ties in the region are to Israel, although arguably 
the Czechs strive for a more balanced approach recently. Th is was illustrated 
by him admitting of being in favour of an independent Palestinian state and 
even raising some critical remarks concerning continuing the construction 
of Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Simultaneously, Topolánek claimed 
that the Palestinians must have a functioning administration, self-government, 
and economic links to Israel, and that it would be impossible to achieve this 
until organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas are disarmed and recognize 
Israel. He also expressed understanding for Israel’s motives to construct the 
wall separating the West Bank. In 2006, Topolánek supported the Czech 
contribution to the UN stabilisation force in Lebanon after the conﬂ ict with 
Israel in the summer of that year, despite the fact that, when taking over the 
oﬃ  ce of Prime Minister, he did not endorse it for ﬁ nancial reasons.
Th e approach of the ČSSD to the Middle East, at least recently, can be 
easily described as multi-vectoral diplomacy. Th is was clearly demonstrated 
by a visit to Syria by party leader Paroubek and his shadow Minister of 
Foreign Aﬀ airs Zaorálek in February 2008. Th is ‘study trip’ deserved harsh 
criticism by the government (namely Prime Minister Topolánek), as the 
ČSSD leaders met with representatives from the Baas party, which is even, 
in the Czech press, referred to as a terrorist organisation (due to its support 
to Hezbollah). Paroubek justiﬁ ed the trip by the motivation to enhance eco-
nomic ties between the two countries and to ensure that the Czech Republic 
could take a more active part in the Middle East peace process, where he 
sees an indispensable role for Syria, and also expressed support for Syria’s 
right to reclaim its occupied territories of the Golan Heights. Paroubek also 
tried to play down the criticism coming from the ruling parties and media 
by claiming that he was also planning a trip to Israel and Palestine, which 
indeed materialized in July 2008. Th e ambition to be a more visible actor 
in the Middle East can also be illustrated by the intention of Jiří Paroubek, 
while still Prime Minister in the summer of 2006, to despatch as many as 100 
Czech troops as part of the international mission to Lebanon. However, the 
government ﬁ nally declined to endorse this participation, as it was on leave; 
moreover, the incoming government of the ODS did not want to take on the 
ﬁ nancial commitment to sustain the Czech presence in the UNIFIL mission, 
fearing that it could stretch into Czech involvement in other missions abroad 
(e.g. Kosovo or Afghanistan) that were viewed as more important.
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Th e position of the KDU-ČSL towards the Middle East is very close to that 
of the ODS in being strongly supportive of Israel in the Middle East conﬂ ict, 
perhaps even more so. Th is can be explained in terms of civilisation arguments 
often visible in the party’s rhetoric, whereby it views Israel as part of the West-
ern democratic world and inherently closer to Europe than its neighbouring 
countries. Th e leading foreign policy spokesperson of the party, Cyril Svoboda, 
(former Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs), has repeatedly reiterated the need for 
a balanced approach towards the region. During the Israel-Lebanon conﬂ ict 
in the summer of 2006, he was quick to ensure that the Czech Republic would 
provide help to both parties – humanitarian aid for civilians in southern 
Lebanon and ﬁ re brigade hoses for Israel. However, his stance during the 
negotiation on the EU position towards the ceaseﬁ re during the Israel-Lebanon 
conﬂ ict was very badly accepted among the Arab countries’ ambassadors in 
Prague.¹⁹ A similarly controversial move by Svoboda, not directly linked to the 
Middle East conﬂ ict, but having wider repercussions, was his proposal to set 
up a joint EU fund to compensate those member states whose property had 
been damaged as an aftermath of the Danish cartoon controversy ‘in defence 
of joint values.’ He also criticised Solana for apologizing to Muslims on behalf 
of the EU without having properly consulted all the member states. 
Th e Green Party’s views on the issue are hard to discern, due to their 
relatively new presence in high-level Czech politics and the fact that the issue 
has become somewhat more important for Czech politicians only recently, 
especially after EU accession. 
Th e Communist party is extremely anti-Israeli, despite their permanent 
isolation that makes them less pronounced. Th e party views Israel as 
a Middle-Eastern clone of the United States – i.e. overly unilateral, disre-
garding international law, and extremely militaristic. Th e party policy is also 
largely consistent with the policy of its predecessor – the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia – that was strongly anti-Israeli and largely pro-Palestinian. 
One point that demonstrates this attitude is an article printed in the party 
newspaper Haló noviny on 25 August 2006, titled ‘Jewish Terrorists Have 
Kidnapped Hamas Commander,’ referring to the apprehension of one of 
the Hamas leaders by Israeli soldiers. Th e Communist party’s statements 
on Hezbollah militants that were exchanged in the summer of 2008 for two 
dead Israeli soldiers referred to the former as ‘freedom ﬁ ghters.’ Th e website 
19) Svoboda, along with Germany and the UK, advocated the reformulation of a proposed common position tabled by the Finnish 
presidency, calling for an ‘immediate ceasefire, replacing it with an immediate cease of animosities followed by enduring armistice.’ 
This was viewed as too strong a pro-Israeli formulation, basically allowing Israel to continue with its strikes. 
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of the party district committee of Nymburk referred to a summer 2006 Israeli 
attack against Lebanon as the ‘Bloody summer aggression of Israel against 
Lebanon’ and ‘killing that cannot be forgotten’ – these are just a few illustra-
tions of the general mainstream party thinking. 
Th e Czech parties’ positions have thus led to a foreign policy that has 
been viewed as very much pro-Israeli in the Middle East. In Israel itself, the 
Czech Republic is often viewed as its biggest supporter in the EU and the 
most ardent advocate of its interests.²⁰ Th e recent moves of the ČSSD, how-
ever, show that the party might try to depart from this image of an ardent 
Isrealoﬁ le and adopt a more balanced approach towards the region, which 
would give it more leverage to get actively involved in the Middle East peace 
process. But it remains to be seen whether the parties will ﬁ nd a consensus 
and a means of achieving this – the ﬁ rst attempt of Paroubek does not seem 
to have made much progress in this respect. 
Conclusion
It can be asserted without hesitation that the consensus characterizing 
Czech foreign policy in the 1990’s and early 2000’s and deﬁ ned by the impera-
tive of joining the EU and NATO has largely disappeared. On one hand, the 
governments and Czech diplomacy try to keep continuity in foreign policy, 
despite their changing partisan composition, striving to identify more con-
sensual topics such as the promotion of democracy or human rights, the sup-
port for the Western Balkans’ integration into the EU, or the active building 
of relations with Eastern EU neighbours. However, when it gets down to the 
USA-EU-NATO triangle, the polarisation of the Czech political scene along 
the right-left axis is clearly visible. 
Th e ODS, the rightmost parliamentary party, views bilateral relations with 
the United States and the active Czech involvement in NATO as imperatives 
for Czech foreign policy. Despite the moderated position of the ODS being 
in government since 2006 and trying to take a more constructive approach 
to the EU (at least for those party members holding executive posts), it is still 
clear that, in foreign policy terms, the party relies more on the United States 
than on Europe. According to the ODS, the EU and its foreign policy is often 
too weak, divided, and dominated by countries or governments who would 
20) Israeli ambassador Arthur Avnon, on leaving Prague, compared his country’s relationship with the Czech Republic to the special 
relationship Israel enjoys with the USA. Israeli political scientist Barry Rubin has commented in the Jerusalem Post that he considers 
the Czech Republic the most pro-Israeli country in the EU. 
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like to see Europe as an anti-pole to the United States, which the ODS ﬁ nds 
unacceptable. Secondly, the ODS is not even in favour of having an overly 
strong Europe in international relations, mainly because of the fear that such 
a Europe would be more prone to confrontation with the United States. It is 
clear that the party will do its best to keep the US and the EU on the same 
board. In the case of internal rifts in the EU, the party will most certainly ﬁ nd 
itself in the strongly pro-American camp. Th e ODS conviction is based on 
the fact that the US is the best guarantor of its shared values of democracy, 
human rights, and freedom in the globalising world, and that its position is 
that such values have to be protected even at the cost of the use of force and 
the breach of the outdated Cold War system of international law, character-
ized often by unaccountable institutions and involving countries who do 
not respect supposedly universal values of democracy and human rights. 
Th e ODS shares, particularly with the Republican US administration, fears 
and suspicions towards international organizations that are out of control 
of democratic countries. Th e ODS is quite prone to reverting to unilateral 
actions (or the ‘coalition of the willing’) of the West (not necessarily only the 
US) should the other means of achieving the goals fail. It is also quite clear 
that the ODS supports strongly NATO as the main institutional link between 
the US and European allies. 
Th e ČSSD, the main rival of the ODS on the Czech political scene, has 
a largely diﬀ erent vision of the world. In the long-term programme of the 
party, namely its part devoted to the ‘Vision of Global Justice,’ one can read 
that the aim of the party is a ‘multilateral world,’ which, with a bit of caution, 
can probably be interpreted as a ‘multi-polar world’. In this document, the 
ČSSD stresses the role of the United Nations, highlights the necessity of 
conﬂ ict prevention, and refuses pre-emptive wars. Th e programme directly 
acknowledges the diﬀ erences between the United States and the EU, with the 
former viewed as largely striving to achieve its goals unilaterally, while the lat-
ter multilaterally, as well as highlighting the limits of unilateral strategy. Th e 
use of force is permissible, according to the ČSSD, only in strict compliance 
with international law. Th is all can be viewed as an indirect criticism of US 
strategy in international relations in recent years. Generally, one can assume 
that its position is very close to the positions of other social democratic 
parties in Western Europe. Th ey tend to view the dominant role of the USA 
in today’s world rather negatively, believing that it creates more instability, 
and, thus, a diﬀ erent arrangement should be found in the form of a multi-
polar world, created through the mechanisms of the United Nations where 
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the EU would play an instrumental role. Th ere is also a strong emphasis on 
the European Union being a more assertive, independent actor, resulting in 
the party’s support for a strong European foreign policy. Th e party is much 
more comfortable with the way the EU has handled international crises so 
far, being a largely soft power, emphasizing eﬀ ective multilateralism and 
diplomacy over the use of force. At the same time, the party is in favour of 
increased defence emancipation from the EU from the United States, reiter-
ating the vision of the EU as another pole in international arena. 
Th e smaller parties in the centre of the Czech political spectrum, namely 
the KDU-ČSL and the Green Party, are balancing somewhere between 
the positions of the main actors, the ODS and the ČSSD. While KDU-
ČSL emphasizes the Trans-Atlantic link and its importance for the Czech 
Republic more than ČSSD, it remains a strong supporter of the common EU 
foreign policy, as well as more emancipation in defence terms. Th e Green 
Party remains more critical of the US, not only due to their unilateralism 
and willingness to use of force for achieving its goals, but also due to the US’ 
refusal to participate in what the party views as the important achievements 
of the international community in the construction of new ‘global governance’, 
such as the ICC or tackling climate change.
Th e Communist party’s strategy is very much based on the negation of 
Czech foreign policy post 1989. Th e party holds extremely critical views of 
both the United States and NATO; its somewhat moderate stance on the EU 
is present primarily because the party has representatives in the European 
Parliament who have inﬂ uence within the United European Left group, and 
secondly because the EU policy of diplomacy, soft power, and respect for 
international law is closer to the Communists’ views of global justice. 
Th erefore, the picture presented herein for the Czech Republic conﬁ rms 
very closely to the hypothesis raised in the introduction. Th e more the parties 
are to the right, the more they tend to follow a respective typology of foreign 
policy typical for established Western European democracies, drawing them, 
in many respects, closer to the USA. Th e more they are to the left, they more 
the parties are likely to partake more anti-American stances. Th is is also 
enabled by the fact that the right-left division on the Czech political scene is 
clearly visible, as was underlined at the beginning. 
Despite these diﬀ erent partisan visions of international relations by the 
two strongest parties, Czech foreign policy, nevertheless, shows a consider-
able degree of stability and continuity. Th is can be explained by at least two 
factors. Firstly, Czech governments are normally coalition governments. Th e 
 The Case Studies: Czech Republic – David Král
government position on foreign policy issues where the EU-NATO-USA 
triangle is at stake are likely to be more moderate than the individual partisan 
positions of the senior coalition parties – the ČSSD and the ODS. Th is has 
to do with the moderating role of the centrist parties, who are present in 
such coalitions, and whose attitude is both Atlanticist (particularly in case 
of the KDU-ČSL) and pro-European (both the KDU-ČSL and the Greens). 
Secondly, the attitudes of the two major political parties themselves can diﬀ er 
signiﬁ cantly when the party is in control of the government. Th e ODS is likely 
to be more pro-European while in control of the government by the simple 
fact that the Czech Republic is in the EU and the ODS ministers meet their 
EU counterparts far more often than the American ones. Similarly, the ČSSD 
is prone to taking a less critical view of the United States in the government, 
as we have seen, for instance, in the case of Iraq or missile defence. However, 
this pragmatic approach risks alienating the politicians holding executive 
posts from their deputies and senators or wider partisan base. As a result, 
the Czech government position is often not very strong in order to comfort 
a variety of actors. Th e advantage of such a position is that it ensures the 
continuity and stability of foreign policy. Th e disadvantage is that, externally, 
the position is not always very clear, legible, and conﬁ rms to what the Czechs 
call ‘sitting with one back at two chairs.’ 
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Tomáš Weiss
Table 1: Parties in the Hungarian Parliament
Term
Parties represented in the Parliament 
(number of mandates)
Governing Coalition
1990 – 1994
MDF¹ (164) FIDESZ (24)
SZDSZ (92) KDNP (19)
FKGP (44) Indep. (5)
MSZP (34) ASZ (2)
MDF – KDNP – FKGP
1994 – 1998
MSZP (209) KDNP (22)
SZDSZ (69) FIDESZ (21)
MDF (38) ASZ (1)
FKGP (26)
MSZP – SZDSZ
1998 – 2002
FIDESZ (148) MDF (17)
MSZP (134) MIÉP (14)
FKGP (48) Indep. (1)
SZDSZ (24)
FIDESZ – MDF – FKGP
2002 – 2006
MSZP (178)
FIDESZ (164)
MDF (24)
SZDSZ (20)
MSZP – SZDSZ
since 2006
MSZP (190) Somogyért (1) 
FIDESZ (+KDNP) (164)
SZDSZ (20)
MDF (11)
MSZP – SZDSZ²
Source: www.valasztas.hu
1) In 1993, MIÉP split off MDF.
2) In 2008, SZDSZ left the coalition. MSZP has continued in a minority government with support of the former coalition partner.
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Parties in the Hungarian Parliament:
ASZ Agrarian Union
FIDESZ Alliance of Young Democrats
FKGP Independent Smallholders’ Party
KDNP Christian Democratic People’s Party
MDF Hungarian Democratic Forum
MIÉP Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MSZP Hungarian Socialist Party
Somogyért Association for Somogy
SZDSZ Alliance of Free Democrats
Hungary played an important role during the fall of communism in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. Since the 1960s, the strict regime established after 
the Soviet invasion of 1956 was turning into a sort of Potemkin village. Th e 
population was supposed to restrain from criticising the regime overtly, but 
was not required to believe in it. Similarly, besides the oﬃ  cial state economy, 
people could raise their living standards through private businesses con-
ducted after the end of oﬃ  cial working hours. Unlike citizens from other 
countries of the Soviet block, Hungarians were relatively free to travel in 
Western Europe. Th is so called ‘goulash socialism’ turned Hungary into the 
‘happiest barrack’ of the Eastern block and was probably the main reason the 
communists stayed in power without major turmoil until 1989.
During the late 1980s, however, the regime turned out to be unmaintain-
able and imploded in round table negotiations between the communists and 
opposition movements. Th e gradual resignation of the regime contributed 
in turn to an abolishment of the communist regimes of other countries. 
Hungary became a ‘hole in the wall’ when it opened the border to Austria 
in 1989, allowing thousands of fellow Central and Eastern Europeans ﬂ ee to 
the West.
Political parties came into existence or were re-established on the basis 
of traditional political parties that had been active in the inter-war period in 
late 1980s and contested in the ﬁ rst free elections in 1990. All major political 
parties of today’s Hungary were already present on the political map in 1990, 
which shows stability unusual in post-communist countries. However, the 
relative strength of the parties has kept changing and several important ones 
have ceased to play any signiﬁ cant role.
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In today’s Hungarian parliament, only four political parties are repre-
sented: the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP), 
the Alliance of Young Democrats – Hungarian Citizens Alliance (Fiatal 
Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Szövetség, FIDESZ-MPSZ³), the 
Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ), and 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF)⁴.
Left and Right
At ﬁ rst glance, the Hungarian political spectrum is very transparent 
today. Th ere are two big parties, the MSZP on the left and the FIDESZ on 
the right, that each achieve over 40 per cent of the votes. Th ere are also two 
small parties that ally themselves with the big ones. Whereas the Alliance of 
Free Democrats serves as a partner to MSZP, the MDF serves as a partner to 
the FIDESZ. Although the coalition of the MSZP-SZDSZ broke down over 
personal and communication issues in 2008 during the second term in oﬃ  ce, 
the SZDSZ continues to support the Socialist minority government. Th e 
FIDESZ and the MDF have formed the opposition. It has been a habit that 
parties in the two blocks mutually support their candidates in second rounds 
of the single-member constituencies. Th e opposition even set up a joint list 
for the 2002 elections.
At second glance, however, the picture blurs. During 1990s, the FIDESZ 
was successful in integrating the right and working its way up to the domi-
nant position (Fowler 2002: 3, Fowler 2004a). Th e 2002 pre-election union 
with the MDF seemed to be another step in unifying all right wing parties 
within one party. In fact, Brigid Fowler argues that the MDF survived as 
a parliamentary party only thanks to this union (Fowler 2004a: 82).⁵ If the 
government of Viktor Orbán of the FIDESZ had remained in oﬃ  ce, the uni-
ﬁ cation may have been successful. After the lost elections, however, the MDF 
reviewed its course, put up a separate list for the 2004 European Parliament 
elections, and disagreed openly with the FIDESZ on the elections’ relevance 
3) Only the abbreviation FIDESZ is used throughout the study, reflecting its use in literature as well as in Hungarian political 
debate.
4) KNDP established a faction in Parliament after the 2006 elections. It is not analysed in the study though, because its independence 
on FIDESZ is more formal than factual. The party was not present during the previous two terms and came back to the fore only 
as a result of its very junior position in the coalition with FIDESZ.
5) Whereas the MDF was able to win 165 out of the parliament’s 386 seats in 1990, it gained 38 seats four years later and only 17 
in 1998. The FIDESZ, on the other hand, was able to raise its share from 21 and 20 seats in 1990 and 1994 elections, respectively, 
up to 148 in 1998.
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for domestic policy (Racz 2006: 204). Th is decision caused a group of 
prominent members to leave the party (Sitter and Batory 2006: 4). However, 
the MDF managed to win one out of 24 Hungarian mandates, aﬃ  rming its 
independence in the 2006 general elections (even if getting over the 5 per 
cent threshold very narrowly).
Unlike communist parties in other Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, such as Czechoslovakia or Romania, Hungarian communists were able 
to adapt to the changing situation of the end of 1980s and take part in the 
regime change actively. Round table negotiations organized between the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) and opposition movements 
conducted during 1989 resulted in free elections in May 1990. In prepara-
tion for the elections, the MSZMP transformed into the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSZP) in October 1989 and, despite losing the elections in 1990, was 
able to establish itself as the major left-wing party during the early 1990s 
and form governments after the 1994, 2002 and 2006 elections. Th e MSZP’s 
coalition partner in all governments, the SZDSZ, has kept a liberal proﬁ le 
that distinguishes it from the dominant MSZP since early 1990s. Gábor 
Demszky, the former chairman of the SZDSZ, has also helped to preserve 
the party’s autonomous proﬁ le, having been the mayor of Budapest continu-
ously since 1990.
Yet, the media understand Hungarian politics largely as a two block con-
test. Th e recent street riots in October 2006 and March 2007 have increased 
this interpretation as they were targeted against the left government in 
general.⁶ Th e two big parties have not objected this view because it fuels 
their dominance in their respective blocks. Th e smaller parties, however, 
do not share this point of view. Th e SZDSZ refuses to accept the whole 
concept of a two-camp political scene. Instead, it recognises three poles of 
the Hungarian political spectrum: socialist, conservative, and liberal.⁷ Th e 
MDF presents itself as the only conservative party, blaming the FIDESZ for 
not having a right-wing programme at all, but only a mixture of right and 
left radicalism.
Unlike in some other countries in the region, notably Slovakia or to some 
extent the Czech Republic, economic issues are not the most important factor 
that puts together the respective camps of the government and opposition. 
Th erefore, there could be three Socialist-liberal governments in oﬃ  ce after 
6) Compare e.g. Left-Right Split Fuels Hungary Unrest, CBS News 26 September 2006.
7) Where not stated otherwise, party positions follow the author’s interviews with Hungarian experts, politicians, and political 
parties’ representatives or affiliates conducted in Budapest in May and June 2007.
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1990 (with a continuing liberal support to the Socialist minority government), 
even though ‘New Labour’ has become the key-word for the MSZP only with 
Gyurcsány (Eddy 2004). Similarly, the market-oriented MDF can denounce 
the protectionist FIDESZ for its left-wing social and economic policies.
Th e Hungarian coalitions must be explained by cleavages other than 
economic policy. Th e opposition parties both stand for traditional rightist 
values, such as support for family or good relations with organised religion. 
Th e FIDESZ 2006 election slogan ‘Job – Home – Family’ (FIDESZ 2006a) 
would work for any right-wing political party in Western Europe. Similarly, 
the government parties are secular with liberal, societal views.
Th e most important factor that has shaped the left-right political cleavage 
in Hungary has been, however, the political parties’ views on Hungary’s posi-
tion in the region and the signiﬁ cance of Hungarians living abroad. According 
to Brigid Fowler (2002: 1), this cleavage shaped Hungarian politics in 1930s 
and re-emerged in 1980s among non-communist intellectuals. Th e right-
wing parties ‘think in terms of the nation’ (Fowler 2002: 1). Th e 1920 Trianon 
peace treaty still arouses bitter feelings among their politicians and voters. 
Th e ﬁ rst post-communist Prime Minister, József Antall of the MDF, declared 
in 1990 that he wanted to be a ‘spiritual prime minister’ for 15 million Hun-
garians. Th is includes Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states beside 
the 10 million living in Hungary, most notable in Romania and Slovakia. 
More diplomatically, but still signiﬁ cantly, Viktor Orbán, the chairman of the 
FIDESZ and Prime Minister in 1998–2002, stated that he believed that the 
Hungarian state and nation did not coincide and that his government ‘would 
be part of the Hungarian nation’ (Deme 1998: note 58). Antall established 
the Government Oﬃ  ce for Hungarian Minorities Abroad (Határon Túli 
Magyarok Hivatala, HTMH) in 1992, an entity that has been very inﬂ uential 
during the terms of both the MDF-led as well as FIDESZ-led governments 
(Dunay 2004: 212). In 2001, the Hungarian parliament passed a law introduc-
ing a system of beneﬁ ts for Hungarians in neighbouring countries based on 
national principle. Th e law was heavily criticised for its exterritorial scope not 
only by countries with Hungarian minorities, but also by the European Union 
and the Council of Europe. Only after the left-wing government took oﬃ  ce 
was an amendment passed that accommodated most of the criticism.
Th e left has been ‘comfortable with the post-communist status quo, and 
with the idea that Hungary is a small, relatively poor state with a still-fragile 
democracy and sometimes dubious national past, bound to accommodate 
itself to the West’ (Fowler 2002: 1). Left-wing governments have never been 
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keen on putting Hungarians living abroad too high on the agenda, even if they 
have kept the issue among their priorities. As an SZDSZ representative put it, 
the ‘MSZP is very worried of being labelled as non-nationalist.’ 
To sum up, Hungarian political parties can, indeed, be divided into two 
separate groups that, in many respects, follow the distinction between left 
and right. Parties on the left could be further distinguished as socialist and 
liberals. However, in many respects, with the Socialists incorporating ‘New 
Labour’ policies and moving towards the centre, the border may blur. On 
the right, the FIDESZ and the MDF can be distinguished by the extent of 
populism used, where the FIDESZ has needed to appeal to far right voters 
while unifying the right. Th e spectrum, for the purpose of our study, can thus 
be drawn as follows:
Positioning of the Hungarian Political Parties on the Right – Left Axis
 MSZP SZDSZ MDF FIDESZ
left right
The ‘National Consensus’ and 
Relevance of Foreign Policy 
During 1990s, Hungarian foreign policy was based on three objectives: 
integration into Western structures, good neighbourly relations, and support 
for the Hungarian minorities across the borders. All the governments pur-
sued the same objectives independently of their political aﬃ  liation. Whereas 
the government consulted foreign policy with the opposition, the opposition 
did not criticise the government on foreign policy issues openly. Th e parties 
created a coordinated system based on parity that worked parallel to the for-
eign aﬀ airs committee in the Parliament. Th e ‘national consensus’ provided 
for the unanimous adoption of basic principles for the country’s security 
policy by the Parliament in 1992, the ﬁ rst oﬃ  cial document that called for 
full membership in NATO (Törő 1999: 81).
Th e relationship between the objectives and their relative importance was, 
however, interpreted diﬀ erently by individual administrations (Dunay 2004: 
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200–203). Th e emphasis that the MDF-led government put on supporting 
Hungarians living abroad impeded good relations with neighbouring states 
that saw such measures as meddling in their internal aﬀ airs. To a certain 
extent, cross-border disputes over Hungarian minorities inﬂ uenced the inte-
gration objective as well because Western countries, struggling with wars in 
Yugoslavia, worried about the further rise of ethnic and nationalist violence 
throughout the region. Gyula Horn’s left-wing government cared more about 
Hungary’s relations with neighbouring governments than with the citizens of 
Hungarian nationality. As a result, basic treaties were signed with Slovakia 
(1995) and Romania (1996) that renounced any territorial claims on each 
other and regulated protection of national minorities (Szerződés… 1995 and 
Szerződés… 1996).
At present, there is no consensus on foreign policy among the Hungar-
ian political parties. Th is is a fact widely recognized by both politicians, as 
well as analysts. It cannot be identiﬁ ed exactly at what point the consensus 
disappeared. Csaba Törő names a reviewed document on the principles of 
security and defence policy adopted in December 1998 as another example 
of consensual foreign policy (Törő 1999: 83). In the late 1990s and at the 
beginning of new century, all relevant parties still supported the main goals 
of Hungarian foreign policy. Nevertheless, the consensus was missing in 
details. Th e parties started using details in domestic debates, such as Orbán’s 
critique of the government’s negotiations with the EU or questioning the 
relevance of NATO membership as a part of the criticism of land ownership 
liberalisation (Hegedűs 1998). Similarly, the MSZP criticised the Orbán gov-
ernment for allowing NATO bombers to use Hungarian airports during the 
Kosovo crisis (Bugajski 2002: 351). In 2003, the consensus was lost without 
a doubt. Erzsébet Nagyné Rózsa identiﬁ es even 4 foreign policy cleavages: 
government v. opposition, government v. the MSZP, within the MSZP, and 
intra-governmental (Nagyné Rózsa 2003: 13).
One of the important, if not the most important, reasons for the disappear-
ance of the national consensus in Hungary is the polarization of the Hungarian 
political scene and the prevalence of domestic over foreign policy. Pál Dunay 
(Dunay 2004: note 16) argues that during his premiership, only domestic poli-
cies mattered for Viktor Orbán, a politician who was anxious to unite right 
wing voters. Th is eﬀ ort directly inﬂ uenced Hungarian foreign aﬀ airs. He was 
not ready to distance himself from the statements of István Csurka, chairman 
of the extreme rightist MIÉP, an action that did harm to Hungary’s image 
abroad. In 1999, Orbán condemned Csurka’s statements on the revision of the 
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borders in Vojvodina only four months after Csurka ﬁ rst made them. Orbán 
also criticized Csurka’s stance in the German daily newspaper Franfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, a publication not widely accessible in Hungary. In 2001, 
Csurka stated that the ‘US had received its due punishment’ (Th e Stephen Roth 
Institute… 2002). Th e Prime Minister did not distance himself from this state-
ment at all, a move that may have been the reason why President Bush did not 
meet with him during his 2002 visit in the US (Kriza 2004: 9).
Th e polarization emerged after the 2002 parliamentary elections. Whereas 
there were only 2 and 1 MPs elected in single mandate districts in the ﬁ rst 
round in 1994 and 1998 respectively, there were 44 MPs elected in the ﬁ rst 
round in 2002⁸ (Benoit 2002: 127). Th e polarization reached its peak as of late 
when the FIDESZ fueled street protests against Prime Minister Gyurcsány in 
September 2006 and March 2007.
Foreign policy topics have thus either become heavily inﬂ uenced by 
domestic aﬀ airs or have disappeared entirely. Th e former is true for the Euro-
pean integration. In the 2004 EP elections, it was almost only the domestic 
agenda that mattered in the campaign (Racz 2006: 206). István Hegedűs 
argues that the political parties saw ‘the European political institutions as 
a new arena in which they could strengthen old domestic partisan cleavages’ 
(Hegedűs 2006: 76–7). Some experts accredit the irrelevance of foreign policy 
to an ignorance of the politicians for whom the foreign policy in general and 
the EU in particular are too complicated. Th is is by no means a problem of 
the opposition only. As others note, there can be no consensus because there 
is no proposal on the side of the government. All reactions were ad hoc for 
a long time, providing a lot of space for playing up domestic policy. A new 
foreign policy strategy, drafted under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign 
Aﬀ airs with contributions from experts, was adopted only in March 2008. 
Th e politicians themselves have also recognized this. Kinga Göncz, the 
Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, complained in an interview that ‘there [was] very 
little talk in Hungary’s present-day public policy discourse about foreign policy. 
We look inwards; we’re provincial.’ (Göncz 2007). Key documents from each 
of these political parties do not pay much attention to foreign policy. Th e 
discussion material on ‘Hungary’s New Social Democracy’ prepared within 
the governing MSZP does not mention security policy even once and the 
EU only very vaguely, largely in relation to Hungarian minorities across the 
border (MSZP 2004). Similarly, a one-year review of governmental poli-
8) In the first round, the candidate must receive more than 50 per cent of the votes to win the mandate straight away.
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cies by the FIDESZ did not touch upon foreign policy. Th e MDF does not 
even have a member in the parliament’s foreign aﬀ airs committee. And the 
SZDSZ preferred appointing the Minister of Economy to a post as Minister 
of Foreign Aﬀ airs.
Th e lack of interest at the moment does not necessarily mean that foreign 
policy cannot make it into the headlines in future. Some argue that a younger 
generation of politicians will have better knowledge of EU aﬀ airs and could 
therefore at least bring European issues onto the table. Even smaller politi-
cal parties may start dealing with foreign aﬀ airs more intensively – SZDSZ 
chairman, János Kóka, allegedly inclines to foreign policy more than his 
predecessors, although voices from the SZDSZ admit that his commitment 
to such issues is still not overly intensive. Th e opposition has also recently 
attacked the Prime Minister for his policy towards Russia. Th us, Hungarian-
Russian relations have suddenly become a highly politicized topic. It is yet to 
be seen if this is just an exception or if it is ﬁ rst in a row of publicly debated 
foreign policy issues.
An impossibility to reach a consensus may have serious consequences 
in Hungarian foreign action. Th e state’s constitution is very rigid and asks 
for a 2/3 majority on speciﬁ c issues. In today’s polarized Hungary, such 
a request can hardly be met. In 2004, for example, the Hungarian military 
contingent had to be pulled back from Iraq because the government was not 
able to prolong its mandate by a 2/3 majority in Parliament. Even though the 
FIDESZ had backed the deployment before, the government requested only 
a very limited mandate for several months during Iraqi parliamentary elec-
tions. Th erefore, it can be speculated whether it was the particular question 
or, rather, a general opposition to a proposal put forward by the government 
that made the FIDESZ MPs vote against the prolongation.
To sum up, Hungary’s foreign policy is not subject to a consensus anymore, 
but suﬀ ers two-fold: from the polarization of the Hungarian political scene 
that hampers any reasonable cooperation between the government and the 
opposition, and from a lack of interest in foreign policy in general.
Views of the US, the EU, and NATO
Hungary set integration into West European institutions as one of its 
priorities very quickly after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Attila Ágh notes that ‘Europeanization’ or ‘Westernization’ were 
‘the most important legitimization devices for Hungarian governments’ (1999: 
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841). After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (where the country played an 
important role), the same was true for the country’s decision to join NATO.
All non-extremist political parties supported both NATO and the EU. 
Th ey were backed by public opinion because more than two thirds of the 
population saw a connection between the EU and NATO accession processes 
(Torő 1999: 93) and supported both of them as the accession referenda in 1997 
(NATO) and 2003 (EU) demonstrated.
Hungary became a member of NATO in 1999 and ﬁ nally also member 
of the EU in 2004. Most experts share the view that the EU membership 
was more signiﬁ cant for Hungary. Besides the successful accomplishment 
of the integration goal, it has also signiﬁ ed a radical change in the other two 
foreign policy goals. Hungarian minorities abroad now have their interests 
secured through European standards and can commute to Hungary freely 
any time they feel so inclined. Good neighbourly relations depend partly 
on the question of Hungarian minorities, but are also improved through 
regional cooperation and the need to cooperate on the European level. 
Some scholars even argue that NATO membership was, above all, a neces-
sary step on the way to EU membership. Th ey believe that the regional 
aspirations that have shaped the three goals of Hungarian foreign policy 
do not require direct involvement from the US. Th us, in general, Hungary 
remains more oriented towards Europe than across the Atlantic (Póti and 
Tálas 2004: 44).⁹ 
Th is does not necessarily mean anti-Americanism. Póti and Talás argue 
that all political parties have their own reasons for why they should support 
NATO and the US (2004: 45). Others insist that active anti-Americanism 
is present only on the extreme right and left and that the rest of the politi-
cal spectrum limits themselves to mere lack of interest caused by a lack of 
capacity to be ‘good pupils’ of the EU and deal with the US intensively at 
the same time. Th is may be the reason why Hungary has been perceived as 
a non-performing member in NATO since the beginning with a permanent 
lack of resources in defence sector (Dunay 2004: 210).
Nevertheless, other scholars see a more pro-US side of Hungarian politics. 
Nagyné Rózsa lists two ‘ﬁ rm believes’ among Hungarian authorities: a) there 
is and must be no contradiction between NATO obligations and the develop-
ment of a European defence capability; and b) preconditions of Hungarian 
9) Póti and Tálas argue that the regional focus of Hungarian foreign policy distinguishes the country from other, more Atlanticist 
new member states of the EU. Those countries either have an increased threat perception (Baltic states), try to increase their 
influence in Europe (Poland), or struggle to avoid periferization (Romania, Bulgaria).
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security are membership in NATO and the US presence (Nagyné Rózsa 
2002: 37). Th is view is supported (in words, at least) in Hungarian oﬃ  cial 
documents (cf. Hungary’s External Relations Strategy 2008).
Positions of the Hungarian Political Parties
Th e following interpretations of the positions of Hungarian political par-
ties have been based beside literature mainly on oﬃ  cial party documents (e.g. 
elections programmes, manifestos), daily press, and interviews with party 
representatives (via questionnaire, telephone, and personal meetings). It is 
questionable, however, to what extent the Hungarian politicians’ rhetoric can 
be seen as a reliable source of information. Viktor Orbán has been reported 
to have said openly at an Atlantic Club Breakfast organized by the FIDESZ 
that a lot is being said for Hungarians and should not be paid much attention 
to abroad. It is thus necessary to compare the parties’ statements with the 
adopted policies where possible.
Every part is divided into ﬁ ve broader topics of US-EU relations: the 
US military presence in Europe, the relationship between NATO and the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Iraq in particular, the external 
aspects of the war on terror, and other foreign policy issues.
MSZP – Hungarian Socialist Party
Th e Hungarian Socialists have held both the Prime Minister’s oﬃ  ce 
and the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs since 2002. Th erefore, they have had 
a huge impact on Hungarian foreign policy recently. Th e inﬂ uence of these 
particular oﬃ  ces has varied according to the personalities that held them: 
Foreign Minister László Kovács, currently the EU commissioner, used to be 
very strong and had signiﬁ cant impact on Hungary’s policy during the Iraq 
crisis in 2003. At the moment, Ferenc Gyurcsány has shifted the centre of 
gravity to the Prime Minister’s oﬃ  ce. Th e ministers of foreign aﬀ airs have 
not always been the authors of foreign policy: Ferenc Somogyi was seen 
merely as an administrator and Kinga Göncz is neither expert nor diplomat. 
Moreover, the experienced foreign policy makers from the MSZP have 
largely moved to Brussels – László Kovács to the EU Commission, Csaba 
Tabajdi and Gyula Hegyi to the European Parliament. Th e same is true 
for many young politicians interested in foreign policy, such as the MEP 
Alexandra Dobolyi.
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US Military Presence in Europe
In general, Europe is closer than NATO for MSZP politicians. As Ferenc 
Gyurcsány puts it regularly: ‘Hungary is our motherland, the Union is […] 
home, and America is our ally’ (Gyurcsány 2007a). A similar phrase appeared 
in the 2004 government programme (Lendületben az ország… 2004). In the 
2007 Prime Minister’s address to ambassadors, Gyurcsány labelled Hungary’s 
relationship to the United States as ‘a priority.’ However, the rest of the speech 
was concerned mainly with the EU and the necessity to deepen European 
political cooperation and the CFSP (Gyurcsány 2007b).
Th e former Foreign Minister, László Kovács, wanted ‘more Europe, but not 
less America’ in 2002 (Póti and Tálas 2004: 46). Current party representatives 
believe that the EU should gradually take over European defence and that the 
US military presence in Europe should be reduced. It should be noted that the 
quotation of Mr. Kovács originates from his article for Th e Washington Times, 
whereas the views of current representatives have been delivered privately. But 
Kovács has been seen as a genuine Atlanticist during his term (Dunay 2004: 
207) at various occasions. Among today’s MSZP foreign policy makers, there 
is probably nobody with such a strong aﬃ  liation. It can be argued that the 
emphasis on Europe has increased in the MSZP.
Regarding the US radar and missile bases in Central Europe, the MSZP has 
been oﬃ  cially very restrained. Mr. Gyurcsány stressed that it ‘would defend 
a signiﬁ cant part of Europe’ but called for more discussion (Logan 2007). As 
one MSZP representative puts it, the MSZP must keep a safe position and argue 
that all threats should be defended. Unoﬃ  cially, however, MSZP representatives 
are very sceptical about the US installations and do not believe that they could 
contribute to Europe’s security. Th e discrepancy between the oﬃ  cial and unof-
ﬁ cial position is the reason why they regard themselves lucky that Hungary has 
not been invited to participate in the anti-missile defence system.
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
In security matters, we can also see a diﬀ erence between the Medgyessy 
and Gyurcsány governments. Th e former called full integration in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization ‘the most important guarantee of Hungarian secu-
rity’ and wanted to ‘contribute to a strengthening of transatlantic solidarity.’ At 
the same time, it supported ‘strategic partnership between NATO and the EU’ 
and wanted to ‘contribute to the formation of the CFSP and common civil and 
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military crisis management’ (Cselekedni, most és mindenkiért… 2002). Th e lat-
ter promoted two pillars of Hungarian external security – the European and the 
transatlantic commitment. Regarding the European pillar, it wanted to deepen 
integration, develop cooperation, and extend the scope of the CFSP (New 
Hungary… 2006). It should be noted that Hungary was a NATO member, but 
only an EU candidate in 2002, whereas it was member of both organizations 
in 2006. Th erefore, the increased emphasis on the EU and its CFSP does not 
necessarily mean a less pro-NATO stance from the Gyurcsány government. In 
the light of the afore-mentioned preference for Europe above the US, however, 
it can be assumed that the Gyurcsány government indeed does value NATO 
less than the Medgyessy government used to in the past.
Such an interpretation has support in the party representatives’ positions 
that were presented to the author. All of them have been very supportive to 
the progressive development of the ESDP and want the EU to be, along with 
NATO, the ultimate security provider in Europe. At least, in the future if the 
EU is not fully capable today. Th e MSZP also supports a subsequent creation 
of a European army. 
Regarding military operations, the party prefers a more important role for 
the EU at the expense of NATO. Although the EU should be given priority 
over NATO especially in its neighbourhood, some voices call for EU prefer-
ence everywhere in the world.
Iraq
Hungary’s Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy signed the so-called ‘letter 
of eight’ backing the US in the political crisis before the actual war in Iraq. 
Experts agree on the analysis that Foreign Minister Kovács made Medgyessy 
sign the letter (Nagyné Rózsa 2003: 13; Dunay 2004: 208). Th e government 
later tried to belittle the signiﬁ cance of the letter. Medgyessy played down 
the meaning of the actual signature and focused on the content that called for 
a peaceful solution. In short, the government became stuck in the eﬀ ort to be 
a good ally to both the countries gathered around the US, plus the countries 
gathered around Germany and France. Th e signature was merely the choice 
of a lesser evil (Póti and Tálas 2004: 46).
Th e MSZP supported and pushed through sending a contingent of Hun-
garian military engineers to Iraq, but not sooner than there was a UN Secu-
rity Council resolution approving such contributions. In 2004, the Gyurcsány 
government wanted to prolong the mandate by three months until March 
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2005 due to the elections that took place in Iraq at the beginning of 2005. 
However, it failed to get the necessary 2/3 majority support in Parliament. 
Ferenc Gyurcsány, commenting upon the decision, stated that the opposition 
put their own interests above their obligation and responsibility, arguing that 
‘it was more than a question of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,’ such 
as of human rights and democratic values. He also announced to send 150 
volunteer soldiers under NATO to Iraq in the summer of 2005, an action that 
did not require parliamentary approval (Lukács 2004).
In private, MSZP representatives are rather critical of the Iraqi operation. 
Although some acknowledge their original support of the US, none of them 
support the current US presence in Iraq. Moreover, they mostly assume 
that the diﬃ  culties in Iraq may lead to a policy change towards the United 
States in Hungary. Rather paradoxically, they also believe that the Hungarian 
participation in Iraq has been successful and needed, even if diﬃ  cult.
It must be noted that, during the Kosovo crisis, when the MSZP was in 
opposition, it criticised the FIDESZ government for its decision to support 
NATO military action against Serbia. 
External Aspects of the War on Terror
All MSZP representatives are united in refusing to grant CIA ﬂ ights or 
interrogation facilities that some European countries have allegedly allowed 
on their territories. Prime Minister Gyurcsány stated that he had never been 
asked to host secret CIA installations, but that he would have declined if 
there had been such a request (Th e Budapest Sun 2005). Gyula Hegyi, MEP, 
praised the government for not participating ‘in the CIA’s illegal European 
action’ (Szőcs 2007). Th ey are, however, very restrained regarding other 
countries’ decisions to allow CIA ﬂ ights inside their territories because, as 
one MP elected for the MSZP puts it, ‘secret missions need secret ﬂ ights.’
Similarly, the MSZP condemns the function of the US military base at 
Guantánamo Bay, seeing little need for such a base and its procedures. Th e 
party would be against any detention of Hungarian nationals in Guantánamo. 
Th is ﬁ rm disapproval is not reﬂ ected in oﬃ  cial positions, however. During 
George W. Bush’s visit to Hungary in 2006, only President Solyóm, who was 
elected against the will of the MSZP, indirectly criticised Guantánamo, say-
ing that ‘the war on terror can only be considered successful if it conforms to 
international human rights’ laws’. No such comment was made by the Prime 
Minister (Th e Budapest Times 2006).
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Other Foreign Policy Issues
MSZP representatives questioned in the framework of this research have 
held very similar positions on all foreign policy issues raised. Th ese positions 
have been rather critical of the US politics. As with other Hungarian parties, 
the MSZP has backed the International Criminal Court from the very begin-
ning (in the parliamentary vote on the ICC status there was only one vote 
against), even though the US did not support it. 
Moreover, MSZP representatives doubt the positive impact US engage-
ment in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, even though some admit that 
it may not have been the case in the past. Similarly, they mostly condemn the 
pro-Israeli stance that the US took during the Israeli intervention in Lebanon 
because they did not see the war as purely defensive.
Th e message is very clear in case of Cuba as well, where the MSZP would 
welcome a change if the US re-evaluated the situation and lifted its embargo. 
Regarding Central Asia, the MSZP would prefer the EU to play a bigger role 
in the region rather than the US.
SZDSZ – Alliance of Free Democrats
Th e Free Democrats have been a traditional coalition partner of the MSZP. 
As such, they have been only second in line regarding foreign policy because 
Socialists have nominated, in all governments, both the Prime Minister and 
the Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs. Th ere is a tradition of foreign policy mak-
ing in the SZDSZ though. Between 1994–98, the party appointed political 
secretaries to the foreign ministry (István Szent-Iványi and Mátyás Eörsi), 
a section of the government that was rather strong at that time under László 
Kovács. In 2006, the SZDSZ was oﬀ ered the post of Foreign Minister, but 
chose environment and water management instead. Th e reason for this deci-
sion had to do the activity of the Prime Minister in foreign aﬀ airs, which does 
not leave much power for the minister.
Until 2004, the SZDSZ shared foreign policy views with the MSZP. After 
2004, however, a gap has appeared, because, as SZDSZ representatives put 
it, the SZDSZ wants to promote value-based foreign policy and that Socialist 
foreign policy is too pragmatic for the party. Similar to other parties, SZDSZ 
experts have partly left for Brussels – István Szent-Iványi became an MEP. 
But some of them have stayed in Budapest – Mátyás Eörsi chairs the SZDSZ 
faction of the European Aﬀ airs Committee in the Hungarian Parliament.
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US Military Presence in Europe
In its rhetoric, the SZDSZ is both very pro-European and very pro-
American at the same time. Th ey support the claim of a ‘More federal Euro-
pean Union! A Stronger Brussels!’ (SZDSZ 2006a: 181) and that the party 
‘could live’ with majority decision-making on CFSP issues. At the same time, 
they consider the US to be the main guarantor of European security and 
bilateral relations with the US to be the primary task for Hungary (SZDSZ 
2006a: 182).
For the SZDSZ, a US military presence is desired. However, the party 
believes that European NATO members should take up more responsibility 
for the defence of the continent. Th e EU should take over ultimately, but only 
in the long run.
Th e US missile defence bases in Central and Eastern Europe will contrib-
ute to the security of European continent, according to the SZDSZ. Even 
if the threat is not present now, it will be in medium-term. Th erefore, it is 
sensible to take appropriate steps today. In any case, the bases should be 
inclusive, in NATO, or NATO-compatible. Representatives of the SZDSZ 
note that it was a wise decision not to address Hungary because Hungarian 
political representation, especially the MSZP, would have problems with 
hosting such bases.
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
Th e Free Democrats are supportive of the ESDP. Th ey call for the strength-
ening of European capacities in order to allow the EU to take care of the 
European continent together with NATO and even conduct operations 
anywhere in the world if necessary. However, they promote sensible coop-
eration with NATO and the US, which they see, as mentioned before, as the 
ultimate guarantor of security in Europe. Th ey insist that the development of 
the ESDP must not undermine NATO or be a rival to it. Th e worst scenario 
for the SZDSZ would be if the EU were not strong enough to act, but strong 
enough to hamper the functioning of NATO.
Th e SZDSZ also supports the creation of a European army, provided that 
it would have clear limitations as to its function.
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Iraq
Th e Free Democrats emphasize the fact that they have been the only 
Hungarian party to support both the operations in Kosovo and in Iraq. Rep-
resentatives of the party stress that their foreign policy positions are based on 
the conviction that human rights are more important than international law. 
Th e party sees itself as a descendant of the Hungarian democratic opposition 
from the 1980s. As such, the Free Democrats do not want to repeat the mis-
takes that the West made during that time, such as appeasing communism. 
Th e whole Iraqi operation has been seen as an endorsement of human rights 
and democracy by the SZDSZ and therefore supported. Th e emphasis from 
the SZDSZ on human rights has also been identiﬁ ed by scholarly literature 
(Póti and Tálas 2004: 45).
In 2004, during the negotiations on whether to prolong the mandate of 
Hungarian soldiers in Iraq, the SZDSZ bluntly supported the extension. If 
they were needed, the party argued, they should stay. Th e same is true for 
the US presence in Iraq today – they should stay, because their presence is 
needed for the democratic transition of the country. Th e party has its doubts 
concerning the success of Hungarian participation, something that is seen as 
having been diﬃ  cult, but believes that it was necessary. 
Th e SZDSZ does not believe that the diﬃ  cult situation of coalition forces 
and the transition process in Iraq could damage Hungarian views of the US 
and US-Hungarian relations. 
External Aspects of the War on Terror
Th e alleged CIA ﬂ ights and installations in Europe are not regarded as 
a political topic by the SZDSZ. Its position is not to make it an issue. Th e 
party believes that the ﬁ ght against terrorism is important and that all states 
should contribute. Although illegal deeds must not be tolerated, there should 
be legal consequences and not political ones.
Some SZDSZ representatives have, however, expressed their opinion 
on some issues accompanying the war on terror. Mátyás Eörsi pleaded 
for the closure of the Guantánamo Bay base because human rights had to 
be observed even during the war on terror (SZDSZ 2006b). Nevertheless, 
SZDSZ representatives make sure that they always add an appreciation of the 
US role in world security when stating anything that could be interpreted as 
a critique (cf. Szent-Iványi’s statements in Népszabadság 2006).
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Other Foreign Policy Issues
In other political issues, the SZDSZ supports the US stances in general. It 
has supported the US backing of Israel during Lebanon war. It also believes 
that the increasing US presence in Central Asia will have positive energy 
security consequences in Europe.
In Cuba, the SZDSZ would like to promote a peaceful regime change. It 
advocates the US sanctions that lead to this end, measures that should be 
dependent on the political situation on the island. Th e Free Democrats would 
not object to the suspension of the sanctions as long as it was accompanied 
by deadlines, clear benchmarks, and ultimately a re-installation of sanctions 
if needed.
All members of the Parliament from the SZDSZ voted for the Hungarian 
accession to the Status of the International Criminal Court.
FIDESZ – Alliance of Young Democrats
It has been mentioned earlier that the FIDESZ has fought hard to unite the 
Hungarian right wing over the last years. Th at implies a certain emphasis on the 
nation of Hungary. In order to become acceptable for the Hungarian extreme 
right, which has been rather strong during the 1990s and catapulted the MIÉP 
into Parliament in 1998, the FIDESZ’s rhetoric has been sometimes very harsh 
and not very well accepted abroad. Th is is the case of bilateral relations with 
Hungary’s neighbours or Viktor Orbán’s silence on Csurka’s statements. Unfor-
tunately for a relevant research, a lot of statements from FIDESZ representa-
tives must be looked at through domestic policy glasses. It is necessary to pick 
up and reconstruct the “real” foreign policy views of the FIDESZ from concrete 
actions that the party has initiated or supported. Th is is, however, very diﬃ  cult 
since the party was in power only between 1998–2002 and has been inﬂ uenced 
by the politicisation of Hungarian domestic politics in opposition. Moreover, 
the 1998–2002 period was marked by the ﬁ nal steps in NATO accession and 
the negotiations over EU membership. Th is inﬂ uenced the foreign policy of the 
country rather signiﬁ cantly and cannot be fully compared to an ‘un-inﬂ uenced’ 
foreign policy of a member state of both organizations.
Th e national factor of FIDESZ policy is expressed in its emphasis on Hun-
gary’s own power, sovereignty, and national interests. Unlike other parties 
that anchor Hungary’s security unambiguously in international cooperation 
(be it NATO, the EU, or both), for the FIDESZ, two pillars are relevant – 
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Euro-Atlantic integration and international cooperation on one hand and 
Hungarian national force on the other (FIDESZ and MDF 2002: 25)¹⁰. As 
a consequence, the alliance with the US or the European states is seen merely 
as a tool for safeguarding the interests of the magyarság (the Hungarianess). 
Th ere is a mistrust of both at the same time – Europe for its historical legacy 
of the Trianon treaty (Póti and Tálas 2004: 45) and the US for personifying 
globalization. It is of no surprise that the FIDESZ describes itself as close to 
the French vision of Europe (FIDESZ 2006b: 7). 
US Military Presence in Europe
Th e FIDESZ seems to be very ambivalent on the EU and US roles in 
Europe. Pál Dunay characterized the Orbán government as ‘disinterested in 
the CFSP’ and ‘not in favour of too much centralization and “federalization”’ 
of the EU (Dunay 2002: 33, 49). Th e scepticism over future of the EU’s foreign 
and security policies is accompanied by an appreciation of the United States’ 
role in Europe. György Schöpﬂ in, an MEP from the FIDESZ, claimed in Th e 
Economist that ‘if extremists took power in Serbia, only America could protect 
Hungary’ (Th e Economist 2006).
At the same time, however, there are voices in the FIDESZ that call for 
reducing the US military presence in Europe and for the EU to take over 
European defence. A strong Europe is seen as beneﬁ cial for Central and 
Eastern Europe because it can stand up against Russia or the US if necessary. 
As Viktor Orbán put it, the US needs Europe to ‘keep her bad instincts down’ 
(Orbán 2005).
Th e party does not have any oﬃ  cial position on the US missile defence 
bases in Europe. From within the party, supporters as well as opponents can 
be heard, pointing out or disputing their contribution to European security. 
Th e independence of Poland and the Czech Republic is stressed as well as the 
demand not to provide Russia veto power over their decision-making.
Although it is unclear whether the FIDESZ would back the establishment 
of such a base in Hungary, it is believed that it would rather not. Th ere is 
a precedence from which to draw conclusions. In the past few years, the 
government has sought a location for a NATO radar base that would be part 
10) Although this was a joint election programme of the FIDESZ and MDF, the author takes into consideration that foreign policy 
had not been an MDF domain in the government (both Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were appointed by 
the FIDESZ and defence was administered by an FKgP member) and attributes the foreign policy expertise of the joint election 
programme to the FIDESZ. The same formulation had already appeared in the Orbán government’s programme. 
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of the NATO air defence. Together with civic organizations, the FIDESZ 
stood out against the location at Zengő Hill due to environmental reasons. 
Th e government proposed a new location at Tubes Hill, but the FIDESZ stood 
out against this proposal again, following public opinion. Zoltán Illés, the 
MP for the FIDESZ, claimed that there was no reason for building the radar 
base on Hungarian territory and, since Slovenia was a NATO member too, 
the base could be established there (Tamás 2003). With the FIDESZ having 
stood up against a NATO radar installation, we could hardly expect the party 
to support a purely US installation.
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
In its latest election programme, the FIDESZ stated clearly that it sees 
NATO as ‘the cornerstone of our [Hungarian] security.’ It is therefore a pri-
ority to safeguard ‘the unity and operability of NATO’ in a way that would 
‘acknowledge national security, the objectives of the United States, and the 
member states alike’ (FIDESZ 2006b: 18). NATO should also be the core place 
of cooperation between Europe and the US (Orbán 2005). Th ere are, however, 
certain reservations regarding the inﬂ uence of European states in NATO that 
have diminished, according to some.
Hungary is, according to Viktor Orbán, a country with ‘a transatlantic 
mindset’ (Corsi 2004), an approach that means cooperation with both the 
EU and the US simultaneously. Although the FIDESZ considers NATO to be 
the most important security organization, the EU should be more active in 
security too. If the ESDP should develop further, the FIDESZ would support 
the creation of a European army if the EU member states so decided. While 
boosting its capabilities, however, the EU should avoid duplications and 
consult NATO ﬁ rst before taking and action (FIDESZ 2004: 16).
Th ere is no clear preference of whether the EU or NATO should take 
a lead in military operations abroad. Th e decision would depend on the 
circumstances of the particular missions. Th e concept of an EU mission is 
not put aside in principle though. And the FIDESZ supports EU operations 
in the Balkans. Th e EU should be active in the neighbouring regions, such as 
North Africa or the Middle East, in general.
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Iraq
Th e FIDESZ supported the original decision to send Hungarian troops to 
Iraq after a clear UN mandate had been granted, although the party had not 
supported the invasion in the beginning. Viktor Orbán did not see ‘any reason 
or national interest why Hungary should support the US in the war in Iraq.’ He 
deduced so from the fact that the EU provided Hungary economically, while 
NATO and not the US militarily (Nagyné Rózsa 2003: 14). Although some 
FIDESZ aﬃ  liates criticised the operation because it had been ‘ill-conceived,’ 
some did so with much more temperament. Gyula Tellér, Orbán’s adviser 
and a formal head of the analytical department of the PM’s oﬃ  ce, argued in 
2003 that the US had ‘toppled a functional, legitimate political regime.’ He 
claimed that the real reason of the invasion had been the ‘boosting of an ill 
American economy by Iraqi means, taking over immense Iraqi oil resources (in 
order to make proﬁ t and – possibly – to blackmail world policy), to provide 
security to Israel that carried out regular war against the Palestinians, and to 
safeguard a regional power status for Israel. President Bush was persuaded to 
carry on with the latter goals by Israel-friendly neoconservative members of 
the administration in his vicinity. What used to be a goal of the State of Israel 
turned to be – with their help – a goal of the United States.’ (Tellér 2003)
When the security situation worsened in Iraq and the MDF started to 
request the withdrawal of Hungarian troops, the FIDESZ kept to its previous 
decision to support Hungary’s participation in the mission, stating that the 
troops were able to do their duty despite the dramatic situation (Th e Buda-
pest Sun 2003). It reserved the right to review the position, a process that 
happened during the following year. In the end, the party’s MPs voted against 
the renewal of the mandate, even if the position had not been very clear and 
that there might have been a way to gain the party’s support (Deák 2004).
Today, the FIDESZ would prefer the US to withdraw from Iraq, the sooner 
the better, because there are no valid reasons for being there. Some believe 
that the whole Iraqi operation and Hungary’s participation in it have contrib-
uted to a growing feeling of anti-Americanism in Hungary.
External Aspects of the War on Terror
International law is important for the FIDESZ, according to its representa-
tives. Th eir positions on parts of the US war on terror reﬂ ect this emphasis. 
Although ready to cooperate with the US in the intelligence sector, FIDESZ 
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representatives criticise both the Guantánamo Bay base, as well as the alleged 
CIA ﬂ ights in some European states, as illegal. Despite this disapproval, the 
topic has not ranked very high in the party’s interest with not much to be 
heard from the party representatives if not requested directly.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
Even if not as harsh as in the case of Mr. Tellér that was quoted above, 
the FIDESZ is generally very critical of US foreign policy activities. Be it 
Cuba or the Middle East, FIDESZ representatives are not very happy with 
American policies and would be happier if the US reviewed them. Th e 
Israeli-Palestinian puzzle, especially, puts the FIDESZ ‘closer to the EU than 
the US’ with some people openly hostile to the foreign policy steps of the US, 
preferring the US to pull out of the region.
For one segment of FIDESZ voters, the US should be blamed for some 
global phenomena, such as globalisation. Because the blame carries over into 
detached issues of foreign policy, the party ends up strongly hostile towards 
the US. However, it should be noted that the hostility has remained verbal 
and restricted to issues where the FIDESZ or Hungary cannot eﬀ ectively 
inﬂ uence anything. Th e party keeps a moderate, more pragmatic tone on 
topics that are more relevant for the country. Th e factual policy conducted 
by the FIDESZ while in power was, notwithstanding the rhetoric, down-
to-earth and not that much diﬀ erent from other governments. To a certain 
extent, the discrepancy in the biggest right-wing party amongst mainstream 
policies on important issues and radical statements on issues where a voice 
from Hungary does not count indicates, more than anything else, that foreign 
policy is not an important topic in Hungary.
MDF – Hungarian Democratic Forum
Similarly to the SZDSZ, the MDF has not had a huge impact on Hungarian 
foreign policy in the last years, having been in opposition since 2002 and just 
the most junior member of the government during 1998–2002. Moreover, 
the number of mandates in Parliament – currently 11 out of 386 – does not 
provide for a signiﬁ cant position either. It has already been mentioned that 
there is not even one MDF representative in the foreign aﬀ airs committee.
However, the MDF used to be the strongest Hungarian political party at 
the beginning of 1990s. József Antall, the MDF chairman and Prime Minister 
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of Hungary, contributed signiﬁ cantly to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
and the creation of the Visegrád Group. Th e interest in foreign aﬀ airs has 
thus survived in the party.
When talking about MDF foreign policy views, party representatives 
discern themselves from the FIDESZ to a large extent. It is logical, because 
not only do the two parties tend to be put together as ‘the opposition,’ but 
the MDF needs to prove its autonomous existence. Th e MDF presents itself 
as value-based on foreign aﬀ airs, but more pragmatic than the FIDESZ, 
which is seen as rather dogmatic. Just like the SZDSZ, the MDF derives 
its emphasis on values from the Hungarian national experience during 
communism. 
As in other parties, the Brussels brain-drain has aﬀ ected the MDF as well. 
Péter Olajos, a long-time head of the party’s European Integration Oﬃ  ce, 
became its only MEP.
US Military Presence in Europe
Views of the MDF on the relationship between the US and the EU are, 
in fact, rather similar to the second small party of the Hungarian political 
spectrum, the SZDSZ. In addition, the MDF is a vivid supporter of both the 
deepening of European integration and the strong role of the US in Euro-
pean security. Th e EP election programme claimed that the voice of the EU 
should be heard in all important foreign and security policy questions. Th e 
integration objective should not just be a common economic area, but pri-
marily a political union of nations and citizens (MDF 2004). On the other 
hand, the general election programme of 2002 emphasised the fact that 
NATO provided security and supported ‘nation-building’ (MDF 2002).
According to the MDF, the US military presence in Europe is important for 
securing the continent. Th erefore, the party supports the anti-missile defence 
bases that the US wants to build in Europe. Th e party believes that they will 
improve Europe’s security. It considers the bases to be an issue of bilateral 
negotiations of individual states.
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
While supporting the further development of the ESDP, the Democratic 
Forum remains cautious regarding its possible consequences for NATO 
because NATO is seen as the guarantor of Hungarian military security (MDF 
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2006). However ideally, both NATO and the EU should be the ultimate 
security guarantors in Europe. Th erefore, the ESDP should be created in close 
cooperation and matched to NATO (MDF 2004).
Th e fear of hampering NATO leads the MDF to reject a creation of a Euro-
pean army. Th e party would be ready to approve such a thing only if it was 
closely coordinated with NATO. Close cooperation and coordination is also 
required while deciding on future military missions. Th e MDF supports the 
notion of independent EU military missions and sees them even as preferable 
where the EU interests are more direct than those of its allies. Although every 
mission should, however, be considered and discussed individually, they do 
not have to be exclusive. Regarding the use of an allied pool of force, the 
MDF rejects the priority of European battle groups without prior consent 
from the US and NATO.
Iraq
Th e MDF faction was the loudest critic of the Hungarian participation in 
the Iraqi operation within the Hungarian parliament. Th e MPs for the MDF 
voted for sending the troops originally, but changed their opinion rather 
quickly. Th ey argued that the troops and the mandate were not appropriate 
to the situation on the ground and that the military action was not prepared 
(Princz 2004a). In 2003, György Gémesi, an MP for the MDF, suggested 
a pull-out only few weeks after the Hungarian Parliament prolonged the 
contingent’s mandate. He argued that the soldiers were trained for home-
defence and not to be deployed in a war zone. In his opinion, Hungary had 
already fulﬁ lled its obligation to NATO by deploying peacekeepers, but was 
not obliged to participate in a war (Th e Budapest Sun 2003). 
In 2004, the party was very coherent in its opposition to any further 
prolongation and contributed to the ultimate pull-out. Th e party chairman, 
Ibolya Dávid, emphasised again that the peacekeeper mandate of the soldiers 
did not reﬂ ect the situation on the ground. She stressed that the MDF was 
always a partner in importing democracy into a country peacefully, but war 
was only the last solution (Princz 2004b).
However, the position of the MDF has not arisen to unanimity from within 
the party. Apparently, there were voices approving of Hungary’s participation 
in the operation. Th e negative position was the result of an internal discus-
sion and concerned the Hungarian contingent only. Otherwise, the author 
has been assured, the MDF is supportive to the eﬀ orts in Iraq.
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It is questionable of whether there was a shift in the party opinion on Iraq 
during 2004–07, or whether the MDF called for a pull-out due to, rather, 
a domestic driven policy. Since the pull-out, there has not been any public 
debate on Iraq in Hungary, despite the fact that a small number of Hungarian 
soldiers are still present in the country. It is thus diﬃ  cult to compare public 
statements from MDF representatives on the issue. Yet, Ibolya Dávid has 
been reported to be travelling to and from the US very often, which might 
be a sign of her rather positive view of the US.
External Aspects of the War on Terror
Th e Democratic Forum claims that Hungary is ‘a partner in the war against 
terrorism’ (Princz 2004b). Its representatives admit that such a war may require 
extraordinary measures and intensive cooperation among various institutions 
and agencies. However, they point out that human rights must be respected. 
Th us, they stress that the US must revisit Guantánamo Bay base issue.
MDF representatives prefer to avoid a clear statement on the alleged CIA 
ﬂ ights in European countries. Th ey refer to procedures and legal bases in the 
aﬀ ected countries as the measure of supporting or condemning the ﬂ ights. 
Th ere was no need for a discussion in Hungary, something that would have 
pushed the MDF to a clear position, since the country was not mentioned 
among the places where the planes were reported to land. 
Other Foreign Policy Issues
In general, the MDF supports the US in its activities in the world. It does 
back the embargo against Cuba, although it should be depending on the 
evolution of the Cuban regime. It also welcomes the increasing US presence 
in Central Asia. Th e party also believes that the US activity may have positive 
consequences not only in energy security, but also in the overall stability and 
democratization in the region.
In the Middle East peace process, the MDF supports all initiatives that 
bring the parties back to the negotiating table. During the Israeli operation 
in Lebanon last year, the MDF advocated the US backing of Israel because it 
saw the operation as a response to terrorist activities.
Together with other Hungarian political parties, the MPs for the MDF who 
were present for the voting gave their voice for the Status of the International 
Criminal Court.
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Conclusion
Foreign policy does not play a decisive role in today’s Hungary. On the 
contrary, domestic policy has often inﬂ uenced foreign aﬀ airs. Th e polariza-
tion of the Hungarian political spectrum further intensiﬁ es such an eﬀ ect. 
Hungary’s relationship to the EU and the US used to be the core of 
a national consensus on foreign policy during the 1990s. It still can be traced 
today in the overall party orientation – all Hungarian political parties are, 
overall, rather pro-European – but the diﬀ erences are in detail and accented 
by ubiquitous politicisation.
Hungarian political parties can be distributed along the left-right axis 
only with huge diﬃ  culties. Th e left wing has recently introduced very liberal, 
Blairite ideas that go against what has traditionally been attributed to the 
left. Th e right wing suﬀ ers from nationalism and populism, which has led to 
protectionism – again not usually attributed to the right. With some reserva-
tions, however, we can place the parties along the axis from left to right as 
follows: MSZP, SZDSZ, MDF, and FIDESZ.
Having investigated the positions of Hungarian political parties, the fol-
lowing statements can be made if we do not include the FIDESZ: 
Th e more to the left the party stands, the more critical it is of the US. ■
Th e more right the party stands, the more cautious it is about the role of  ■
the EU. 
Th e MSZP has shown a large degree of criticism of the US and a huge 
support of the political integration of the EU. Th e positions of the SZDSZ are 
characterised by a strong emphasis on European political union, although, at 
the same time, exhibiting an openness to US policies and actions. Th e MDF is 
very supportive of the US. Among these three parties, the MDF emphasises 
the role of NATO the most important and pursues a conditionality of EU 
integration in the ﬁ eld of security policy with respect to NATO.
Th e FIDESZ is a special case that does not ﬁ t into this pattern. Th e party 
has been cautious about both EU political integration and the US. Th e 
emphasis on the nation and rhetoric that is aimed at weakening extreme 
right parties, along with populism and anti-Americanism in economic aﬀ airs, 
corresponds to parties further right in Western Europe’s political spectra.
Th e rhetoric, programmes, and statements of the parties’ representatives 
may serve to create a general conception of their respective policies. Once in 
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power, however, the MSZP, as well as the FIDESZ, have taken up pragmatic 
policies aimed at good relations with the US, despite the possible scepticism 
of the United States and its policies. Th is pragmatism is probably necessary 
for a rather weak country ﬁ rmly established in the Euro-Atlantic structures 
and will not change in the near future.
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Table 1: Parties in the Polish Government
Term Prime Minister
Parties Represented in the 
Governing Coalition
1989 – 1990 Tadeusz Mazowiecki
Government of National Unity:
A wide coalition of communists,
post-communist parties, and Solidarity
1991 Jan Krzysztof Bielecki UD, KLD, PC, ZChN
1991 – 1992 Jan Olszewski ZChN, PC (post-Solidarity)
1992 Waldemar Pawlak Caretaker – never won a vote of conﬁ dence 
1992 – 1993 Hana Suchocka
Post-Solidarity: 
UD, KLD, ZChN, PL, PPP
1993 – 1994 Waldemar Pawlak 2nd cabinet SLD – PSL 
1994 – 1995 Józef Oleksy SLD – PSL
1995 – 1997 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz SLD – PSL 
1997 – 2001 Jerzy Buzek 
AWS – UW (from 2000, the 
minority government)
2001 – 2004 Leszek Miller
SLD – UP – PSL (until 2003, after that 
minority government of SLD – UP) 
2004 – 2005 Marek Belka SLD – UP minority government
2005 – 2006 Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz PiS – SRP – LPR 
2006 – 2007 Jarosław Kaczyński PiS – SRP – LPR
From 2007 Donald Tusk PO – PSL 
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Acronyms:
AWS Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Solidarity Electoral Action)
KLD Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny (Liberal-Democratic Congress) 
LPR Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)
PC Porozumienie Centrum (Centre Agreement)
PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
PL Porozumienie Ludowe (People’s Agreement) 
PO Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) 
PPP Polska Partia Pracy (Polish Labour Party)
PSL Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party) 
SLD Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) 
SRP Samoobrona RP (Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland) 
UD Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union) 
UP Unia Pracy (Labour Union)
UW Unia Wolności (Freedom Union)
ZChN Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (Christian-National Union) 
The Polish Political Scene 
Giving an account of the Polish political scene is not a particularly easy 
task. Unlike in other countries of the region, especially in the Czech Republic 
or Hungary, Polish politics has been extremely changeable with new parties 
emerging and disappearing, uniting and splitting, and politicians changing 
their party aﬃ  liations. In reviewing all the political parties registered since 
1989, we would arrive at an incredible ﬁ gure of seventy-four. As a result, the 
voters’ behaviour has been highly volatile. Due to this fact, the right-left divi-
sion and the typology of political parties applicable in Western Europe or other 
established democracies also pose certain problems in the Polish context. In 
terms of the party system, diﬀ erent cleavages endure in Poland as a result of 
the transformation process. Th e right-left division, albeit existent, does not 
seem to be the main dividing point among political parties; if so, it is still 
more a socio-economic transformation cleavage rather than the established 
owner-employer or centre-periphery conﬂ ict line that prevails in the West. 
For instance, the existence of populist Self-Defence (Samoobrona) is often 
conceived to represent the ‘losers’ of the transformation process. Certainly, 
the nature-of-the-regime conﬂ ict line endures strongly on the current politi-
cal scene. Although it divides the post-communist parties of the ‘left,’ it also 
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increasingly does so to the more pragmatic Civic Platform (PO) from Self-
Defence and the Law and Justice Party (PiS), with the latter strongly (and, in 
some experts’ views, almost hysterically) emphasising the need for overcoming 
the residues of the past. Th e axiological (value-based) conﬂ ict line separates 
the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Law and Justice (PiS), who stand for 
extremely conservative and supposedly traditional ‘Polish’ values; these parties 
put a strong emphasis on a link with the Catholic Church and issues such as 
abortion, gay rights, or euthanasia, separating them from more liberal and 
secular oriented parties such as the Civic Platform (PO), the Union of the 
Democratic Left (SLD), or the Polish People’s Party (PSL). To some extent, we 
could even track signs of the national conﬂ ict line with parties such as Self-
Defence or the League of Polish Families (LPR), who strongly emphasize the 
national character of the Polish state and deﬁ ne it against the others (let it be 
the EU or Anti-Semitic cards played by some members of the LPR). A classical 
cleavage centre – periphery is demonstrated by the existence of two peasant 
parties – the Polish People’s Party (PSL) and Self-Defence. Both parties appeal 
mainly to agrarian voters, the former being close to the Czech Christian Demo-
crats (KDU-ČSL) with a very pragmatic approach that can swing either left 
(as in 1993–97 and 2001–03) or right (from 2007), and the latter being largely 
populist, appealing mainly to negative voters. 
One feature, however, is very characteristic for the Polish political scene. 
Polish experts use the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ quite extensively. Th is can be, 
perhaps, attributed to the system’s extensive fragmentation, whereby it would 
be diﬃ  cult to describe it otherwise. Th e question remains as to what extent this 
is consistent with Rokkan’s classiﬁ cation of the right-left cleavage in Western 
Europe. It can be assumed that the ‘left’ represents various parties that emerged 
from the pre-1989 dominant Polish United Workers’ Party – PZPR and those 
who held power between 1993 to 1997 and then again from 2001 until 2005. 
Similarly, the parties of the ‘right’ (drawing their substrate mainly from the 
Solidarity movement) were present in the ﬁ rst governments after the fall of 
communism (1989 to 1993), then again from 1997 to 2001, and lastly being in 
oﬃ  ce since 2005. It is a paradox to see that, despite this fragmentation through 
the course of 1990’s, the left was the dominant force in Polish politics and 
was backed by the presidency of Alexander Kwaśniewski; the situation was 
totally reversed after 2005, when the parties on the ‘left’ fell into huge disarray.¹ 
1) This happened despite the fact that three leftist parties [the SLD (Democratic Left Alliance of W. Olejniczak), the SDPL (Social 
Democracy of Poland of Marek Borowski), and the PD (Democratic Party of Janusz Onyszkiewicz)] ran for the 2007 elections as 
the LiD – the Left and Democrats alliance. This coalition has, however, split again. 
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In fact, some analysts think that the left will not be able to recuperate in 
Poland in the foreseeable future and that the current political scene will 
remain for years and be dominated by the right. Th e outcome of the 2007 
Polish elections illustrates this tendency quite clearly: while the ‘right’ (i.e. 
Civic Platform, Law and Justice, and Pawlak’s People’s Party) holds 406 
mandates in the current Sejm, the left-wing parties, including the SLD, 
the DP, and the SDPL, came to hold a mere 53 seats! Even more remark-
able is the situation in the Senate, where only the PO and the PiS are 
represented, the former having 60 senators and the latter 38, with the only 
left-wing senator being former Premier and Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs, 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Th us, the Senate is also totally dominated by 
the political right. 
Th e second distinctive feature of the Polish political system is the pres-
ence of populist parties, namely the Self-Defence Party (Samoobrona) of 
Andrzej Leper, and the League of Polish Families (LRP)² of Roman Giertych. 
Although their inﬂ uence has largely diminished since the 2007 general 
election, where they won only 1.53 and 1.30 of votes respectively, they 
have been part of the governing coalition in the 2005–2007 government; 
this era marks the critical period for examining many of the foreign policy 
issues discussed in this paper. Th ese parties were very loud on issues such 
as abortion, gay rights, the role of the Church, or the rights of the peasants. 
On many occasions, they were held responsible for the condemnation and 
ridicule of the Polish government during this period. It is not surprising 
that – despite the fact that the two parties stand on the opposite sides of 
the left-right spectrum – it is in foreign policy where the positions of these 
two parties often converged due to their accent on Polish sovereignty, secu-
rity, the need to protect Polish interests and values, etc. Th is also points to 
additional problems for the right-left classiﬁ cation of the Polish scene as 
described above. 
Polish political parties have gone through several metamorphoses during 
the course of the transformation period. However, the point of this paper is 
not to analyse the evolution of the Polish party system, but to focus on the 
diﬀ erences among the political parties concerning the foreign policy agenda. 
For this reason, attention will be paid only to the most relevant political 
parties who are currently represented in the Polish parliament, or those that 
were represented in the period relevant for the case studies examined. 
2) The League of Polish Families draws its name from a pre-war ancestor party with a strongly anti-Semitic agenda.
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Positioning of the Polish Political Parties on the Right – Left Axis
 Samoobrona SLD SDPL PD PSL PO PiS LPR
left right
Abbreviations/acronyms:
SLD Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)
SDPL Social Democracy of Poland (Socjaldemokracyja Polska)
PD Democratic Party (Partia Demokratyczna)
PSL Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)
PO Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)
PiS Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedłiwość) 
LPR League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin)
National Consensus and the Relevance of Foreign Policy
In many respects, Poland represents a special case among Central and 
Eastern European countries and the new members of the European Union. 
Th is applies to the new self-perception of Poland in the international arena, 
its foreign policy goals, priorities and consensus, as well as some structural 
pre-conditions relating to the speciﬁ cs of Polish society, its political scene, 
and political parties.
Poland has emerged from communism as a country championing inte-
gration with Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as having a strong pro-US 
inclination in its foreign policy. Th is goes along (to a diﬀ ering degree) with 
the inclination of political elites with other countries of the region. Th ere are, 
however, other features that make the Polish case and the orientation of its 
foreign policy, particularly, a strong reliance on the United States, distinct 
from its neighbours. 
Th e ﬁ rst distinction has to do with many historical reminiscences and 
the self-perception of Poland’s position in Europe. Th e ‘partition syndrome’³ 
and the legacy of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact resonates across the Polish 
3) Relating to the three successive partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795 by Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburg Empire and 
resulting in the disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe for over 100 years, with a short intermezzo of the Grand Duchy 
of Warsaw existent during the Napoleonic Wars.
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political elites, as well as among the general population, far more strongly 
than, for instance, the Munich Agreement in the Czech Republic or Slovakia 
and, arguably, even more than the Treaty of Trianon in Hungary. Since the 
re-emergence of an independent Poland after WWI, the main imperative of 
Poland was to reassure its sole existence and sovereignty in the buﬀ er zone 
between two of its powerful neighbours, Germany in the West and Russia (or 
the Soviet Union) in the East. Th e fall of communism and subsequent integra-
tion with the West has not changed much in what is, by outside observers, 
often viewed as a Polish obsession with security. On one hand, it is true that 
relations with Germany have improved immensely during the course of 1990’s 
and even more so in the last year,⁴ as well as general perception of Germans 
among the Polish population (Cwiek-Karpowicz 2006). However, the recent 
rapprochement between Germany and Russia on many issues, especially the 
energy deal on the North Stream pipeline that bypasses Poland, has led the 
Polish political representation to be suspicious about German dealings with 
its Eastern neighbour and led the former Polish Minister of Defence Sikorski 
to compare this deal to a new Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Th ese perceptions 
put security and foreign policy, in general, very high on the Polish political 
agenda. In fact, there is a strong consensus across the political spectrum on 
the importance of foreign policy. Th is also plays an important role in the 
perception of the United States as the ultimate guarantor of Polish security. 
Among the Polish political elites, there is a widely shared notion that it is in 
the Polish national interest to keep the US strongly engaged in Europe, as 
well as to support its actions in a wider international context. 
Another important element is that Poland views itself as a big player in 
the enlarged European Union⁵. Poland deﬁ nitely sees itself as a setter rather 
than a recipient of foreign policy in Europe. Poles seem to view EU foreign 
policy to be set by the big players and have made many attempts to assert 
themselves as part of the G-6 club within the EU and also engage in other 
initiatives involving the major EU players, such as the Weimar Triangle. 
Whether their strategy has been successful or not is another question; in 
any case, there is a widely shared notion that Poland has to engage actively 
in EU foreign policy making. Linked to what has been said, it is natural that 
4) After the Polish elections in 2007 and a Citizen Platform-led government, many experts refer to new Polish-German rapprochement, 
illustrated by close personal links between German Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski; 
see also further. 
5) Although some Polish experts claim that Poland has an internal dilemma, which could be referred to as the ‘size complex’ – it is 
not always evident whether the Poland wants to act the same way as the other big players in the EU (e.g. Germany, UK, France), 
or rather to align with smaller countries, particularly its neighbours. 
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Poland remains committed to making sure that Europe and the United States 
work closely together on many foreign policy issues. However, the desire to 
be a stronger player in EU foreign and security policy also somehow changes 
the Polish perceptions of Atlanticism, as we will see. 
A traditional playground of Polish foreign policy activism is Eastern 
Europe, where Poland has played an important role in respect to the EU as 
well. It was the ﬁ rst country in the EU to play the Ukrainian card after the 
Orange revolution, calling for the recognition of the ‘European choice’ of 
Ukraine (among with other EU governments) and pushing consistently for 
an association agreement with Ukraine. In addition, the strong position that 
translated into a veto occurred over the mandate to negotiate a new EU-
Russia enhanced treaty to replace the expired Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement (PCA), justiﬁ ed by the Russian ban on the export of Polish meat 
to Russia; this has been another example that Poland will not surrender its 
national interest in the region. If we add the activism of the Polish political 
establishment on Belarus, pushing for the extension of a visa ban on top 
Belarus oﬃ  cials in the EU, Poland emerges as a strong player in the Eastern 
policy, striving to shape the agenda in its own favour. 
But the manifestation of Poland’s self-perception in foreign policy is not 
only evident in its immediate vicinity. Polish government was one of the ﬁ erc-
est supporters of the George W. Bush administration in Iraq, having signed the 
Letter of Eight, sending troops to Iraq as a part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
and agreeing to administer one of the occupation sectors. Some prominent 
Polish politicians and thinkers even acknowledged that it was the decision to 
send around 200 Polish troops to Iraq (under Operation Iraqi Freedom) and, 
subsequently, as many as 2,500 in the stabilization mission, plus the agreement 
to take over one of the stabilization sectors, that ﬁ nally parachuted Poland into 
the group of important players in international relations, along with countries 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom. For instance, Dariusz 
Rosati, MEP and Former Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs in 1995–97, claims that, 
by sending the troops, Poland overnight turned into a country that matters 
much more on the international scene than it did two or three years prior to 
the invasion (Kosiewski and Krzeczunowicz 2003: 23). 
Another element underpinning more global Polish aspirations was the 
proposal for the reform of the United Nations (Kosiewski and Krzeczunowicz 
2003: 16). It was in 2002 that Poland had tabled some of the ﬁ rst proposals. 
Although they originally generated very little attention, they gradually built 
up a positive momentum that attracted the attention of big players such as 
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the United States and Russia, even though such countries originally seemed 
to be quite indiﬀ erent towards discussing these issues or even considering 
possible changes. 
Th erefore, even if the primary imperative of Polish foreign policy remains 
its reassertion, in security terms, in a wider European context, and particu-
larly vis-à-vis Russia, contemporary Polish foreign policy is characterized by 
a multiplicity of interests and playgrounds in which Poland seeks an active 
or even a leadership role – let it be the United Nations, the EU, the Weimar 
Triangle, Visegrád, the Central European Initiative, Iraq, Afghanistan, co-
operation in the Baltic region, or active contribution to the promotion of 
democracy. Some experts would question the adequacy of current Polish 
foreign policy goals and ambitions, given its limited resources, legacy of 
recent transformation, and continuing relative poverty compared to other 
large countries in the EU and the US. Th e actual eﬀ ects of this activism from 
recent Polish foreign policy still remain to be seen. 
Positions of the Polish Political Parties on Foreign Policy Issues
While it has been said that the political scene in Poland is not easy to 
describe or analyse, foreign policy in many respects represents a much more 
consensual issue in Poland due to the factors that were mentioned in the 
previous section. Th is is not to say that the positions of the individual parties 
on foreign policy do not diﬀ er; however, these are certainly not the issues 
that would pose major cleavages in the Polish political arena. Nevertheless, 
‘the devil is in the details;’ thus, a closer examination of particular issues will 
show certain nuances and divergences. 
Views of the US, the EU, and NATO 
As well as in the case of other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
it is also true of Poland that the twin goals of EU and NATO integration 
represented a cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy during the course 
of the 1990’s, as well as the beginning of 21st century. Th ese are, however, 
complemented by a third goal, something not as visible in other countries 
in the region – a necessity to keep a very close bilateral link with the United 
States. In reality, while Polish foreign policy was often at odds with the EU 
(especially in the ﬁ nal phase of accession negotiations or the negotiations 
over the Constitution and, subsequently, the Lisbon treaty), relations with the 
United States have been excellent throughout, regardless whether the ‘right’ 
or ‘left’ were in power. Th is is quite visible on the change of the presidency 
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(which in Poland plays a somewhat stronger role in foreign policy than in 
other countries in the region). Aleksander Kwaśniewski enjoyed the reputa-
tion of being both Altanticist and pro-European; his links with both Wash-
ington and Brussels were excellent. While the assumption of the presidency 
by Lech Kaczyński was met with a lot of nervousness in Brussels (and rightly 
so), the relations with the US administration were not substantially aﬀ ected 
by this change. 
Marcin Zaborowski explains the relationship and esteem for the United 
States in Poland, or what he calls the Polish ‘instinctive Atlanticism,’ 
(Zaborowski 2004: 7) through several factors. It is, ﬁ rstly, a result of a histori-
cal legacy dating back as late as the 18th century (the role played by generals 
Kosciuzsko and Pulawski in the American War on Independence), as well as 
the role that the United States played in the re-creation of Poland in 1918, in 
the defeat of Germany during WWII, and later in the defeat of communism. 
However, there are other factors that account for this ‘special relationship.’ 
One of them is the presence of a large community of immigrants from Polish 
descent in the United States, accounting for as many as 10 million people 
and making Chicago the second biggest Polish city after Warsaw (ibid). Th e 
fact that many Americans of Polish origin possess voting rights makes the 
relationship with the US a crucial question for any Polish government. It is 
also interesting to note that Poles abroad enjoy special attention in election 
party programmes. While this traditionally meant mainly Poles in the US 
and Canada, large Polish communities have recently emerged in the UK and 
Ireland where many Poles migrated after EU accession.
Th e relationship with the United States enjoys a key part in the pro-
grammes of many Polish political parties. However, the place and formulation 
diﬀ er, which might indicate an interesting pattern for future developments. 
For instance, the PiS programme for 2007 addressed the US in the security 
section of the foreign policy programme, which happens to be its ﬁ rst part, 
and refers to the ‘strategic partnership’ between Poland and USA in the 
context of anti-missile defence (PiS 2007). Similarly, the PO programme 
refers to the strategic partnership with the United States (PO 2007), but 
in the context of a foreign policy section called ‘A Strong and Safe Poland 
in the EU,’ stating that keeping a close alliance with the United States is as 
important as enhancing the position of Poland in the EU. Th e programme of 
the Democratic Party (PD) in the section called ‘We will ensure a powerful 
position for Poland in Europe and in the World’ mentions the relations with 
the US only in the fourth point, while the ﬁ rst point highlights the necessity 
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to support the integration of EU foreign policy, arguing that ‘we want to be 
part of such an organization of states that possesses a means of inﬂ uencing 
the world order.’ In the part dealing with the role of the US in the world, it 
mentions that the EU and the USA together bear responsibility for solving 
many of the worlds’ problems and that Poland plays an important role in 
tightening the transatlantic partnership. 
In the following section, we will analyze and explain the position of the 
relevant political parties on diﬀ erent issues that involve the United States, 
and explain how a particular position has emerged and why it is so. Rather 
than following the position of each party on each topic, we will try to proceed 
issue by issue and look into the positions of individual parties on these ques-
tions and explain why and how the stance has evolved and changed. 
US Military Presence in Europe
Th ere is a general consensus among the main Polish political parties 
analysed herein that the United States is absolutely essential in terms of pro-
viding for European, and for that matter Polish, security. Th is fact is widely 
acknowledged in many party programmes. Th e PO election programme 
states that it is in the ‘vital interest of Poland to assure a US military pres-
ence in Europe.’ Th e PSL 2007 election manifesto recognizes that ‘the US, as 
a global power bearing highest responsibility for the international security, 
must remain present in Europe.’ Law and Justice, in its programme, refers to 
an enhanced Polish security through Polish participation in the anti-missile 
project, namely by placing US missiles in Poland. Most of the left-wing 
parties, however, do not make such speciﬁ c references to the US presence 
in Europe in their basic programme documents, nor do the small populist 
parties – the LPR and Self-Defence. 
Poland, as viewed from the outside, has an image of the most ardent sup-
porter of US military presence from the ‘New Europe.’ Generally, this picture 
is right; however, a closer look at some detailed policy issues, nevertheless, 
reveals diﬀ erences among the political parties’ positions.
Since 2006, the discussion on the US military presence was very much 
reduced to the issue of placing the components of US anti-missile defence 
shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Th e proposal to host the base in 
Poland was made by the US administration at the end of 2006 at a time 
when the government was composed of Law and Justice, the League of 
Polish Families, and Self-Defence. Th e Law and Justice party welcomed the 
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initiative quite enthusiastically, viewing it as yet another recognition of the 
importance of Poland for the United States and an opportunity to boost 
the strategic partnership between the two countries. Th e proposal to install 
such system in Poland was also welcomed by the LPR, a coalition partner at 
the time. Th is step was not largely disputed by the Civic Platform, the main 
opposition party at that time. 
Th e concerns voiced on the matter came mainly from the opposition parties, 
particularly the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). It is not to say that the SLD is 
against the anti-missile system as such; however, it is certainly more cautious. 
Although former Prime Ministers Miller and Belka supported the concept, 
they underlined that it should be an integral part of the NATO defence system 
and that Poland must be consulted along with other allies in NATO, as well 
as within the European Union. An outright opposition came from the Polish 
People’s Party (PSL), who signalled its disapproval of this initiative. 
Nevertheless, the calculation of the governing coalition at this time went 
beyond a mere debate about the anti-missile shield as such. It opened up 
a question of Polish security and the guarantees provided by multilateral 
organisations, namely NATO. Two people were instrumental in this respect – 
the Minister of Defence, Radoslaw Sikorski, and his deputy Witold Waszc-
zykowski, who was appointed chief negotiator with the US administration 
on the missile base in Poland. Although Sikorski is considered to be the 
spiritual father of the idea of placing the base on the Polish territory, not 
least because of his previous engagement in Washington and his close links 
to neo-conservative circles, he proved to be very tough on the Americans 
in clearly articulating Polish demands. Both Sikorski, and Wasczykowski 
even more so, voiced that the plans for the base in Poland would have to 
be accompanied by a bilateral security arrangement with the United States. 
Sikorski even compared the desired arrangements to the guarantees the USA 
is providing to Japan or South Korea. Furthermore, the base would have to 
be equipped with the Patriot missiles and complemented with the enhanced 
system of regional defence. Finally, the clash between Sikorski and the PiS 
leaders, particularly the Kaczyński brothers, resulted in his resignation after 
not having been able to defend his tough negotiating stance in the cabinet.⁶ 
Th e developments around the anti-missile system in Poland took a rather 
diﬀ erent turn as a result of the 2007 general elections, which brought to gov-
6) The reasons for the resignation of Mr. Sikorski in February 2007 are not clear. It is likely that it happened through the pressure 
of the President’s chancellery; however, the reasons were probably multiple, along with the ensuing WSI (Military Information 
Services) scandals that involved Antoni Macierewicz, the person in charge of its reconstruction. 
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ernment the coalition of Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform (PO) and Waldemar 
Pawlak’s People’s Party (PSL). Th is, in itself, made for a certain twist in the 
game. Firstly, the new foreign minister in Tusk’s government is Radoslaw 
Sikorski, who originally served as Defence Minister in the PiS-led govern-
ment and was put in charge of the negotiations once again. His hard stance 
in the negotiations with the US was already mentioned. While the Czech 
Republic had already completed its negotiations on the placement of the 
radar system, the talks with Poland were stuck at an impasse, leading to the 
frustration of American negotiators, and even the threat that the US would 
pull out of the deal. Th is threat did not seem real by most Polish experts. 
Firstly, the approach was seen as traditionally tough Polish negotiating 
tactics, a method that we know even from negotiations on the country’s EU 
accession, voting in the Council, etc. Secondly, the PO actually signalled 
before the elections that there would have to be a clear quit pro quo for an 
aﬃ  rmative vote from Poland, particularly, the US participation in upgrading 
the Polish army with Patriot missiles. Th irdly, it would be absurd to accept 
that Sikorski, who was behind the whole idea, would let the talks collapse – it 
is widely thought that, given his long experience in Washington, he knows 
exactly how far he can go and what he can demand during negotiations. 
Th e position of the PO has been that it would not endorse the base without 
being sure that this deal would substantially improve the security of Poland. 
Unlike the PiS, who seemed to be more concerned about having a bilateral 
security agreement with the United States, it seems that the PO has been 
pulling more in the direction of a substantial US contribution to upgrading 
of Polish defence systems, as well as bearing a large bulk of the cost for such 
an operation. 
In any case, the tactics of the PO have been heavily criticised by the PiS as 
extremely damaging to traditionally very good US-Polish relations. Similarly, 
Jaroslaw Kaczyński strongly attacked Tusk for his visit to Moscow during 
which he tried to explain the importance of the missile deal with the United 
States to the Russian administration. Th is might have to do with the fact 
that the PiS clearly acknowledged that he views the missile base as a security 
guarantee vis-à-vis the Russian threat. Th e PO has done a lot to dismantle 
Russian concerns, and has instead focused the negotiations on American 
participation in upgrading Polish army equipment⁷. 
7) The fact that the PO’s position was more of a negotiated tactics rather than an opposition to the base is reiterated by the fact 
that at the time of the editing of the publication, the agreement between the USA and Poland on the missile defence has been 
successfully concluded. 
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Relationship with NATO and the ESDP
It can generally be said that the rightmost Polish political parties are 
very supportive of the United States and NATO as the security agents 
and very suspicious of the EU in that respect. Th e position of the LPR can 
be illustrated by a statement attributed to Giertych, in which he says that 
Poland ‘could become the US aircraft carrier.’8 On the other hand, given 
an overall Euroscepticism from the LPR, one would hardly expect that the 
party would be too much in favour of building up European defence, or 
even a European army. 
Th e position of the PiS is very similar, albeit a bit contradictory and incon-
sistent. It could have taken many by surprise when Jaroslaw Kaczyński, on his 
ﬁ rst oﬃ  cial visit in the capacity of Prime Minister in Brussels during August 
2006, announced that he wants ‘the EU to constitute a power similar to the 
US’ (Spinant and Taylor 2006) and that he supports ‘a strong, political Europe 
that would also be a true military power.’ Lech Kaczyński, in November 2006, 
supported the creation of a European army that would comprise 100,000 
troops, remain closely linked to NATO, and execute military operations 
outside Europe (Cienski and Wagstyl 2006). However, most Polish analysts 
believe that this does not reﬂ ect Kaczyński’s conviction and that he stated 
this in an attempt to show that Poland could play a constructive role in the 
building of the ESDP. In addition, the way it was supposed to be presented 
caused a lot of confusion, leaving the credibility of such a proposal in doubt.⁹ 
In reality, Lech Kaczyński remains deeply disillusioned with the actual role 
that Europe can play in the security arena. 
Beyond that, there is scepticism not only towards the ESDP, but also NATO. 
Th is is further supported by statements from the Deputy Minister of Defence 
Wasczykowski that ‘NATO is not an alliance of our dreams.’ He suggests that 
NATO can no longer assure the security of Poland due to the fact that the 
Alliance has not invested its time in enhancing its defence systems since 1999 
(Warsaw Business Journal 2007). Th is distrust towards NATO was also ﬂ eshed 
out by another prominent PiS ﬁ gure, the chairman of the Foreign Aﬀ airs 
Committee in the Sejm, Pawel Zalewski, stating that the distrust is caused by 
the lack of engagement from allies in NATO missions (Palata 2007). Th us, the 
PiS, within the framework of bilateral negotiations on the anti-missile defence 
8) Quoted by one of the leading Polish experts on the issue.
9) Lech Kaczyński acknowledged that the idea was discussed a week earlier between Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczyński and German 
Chancellor Merkel; however, Jaroslaw Kaczyński expressely denied having talked to Merkel about such a proposal. 
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system, seeks a special defence deal with the United States similar to arrange-
ments with other countries such as the UK, Japan, or South Korea. 
Th e position of the PO recognizes the key importance of NATO, the 
USA, and the EU in the context of building Polish security arrangements. 
In its election manifesto of 2007, it states clearly that it wants Europe to 
accept more responsibility for its own security, as well as that of the world. 
Th is is quite important, as it suggests that the PO is supportive of an active 
Polish engagement in missions implemented under the EU ﬂ ag. However, it 
simultaneously stresses that the EU must implement such tasks in alliance 
with the United States and NATO and that they bear a joint responsibility 
for global peace, security, and the stability of international order (PO 2007). 
A more balanced approach to EU initiatives and an evolving defence policy 
are also ways of distinguishing the PO from the PiS, whose policy of ardent 
pro-Americanism has been seen as extremely damaging to Polish interests 
by Donald Tusk, as well as some prominent PO members in the European 
Parliament (e.g. Saryusz-Wolski). 
Th e Democratic Party (PD) shows an even more favourable approach to 
the ESDP, EU-led missions, and more responsibility from Europe for its own 
defence. One of the prominent party members, former Minister of Foreign 
Aﬀ airs and recently deceased member of the European Parliament, Bronisław 
Geremek, has co-authored a declaration, adopted by other prominent ﬁ gures 
in the EP such as Elmar Brok, Jo Leinen, and Nicole Fontaine, calling, inter alia, 
for ‘the EU to establish a foreign policy, security, and defence union’ and that the 
EU should be equipped with ‘joint defence forces that would genuinely enable 
the European Union to act autonomously.’ However, the position of Geremek, 
who was in the European Parliament since 2004, was probably somewhat more 
enthusiastic about European defence capabilities than the party as a whole. 
For instance, in the opinion of the party’s leader, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the EU 
military missions are preferable only in Europe or perhaps in Africa; however, 
in other regions, it is the USA or NATO that should take the lead. Although 
he claims to be in favour of the progressive framing of the ESDP, he underlines 
that the ultimate responsibility for European security must be borne by both 
NATO and the EU in close co-operation. He is neither in favour of creating an 
autonomous EU-army, unless it is closely co-ordinated with NATO. 
It is also necessary to highlight that both Geremek and Onyskewicz held 
key positions in the AWS¹⁰-led government (the former was the Foreign 
10) AWS: Solidarity Electoral Action, a party that was the leader in the 1997–2001 government. It subsequently split into currently 
existing right-wing and centre-right parties, such as the PiS, the PO, and the DP.
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Aﬀ airs Minister, the latter the Defence Minister) between 1997 and 2000 
(representing the Democratic Union party and resigning after the AWS-UW 
coalition broke up) and, during this period, were highly critical of the EU 
plans to establish a EU security and defence policy. Th e main concerns were 
related to the exclusion of non-EU NATO members from the decisions made 
within the framework of the ESDP. Geremek explicitly argued for including 
six non-EU European NATO members into ESDP decision making, while 
Onyszkiewicz stated that the EU plan was unclear and lacking in military 
and operational viability (Zaborowski 2004:17). 
Th e position of the left parties, the SLD and the SDPL, on the relation-
ship to the ESDP and NATO remains a bit blurry. Th ere is no explicit 
reference to NATO or the ESDP in the party election manifestos. However, 
given the deeds, one can assume that they also view NATO and the US as 
the cornerstone of Polish security. It was under the premiership of Leszek 
Miller in December 2002 that one of the biggest military deals ever was 
executed, when the Polish government accepted a 3.8 billion USD loan 
from the US Congress to procure 18 F-16 aircraft from Lockheed Martin 
(Wayne 2003). In many ways, this was interpreted as a desire from Poland 
to prove its credibility as a mature NATO member. Nevertheless, the choice 
of procuring American, rather than European, defence systems was also an 
expression of the pro-American credentials of the Poles (Zaborowski 2004: 
7). Kwaśniewski, during the course of his term of oﬃ  ce, consistently praised 
the leading role of the United States in the world, claiming that it is ‘both 
unquestionable and that it should be exercised.’ 
Th e Foreign Minister in the 2001–2005 government, Wlodimierz Cimosze-
wicz (SLD),¹¹ took a more positive approach towards the gradual development 
of the ESDP, stressing that the ESDP should concern itself with developing 
capabilities rather than institutions.¹² He acknowledged explicitly that Poland 
was in favour of deepening its integration in the CFSP, while still stressing the 
value of transatlantic relations. He also supported the establishment of the 
European Armaments Agency, however, while also pointing out that it should 
remain open to transatlantic armament co-operation. During his keynote 
address at the Batory Foundation conference in 2003, Cimoszewicz called for 
close EU-US co-operation and acknowledged that it is the country’s interested 
to foster it for fundamental reasons (Kosiewski and Krzeczunowicz 2003). 
At the same time, he admitted during the speech that some of the concepts 
11) Cimoszewicz has not been in politics since 2005; however, in 2007, he was elected to the Senate as an independent senator. 
12) Lecture by W. Cimosczewicz at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin, 12 March 2003.
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for protecting US security interests (such as the ‘coalition of the willing’ for 
addressing unconventional threats) could undermine NATO and imply a selec-
tive approach. Th is would indicate some criticism towards an overly unilateral 
approach of the United States and an inclination from the SLD to act through 
a multilateral framework rather than unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions. 
To conclude, all the major parties agree that US involvement in Europe is 
crucial for Polish security, as well as that of NATO. However, the parties on 
the right, particularly the LPR and the PiS, are sceptical towards European 
plans for enhanced European security and a more active European involve-
ment outside of Europe. Th e centre and centre-left parties (PO, PSL, DP, SLD, 
and SDPL) take a much more positive view of the emerging role of Europe as 
a security provider. However, their position and support is still conditioned 
on the fact that Europe will co-operate closely with NATO and the US, and 
also that Poland will be included in any substantial debate. Th e much more 
positive approach from the centre and left parties to the ESDP was facilitated 
by the accession of Poland to the EU, Polish participation in decision making 
regarding the ESDP, and in the European Armaments Agency. Th is ﬁ ts with 
the Polish interest of being a strong and credible actor in the security ﬁ eld.
Iraq
For none of the other countries in the region is the relationship to the 
United States and Atlanticist inclination as illustrative as on examining the 
Polish involvement in Iraq. Maria Wągrowska refers to it as to the ‘most 
controversial undertaking in Polish foreign and security policy during the 
last 15 years’ (Wągrowska 2004). 
When discussing Iraq in the context of the Polish political scene, one must 
distinguish between Polish participation in the military intervention and its 
subsequent stabilization of the country. As far as the ﬁ rst issue goes, there 
was relatively little debate; Poland’s involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
was not contested by any of the government or opposition parties, nor from 
the parties not represented in Parliament, and not even from the public 
administration (Wągrowska 2004). Th is support for the US intentions was 
symbolically expressed by Prime Minister Miller’s signature of the famous 
‘Letter of Eight’ in January 2003. Th e decision to send a strong, elite unit of 
200 soldiers to participate in the intervention was adopted by the government 
in March 2003, endorsed by President Kwaśniewski, and supported by both 
major opposition parties, the PiS and the PO. 
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While Polish participation in the military operation was quite non-con-
troversial and achieved quickly, Polish involvement in the stabilization mis-
sion started to point out divergences among various stakeholders, including 
the political parties. Firstly, even the government was surprised that Poland 
was invited to take command of one of the stabilization zones in Iraq. Even 
as early as March 2003, such a possibility had been practically ruled out, 
with the Minister of Defence Smajdziński arguing that this would ‘have 
a negative inﬂ uence on the ﬁ nances of the department’ (Wągrowska 2004: 
16). Once it was agreed that the Americans would pay a substantial part of 
the activities of the contingent, including its transportation, the decision to 
move in was given a green light; the contingent was relocated to Iraq at the 
beginning of June 2003.
Since then, there has been a continuous debate in Poland about the costs 
and beneﬁ ts of the Polish presence in Iraq. Originally, the government 
mandated that the contingency stay in Iraq until the end of 2003 with the 
possibility of prolonging the mission by one year and then, subsequently, by 
six-months periods. 
Th e ﬁ rst politician that openly brought in the question of Polish with-
drawal from Iraq was the Minister of Defence, Jerzy Szmajdziński, in an 
interview for Gazeta Wyborcza in October 2004. Szmajdziński, for the ﬁ rst 
time, set a deadline, stating that Poland would leave the country by the end 
of 2005, which was connected to the lapse of the Security Council Resolution 
n. 1546. Th is was followed by appeals from his party – the SLD – urging the 
government to set a pullout date. Th e appeal of the party congress adopted 
on 3 July 2004 came very soon after the oﬃ  cial transfer of sovereignty to 
Iraqi authorities on 28 June 2004. In October, Marek Belka only very closely 
survived a vote of conﬁ dence after claiming that ‘we would not stay in Iraq 
an hour longer than needed’ and had to promise to scale down the Polish 
deployment of some 2,500 troops during the course of 2005. It is important 
to note that the pressure to do so did not come from the opposition, but 
rather from the ranks of the ruling party, the SLD. 
Th e victory of the PiS in the 2005 elections marked a change in the posi-
tion of the Polish pullout from Iraq. Although, originally, the remaining 1,500 
troops that stayed were supposed to be withdrawn by January 2006, Prime 
Minister Marcinkiewicz decided to defer the decision after the outcome 
of the Iraqi elections in December 2005. He subsequently asked President 
Kaczyński to prolong the mandate by another year. Th us, the position in Iraq 
changed again, although the PiS remained virtually the only party supporting 
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a continuous deployment. Th e mandate was prolonged for yet another year 
at the beginning of 2007, although a further scaling down to 900 troops was 
also accepted by the government. Th e hard stance of the PiS was maintained, 
despite the escalation of violence against Poles present in Iraq. Shortly before 
the elections on 21 October 2007, a car transferring the Polish ambassador in 
Iraq was attacked, claiming the life of a Polish soldier; subsequently, there was 
another explosion near the Polish embassy. In fact, after the attacks, Prime 
Minister Kaczyński warned against “deserting” Iraq; Minister of Defence 
Szczyglo warned that ‘anyone campaigning on the issue of withdrawal from 
Iraq would bear full responsibility for the welfare of Polish troops there.’ 
(Dujisin 2007). 
Even the smaller coalition parties, Self-Defence and the LPR, defended 
the pullout. Lepper’s Self-Defence has been against the participation in the 
stabilization force for a long time. Two LPR ministers, Giertych and Wie-
checki, clashed with the rest of the government over the prolongation of the 
mission and initiated a call for a national referendum on the issue that was 
to be called in May 2007. However, the proposal did not win the necessary 
absolute majority in the Sejm.
Th e Civic Platform (PO) has put withdrawal from Iraq at the top of its for-
eign policy agenda for the 2007 early elections. Donald Tusk was committed 
to terminating the Polish mission in Iraq completely by mid-2008. However, 
the need of co-habitation with PiS president Kaczyński, who has levers to 
defer the decision should he deem it premature, made things a bit more com-
plicated. Th e president and the PO ﬁ nally managed to strike a deal resulting 
in a compromise by which there would be a pullout by October 2008. 
Let us brieﬂ y summarize and look at the reasons for the political parties’ 
positions. For the PiS, which has been undoubtedly the staunchest supporter 
of continuing the Polish presence, support was motivated by its alleged 
expectations from the United States. At the time, when many countries were 
pulling their troops out of Iraq, even while situation constantly deteriorating, 
it was considered unwise to send a wrong signal to Washington. It is pos-
sible that Kaczyńskis also deemed it necessary to prove Polish credentials 
for the deals they needed to strike with the US on other issues, such as the 
missile base and a special security agreement with the US. For the PO, the 
engagement in Iraq did not pay back enough to Poland. For the PO, the 
Polish engagement in Iraq bore enormous costs, resulting in a resentment 
in public opinion and diminishing pro-Americanism in Poland; yet, Poland 
received very little or nothing in return. In the opinion of Tusk and Sikorski, 
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Poland did not get anything of what it wanted – visa waivers, army upgrades, 
or extensive orders in the reconstruction of Iraq. In the PO’s opinion, it is 
necessary to show Washington that Poland would not support it at any cost 
and for no beneﬁ t. Th us, a very similar way of thinking that applied to the 
PO’s position on anti-missile base. For the LPR and Self-Defence, the negative 
position of continuing the country’s presence in Iraq is quite understand-
able – both parties are largely populist; public opinion (which was strongly 
against Polish involvement and the polls shifted even more in favour of Polish 
pull-out) is negative; the party cannot win any political points by supporting 
it. It was also diﬃ  cult for these parties to conceive, something very much ori-
ented to ‘national interest’ rhetoric, what the Polish interest is in keeping law 
and order in a faraway country. Finally, for the SLD, the arguments would be 
similar to the PO; the party has advocated for a pullout ever since the former 
passing of sovereignty to the Iraqi government happened. Th e argument 
voiced by the Polish left often entails that the Polish capacities are already 
overstretched by involvement in too many missions – however, particularly 
Iraq and Afghanistan are often mentioned. One could, perhaps, interpret it 
in a way that the approach of Poland should be more balanced – given that 
it has limited resources, Poland should not focus only on US-led missions, 
but should leave some capacity for active involvement in the ESDP. As was 
mentioned, the SLD wants Poland to play a strong role in European security. 
With too much of its energy being focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, it might 
lose the credibility amongst the strong players in the EU. 
External Aspects on the War on Terror
Th e biggest endeavour in Polish involvement in a worldwide ‘war on ter-
ror,’ as deﬁ ned by George W. Bush, is its involvement in Afghanistan, where 
Poland participates actively in the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF). Poland contributes at the moment with around 1,200 troops to this 
NATO-led mission, as well as a special force named GROM, deployed in the 
Kandahar province for unconventional operations. 
Th e Polish deployment in Afghanistan enjoys much larger support and 
consensus among the major political parties, i.e. the PiS, the PO, and the 
SLD, than the mission in Iraq. Th is is despite the fact that public opinion is 
generally opposed to any deployment of Polish forces abroad; Polish analysts 
point out that ordinary Poles can hardly distinguish between the two mis-
sions. Public backlash culminated after August 2007 when six Polish soldiers 
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operating in Southeastern Afghanistan opened ﬁ re on a village (allegedly 
thinking that Taliban insurgents were hiding there) resulting in the killing of 
eight civilians, including a pregnant woman. 
In addition, unlike the mission in Iraq, which was partially paid for by the 
United States, the costs of the involvement in Afghanistan were borne by 
Poland alone. Th is seems to cause some concerns, particularly for the SLD, 
fearing that Polish resources might become overstretched. 
Th e SLD-led government agreed with the participation of Poland in 
Operation Enduring Freedom, including Afghanistan; however, it did not 
support the United States in the initial strike against the Taliban and decided 
to contribute only after the international stabilization mission was authorized 
by the UN in December 2001 by sending a de-mining team to the country in 
2002, as well as providing combat engineers and logistical support. 
Th e biggest controversy was sparked by the decision of the PiS-led gov-
ernment in September 2006 to boost the Polish presence in Afghanistan 
by contributing an additional 1000 troops to the NATO-led mission. As 
the announcement was made by Minister of Defence Sikorski, it caused 
strong reactions from the coalition partners, the LPF and Self-Defence. 
Giertych, the leader of the LPR, commented, ‘When the USSR was ﬁ ghting 
in Afghanistan, Poland did not have to send its soldiers there.’ Similarly, 
the leader of Self-Defence, Andrzej Lepper, suggested that it was unfair 
that Sikorski made this announcement (moreover, in Washington) without 
consulting with the smaller coalition partners on such a large-scale deploy-
ment and threatened to initiate a parliamentary resolution condemning 
Sikorski’s move as incompetent and harmful to the Polish Republic (Cienski 
and Dombey 2006). 
Th e PO has not made any signs of intentions to limit its involvement in 
Afghanistan. In fact, Tusk pledged to bolster the Polish presence to 1,600 
troops and deploy 8 additional helicopters in the southern province of 
Kandahar. Th ere is a clear link between pulling out of Iraq and an increas-
ing presence in Afghanistan. By many, this is interpreted as a fact that the 
PO prefers an engagement of missions linked to NATO rather than the 
‘coalition of the willing.’ However, one of the prominent PO ﬁ gures, Deputy 
Speaker of the Sejm for the PO, Bronislaw Komorowski, pleaded already 
ahead of the 2007 parliamentary election to change the nature of the cur-
rent Polish engagement from the one of a combat nature to that of a civil-
ian mission (McNamara 2007). Th is stems from a shocking experience in 
August 2007 when a group of Polish soldiers was implicated in allegedly 
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opening ﬁ re on civilians, which caused a huge uproar from the Polish public. 
However, the PO Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski, in his speech in Canada 
in February 2008, underlined the necessity of Poland to remain engaged 
militarily and explain motives that are not only pragmatic. It is well possible 
that Sikorski’s personal experience of being a war reporter in Afghanistan 
during the 1980’s makes him take a somewhat more personal approach; it 
is also possible that, to a Polish audience, he would have delivered a slightly 
diﬀ erent message. Nevertheless, an early pullout from Afghanistan is not 
likely to be on the PO agenda. 
As far as the allegations of Poland hosting secret CIA detention facilities 
and CIA ﬂ ights bringing terrorist suspects to Europe, this generated very 
little response from Poland. All the key ﬁ gures, regardless of their party aﬃ  li-
ations, denied such allegations. Th e testimonies from the intelligence sector, 
as well as the Council of Europe report authored by Swiss senator Dick Marty, 
acknowledge that at least two prominent SLD ﬁ gures, Prime Minister Miller 
and President Kwaśniewski, were aware of the existence of such facilities in 
Poland. Kwaśniewski admitted that CIA ﬂ ights might have stopped in Poland, 
but that there were certainly no detention centres. Although a parliamentary 
investigation into these accusations was launched, the outcomes were never 
publicised due to national security concerns. Th e government announced 
that the outcomes of the investigation found the allegations to be unfounded, 
causing Prime Minister Kaczyński to declare it a ‘closed issue’ (Amnesty 
International 2007). It is indeed very diﬃ  cult to discern whether there are 
any strong positions from the political parties on the issue of CIA ﬂ ights. Due 
to the high sensitivity of the issue, the key representatives from the political 
parties keep a low proﬁ le on this issue, perhaps in an attempt to deny any 
accusations that might damage the reputation of Poland as a country. 
The Middle East Conﬂ ict 
Among other issues that deserve attention in terms of the Polish parties’ 
attitudes towards the United States, one probably worth mentioning is the 
country’s attitude towards the Middle East conﬂ ict. During the times of com-
munism, Poland played a rather pro-Palestinian role, similar to other coun-
tries from the Communist block. After the fall of communism, Poland tried 
to take a more balanced approach, which can be described as ‘equal distance’ 
(Kolarska-Bobińska and Mughrabi 2008) and even strived to play a mediating 
role between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Th e Polish engagement in 
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the Middle East, rather weak during the 1990’s, has intensiﬁ ed at the begin-
ning of 21st century. First and foremost, it is linked with the Polish presence 
in Iraq, where Poland was ﬁ ghting along with the US in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom and subsequently took control of one of the occupation sectors. Polish 
diplomats also strongly believe that the conﬂ ict in Iraq had a strong impact 
on the entire region, including the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂ ict. 
Th e Polish policy of ‘equal distance’ has not changed signiﬁ cantly in the 
past few years, despite changing partisan composition from the Polish gov-
ernments. As one Polish diplomat noted, the Polish political right tries to 
be more pro-Israeli for both historical reasons and the style of governance 
that was demonstrated when the PiS was in power in 2005–07. ‘Kaczyński 
likes the fact that Israel has a similar vision of a strong country and “state 
democracy,” which puts a strong emphasis on security,’ he observed 
(Kolarska-Bobińska and Mughrabi 2008). Th is is reiterated by a statement 
from Andrzej Krawczyk, foreign policy advisor to Lech Kaczyński, calling 
good relations with Israel one of Poland’s foreign policy priorities ahead of 
Kaczyński’s visit to Israel in summer 2006 (Taube 2007). At the same time, 
Kaczyński managed to maintain a good relation with the Palestinian author-
ity, where his visit in September 2006 was described as a big success.
In respect to Israel, the position of the PO does not seem to diverge very 
much to that of the PiS. It was clearly demonstrated during Donald Tusk’s 
visit to Israel in April 2008, expressing a particularly strong Polish under-
standing for Israel’s concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme. Equally, 
on the political left, the instrumental person who tried to improve relations 
between Poland and Israel was Aleksander Kwaśniewski during his ten-year 
presidency. 
On the contrary, the situation is more complicated with the far right. 
Relations with Israel are stranded because of alleged anti-Semitism on 
the part of many LPR members. At the time when Roman Giertych, the 
party leader, was appointed the Minister of Education, the Israeli oﬃ  cials 
refused to meet with him, referring to the anti-Semitic platform of the party. 
Indeed, it seems that a rather deeply rooted anti-Semitism present in Polish 
society still poses certain problems in restoring Polish credibility vis-à-vis 
Israel, despite political statements on both parts referring to a strategic 
partnership and the orientation of both countries’ foreign policy towards 
the United States. In a 2003 poll, 46 of Poles admitted to disliking the Jews, 
a ﬁ gure similar to those disliking traditionally unpopular nationalities such 
as Russians, Arabs or Gypsies. 
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Otherwise, deep partisan divisions towards the Middle East cannot be 
easily discerned. Several variables probably play a role here. First, Poland 
is balancing between an original pro-Palestinian approach that has earned 
the country certain credibility among Arab states in the region, as well 
as Israel where, due to complicated historical links, it is trying to reassert 
itself as a strategic partner and advocate inside the EU. Secondly, the Polish 
engagement in Iraq mandates that Poland pursue a more pro-active Middle 
East policy. Th is is also reﬂ ected in the Polish deployment in the UNFIL 
peacekeeping mission in Lebanon that was raised to 500 troops, as well as the 
humanitarian aid provided to Lebanon and Syria during the conﬂ ict between 
Israel and Hezbollah during the summer of 2006, or the Palestinian Authority 
being one of the priority countries of the Polish Oﬃ  cial Development Assist-
ance (ODA). Th us, it seems to be the case that the Polish partisan positions 
keep continuity in the policy of ‘equal distance’ in the Middle East, striving 
to make Poland a more important and credible partner in the region. As one 
Polish oﬃ  cial puts it: ‘they [the Polish peacekeeping missions in the region] 
are Poland’s biggest asset: the more missions, the bigger Poland’s involvement 
in international and EU policy towards the region. Th ey increase its cred-
ibility as an EU member and strengthen its position’ (Kolarska-Bobińska and 
Mugrabi 2008). Strangely enough, the Polish position does not reﬂ ect what 
is often viewed as a one-sided approach from the United States to the region 
and proves that a Polish foreign policy consensus does not necessarily have 
to ‘copy’ the US attitude. 
Conclusion
Th e account of the foreign policy positions of the Polish parties has to 
start with the assertion that there is a large degree of consensus across the 
Polish political scene as far as the relationship with and support of the United 
States is concerned. Th is stands in opposition to support for EU actions or 
positions vis-à-vis other international organizations where the diverging 
positions of political parties are more obvious. However, even regarding the 
United States, the stances are starting to be more nuanced as we move across 
the Polish scene.
Th e most ardent supporters of the US policies can certainly be identiﬁ ed 
in what we described at the beginning as the Polish right. Th e PiS is the most 
pro-American of the Polish parties; this can be illustrated in almost all the 
issues that we examined. 
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Th e LPR does not exactly ﬁ t the pattern of strong pro-Americanism. 
Rhetorically, it seems to be a supporter of the United States, especially 
when opposed to the European Union in the international arena, some-
thing that can be interpreted as a prevailing, strong Euroscepticism within 
the party. However, when it comes to paying the price of such support, 
such as deployment the Polish troops in US or NATO-led missions, the 
party has a problem. It clearly is not convinced on the beneﬁ ts of Polish 
soldiers risking their lives in faraway countries, which can be explained 
by the strong accent on Polish interests and populism within the party, 
exploiting a largely hostile public opinion to Polish engagement in such 
missions. In addition, the either explicit or implicit anti-Semitism from 
many of the party’s members puts its credibility vis-à-vis the United 
States in question. Th us, a more correct interpretation is that the party is 
strongly nationalist or ‘souverainist’ in its approach to foreign policy, com-
plemented with a strong populism, being sceptical of both the EU and the 
USA, with a strong nationalist accent separating it from the mainstream 
right-wing parties. 
Th e PiS considers the country’s relationship to the US a cornerstone of 
Polish foreign and security policy and maintains that this strategic partner-
ship must be sustained and cherished. Poland must act as a good ally of the 
United States and try not to alienate itself by adopting measures that might 
be regarded as disloyal in Washington. Th is goes hand in hand with certain 
scepticism towards the EU, particularly towards Germany, who – according 
to the PiS – does not necessarily share the same objectives and interests in 
international relations, and a huge dislike and suspicion of Russia, which 
has become an archenemy for the Kaczyński brothers. However, no diver-
gence of interests is viewed vis-à-vis the United States. 
Th e position of the Civic Platform (PO) is more pragmatic. It is true 
that the PO still values enormously the strategic relations with the United 
States. However, compared to the PiS, it tends to view this relationship 
more in cost-beneﬁ t terms. In other words, the relationship with the US 
must bring tangible beneﬁ ts to Poland. It wants Poland to act more – at 
least symbolically – on equal footing vis-à-vis the US, or as partners rather 
than a provider – recipient situation. Th is stance of the PO goes hand 
in hand with the same pragmatism towards the European Union and its 
foreign and security policy, striving to keep the balance of support for the 
activities and initiatives of both actors while still projecting a great deal of 
its own interest.
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As for the parties of the centre-left and left, such as the PSL, the SLD, and 
the SDPL, the positions on foreign policy matters and the US become even 
blurrier. Even in their case, the United States plays a crucial role in Polish 
foreign policy. However, these parties see as equally importantly the com-
mitments Poland has vis-à-vis their European partners. Th ey want Poland 
to be a good and reliable ally for the US, but also prove Polish credibility as 
an actor within the EU, not least in framing its foreign and security policy. 
Th us, they try to make sure that Poland uses all its inﬂ uence to be a bridge 
between the Transatlantic partners, an entity that makes the EU and the 
US pull in the same direction, if possible. 
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Table 1: Parties in the Romanian Parliament (Chamber of Deputies):¹
Term
Chamber of Deputies 
(number of mandates)
Governing 
Party or 
Coalition
1990 – 
1992²
National Salvation Front (FSN, 66.3%, 263 seats)• 
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR, 7.23%, 29 seats)• ³
National Liberal Party (PNL, 6.41%, 29 seats)• 
Ecological Movement of Romania (2.62%, 12 seats)• 
National Peasants Party – Christian Democrats (2.56%, 12 seats)• 
Alliance for Romanian Unity (2.12%, 9 seats)• 
Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (1.83%, 9 seats)• 
Romanian Ecological Party (1.69%, 8 seats)• 
Romanian Socialist Democratic Party (1.05%, 5 seats)• 
Social Democratic Party (0.53%, 2 seats) • 
Democratic Group of the Centre (0.48%, 2 seats)• 
Parties gaining one seat + 9 seats allocated to ethnic minorities• ⁴
Total: 396/387 (+9 seats for ethnic minorities)
Voter turnout: 86.2%
FSN 
1) Romania has a bicameral Parliament with both chambers equipped with comparable competences; according to the Law 
No. 68/1992, in effect as of the 1996 elections, members of both chambers are elected from electoral districts on the basis of 
proportional representation. Members of both chambers are elected for a four-year term. The threshold for entering the Parliament 
is 3%; there was debate in Romania on elevating the threshold to 5%. There are 42 constituencies ranging from 4 to 29 deputies. 
An initial seat distribution at the district level uses the Hare quota; a second distribution at the national level applies the d’Hondt 
formula to allocate any remaining seats. Romania is a semi-presidential republic with the President elected directly in a two-round 
major vote system with one possible re-election. When in function, he/she cannot be a member of a political party. The change 
of the constitutional framework as of 2003 prolonged the original four-year presidential term to five years. The 2004 elections 
were the last instance of when both the chambers and the President were elected at once. President Traian Băsescu proposed 
another change of the electoral system – a referendum on the introduction of a two-round uninominal voting system was held 
simultaneously with the referendum on his suspension in May 2007. Due to insufficient voter turnout (44%), the referendum 
(in favour of change) on the change of the electoral system was declared invalid. 
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Table 1: Parties in the Romanian Parliament (Chamber of Deputies):
Term
Chamber of Deputies 
(number of mandates)
Governing Party 
or Coalition
1992 – 
1996
Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN• ⁵, 27.7%, 117 seats)
Democratic Convention of Romania• ⁶ (CDR, 20%, 82 seats)
FSN (10.2%, 43 seats)• 
Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR, 7.7%, 30 seats)• 
UDMR (7.5%, 27 seats)• 
Greater Romania Party (PRM, 3.9%, 16 seats)• 
Socialist Labour Party (3%, 13 seats) • 
13 seats allocated to ethnic minorities• 
Total: 341(328)⁷
Voter turnout: 76.3% 
FDSN, 
Romanian National 
Unity Party, 
Greater Romania 
Party, 
Socialist Labour 
Party⁸
1996 – 
2000
CDR• ⁹ (30.2%, 122 seats)
Party of Romanian Social Democracy (PDSR• ¹⁰, 21.5%, 91 seats)
Social Democratic Union• ¹¹ (12.9%, 53 seats)
UDMR (6.6%, 25 seats)• 
Greater Romania Party (PRM, 4.5%, 19 seats)• 
Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR, 4.4%, 18 seats)• 
15 seats allocated to ethnic minorities• 
Total: 343(328)
Voter turnout: 76%
CDR,
Social Democratic 
Union,
UDMR 
2000 – 
2004
Party of Romanian Social Democracy-Social Democratic • 
Party of Romania (PDSR/PSD¹², 36.6%, 155 seats)
Greater Romania Party (PRM, 19.5%, 84 seats)• 
Democratic Party (PD, 7%, 31 seats)• 
National Liberal Party (PNL, 6.9%, 30 seats)• 
UDMR (6.8%, 27 seats)• 
18 seats allocated to ethnic minorities• 
Total:345(327) 
Voter turnout: 65.3%
PDSR/PSD,
UDMR 
2004 – 
2008
National Union PSD + PUR• ¹³ (36.8%, 132 
seats; PSD-113 seats, PUR-19 seats):
Justice and Truth Alliance (PNL+PD, 31.5 %, • 
112 seats; PNL-64 seats, PD-48 seats)
Greater Romania Party (PRM, 13%, 48 seats)• 
UDMR (6.2%, 22 seats) • 
18 seats allocated to ethnic minorities• 
Total: 332(314)
Voter turnout: 56.5 %
Justice and 
Truth Alliance, 
UDMR, 
PUR¹⁴, 
(in 2007 
PNL-UDMR¹⁵)
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2) The ‘Assembly of Deputies’ was elected on the basis of the system combining multi-member districts and proportional representa-
tion. The Chamber consisted of 396 seats, of which 9 were reserved to the representatives of the ethnic minorities. The elections 
took place on May 20, 1990.
3) The UDMR results in the first elections were the most striking; it was clear that almost all 2-million of the large Hungarian 
minority in Romania voted unanimously for this ethnic-based party. The electorate of the party has remained more or less the 
same since then.
4) Every officially recognized minority participating in the elections is entitled to one seat in the Chamber of Deputies, if it has not 
won a seat in either the Chamber or the Senate vote. The number of seats allocated to minorities, thus, varies from election to 
election.
5) PM Petre Roman’s supporters in the FSN argued for further reforms; Roman was elected a party chairman in March 1992. In 
response, President Iliescu and his supporters broke off from the FSN and established the FDSN.
6) In 1992, the CDR was an electoral coalition of 12 parties, including the PNL, the Romanian Ecological Party, the National Peasant 
Party-Christian Democrats, the Civic Alliance Party, the Party of Romanian Social Democracy, and other smaller parties. (Crowther 
2004: 370; University of Essex 2002).
7) The electoral rules established by the legislature in July 1992 reduced the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to 328 
(without the seats reserved for ethnic minorities) and expanded the number of seats in the Senate to 143.
8) An agreement of support for the FDSN was concluded in 1995.
9) In 1996, the Democratic Convention of Romania was an electoral coalition of 12 parties, including the PNL, the Romanian Ecological 
Party, the National Peasant Party-Christian Democrats, the Civic Alliance Party, the Alternative Party of Romania, the Association 
of Former Political Prisoners, and other smaller parties (Crowther 2004: 384; University of Essex 2002).
10) The former FDSN from the 1992 elections later changed its name to the Party of Romanian Social Democracy-Social Democratic 
Party of Romania, and even later to the Social Democratic Party (PSD); for details, see below.
11) The electoral alliance of the Democratic Party (PD), formerly, the FSN – Petre Roman’s party and the Social Democratic Party 
(PSDR), a member of the CDR in the 1992 elections; the PD won 43 seats in the Chamber of Deputies; the PSDR won 10 seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies. (Crowther 2004: 384; University of Essex 2002).
12) The party later changed its name to the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
13) The Humanist party of Romania was founded in 1991; in May 2005, it changed its name to the Conservative Party.
14) In December 2004, the PUR signalled a switch of political partners and later broke from the electoral coalition with the PSD. On 
December 25, 2004, the UDMR and the PUR signed a government coalition protocol with the Justice and Truth alliance (PNL+PD), 
with Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu as the designated PM. The PSD was left in opposition.
15) In December 2006, the ruling coalition started to split due to controversies arising between the president and the PM; the 
Conservative party left the government. After a couple months of disputes, a reshuffling in the government and the end of the 
PNL-PD alliance was announced and a minority government of the PNL and the UDMR was established. In parallel, part of the 
PNL members, including former PM Theodor Stolojan, formed the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) – a pro-Băsescu splinter of 
the PNL. The minority government has been ruling with the support of the PSD opposition (the governing parties together with 
the PSD initiated the impeachment procedure of the President).
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Table 2: Parties Represented in the Romanian Parliament (Senate):
Term Senate (number of mandates)
1990 – 1992
National Salvation Front (FSN, 67%, 91 seats)• 
UDMR (7.2%, 12 seats)• 
National Liberal Party (PNL, 7%, 10 seats)• 
Romanian Unity Alliance (2.2%, 2 seats)• 
Ecological Movement of Romania (2.5%, 1 seat)• 
National Peasants’ Party – Christian Democrats (2.5%, 1 seat)• 
Romanian Ecologist Party (1.4%, 1 seat)• 
Total: 119
1992 – 1996
FDSN (28.3%, 49 seats)• 
CDR (20.2%, 34 seats)• 
National Salvation Front (PD, 10.4%, 18 seats)• 
Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR, 8.1%, 14 seats)• 
UDMR (7.6%, 12 seats)• 
Greater Romania Party (PRM, 3.8%, 6 seats)• 
Socialist Labour Party (3.2%, 5 seats• 
Agrarian Democratic Party (3.3%, 5 seats)• 
Total: 143
1996 – 2000
CDR (30.7%, 53 seats)• 
Party of Romanian Social Democracy (PDSR, 23.1%, 41 seats)• 
Social Democratic Union (13.2%, 23 seats)• 
UDMR (6.8%, 11 seats)• 
Greater Romania Party (PRM, 4.5%, 8 seats)• 
Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR, 4.2%, 7 seats)• 
Total: 143
2000 – 2004
Party of Romanian Social Democracy-Social Democratic • 
Party of Romania (PDSR/PSD, 37.1%, 65 seats)
Greater Romania Party (PRN, 21%, 37 seats)• 
Democratic Party (PD, 7.6%, 13 seats)• 
National Liberal Party (PNL, 7.5%, 13 seats)• 
UDMR (6.9%, 12 seats)• 
Total:143 
2004 – 2008
National Union PSD+PUR (37.5%, 57 seats) • 
Justice and Truth Alliance (31.8%, 49 seats)• 
Greater Romania Party (13.6%, 21 seats)• 
UDMR (6.2%, 10 seats)• 
Total: 147
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Table 3: Presidential Elections
Term Candidates (in the second round) President Elect
1990 – 1992
Ion Iliescu (FSN), 85% • 
Radu Campeanu (PNL), 10.6%• 
Voter turnout: 86.2 %
Ion Iliescu,
NSF (in the ﬁ rst round)
1992 – 1996
Ion Iliescu (FDSN), 61.4 %• 
Emil Constantinescu (CDR), 38.6%• 
Voter turnout: 76.3 %
Ion Iliescu, 
Democratic National Salvation Front 
1996 – 2000
Emil Constantinescu (CDR), 54.4%• 
Ion Iliescu (PDSR), 45.6%• 
Voter turnout: 76%
Emil Constantinescu,
Democratic Convention of Romania
2000 – 2004
Ion Iliescu (PSDR), 66.8%• 
Corneliu Vadim Tudor • 
(Greater Romania Party), 33.2%
Voter turnout: 65.3% 
Ion Iliescu,
PSDR
since 2004
Traian Băsescu (Justice and • 
Truth Alliance, PD), 51.2%
Adrian Năstase (PSD), 48.8%• 
Voter turnout: 54.8%
Traian Băsescu,
Justice and Truth Alliance
 
Table 4: Referendum on the Suspension of the Impeached President – Traian Băsescu
Date Options 
May 19, 2007
No (against suspension), 74.5%• 
Yes, 24.8%• 
The remaining votes were invalid.
Voter turnout: 44%
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Table 5: The EP Elections (held on November 25, 2007)
Party EP Group Number of Mandates
PD EPP-ED 13 (28.8%)
PSD PES 10 (23.0%)
PNL ELDR 6 (13.4%)
Liberal Democratic Party, PLD¹⁶ EPP-ED 3 (7.8%)
UDMR EPP-ED 2 (5.5%)
Independent 
The Greens /
European Free Alliance
1 (3.4%)
Total: 35 seats 
Voter turnout: 26.5%
Due to its late modernization and the rigidity of Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime, 
Romania was, according to some (Crowther 2004: 365), one of the lesser-pre-
pared post-communist countries to carry out the process of democratization 
and transition that began in 1989. Th e society was fractured along class and 
ethnic cleavages with no sound political alternatives or an opposition to the 
ruling Romanian Communist Party, which displayed no reformist tendencies. 
In 1989, popular protests against the regime, started by ethnic Hungarians in 
Timisoara, took place in Bucharest and other big cities; after the army mutinied, 
hundreds of soldiers were killed in ﬁ ghting against regime-loyal forces. After 
the fall of the regime, the hastily created National Salvation Front (FSN) 
involved the leaders of the spontaneous uprising, several reform communists, 
and the elites of the former regime who had abandoned it timely. Th e FSN 
seized power on December 22, 1989,¹⁷ headed by Ion Iliescu, the former high-
positioned communist party member, declaring no electoral intentions.¹⁸ 
However, after making some adjustments to its structure and composition¹⁹ 
and coming under pressure from its emerging opposition,²⁰ the FSN changed 
16) The Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) split from the PNL at the beginning of 2007; see footnote 15.
17) In December 1989, Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife were tried and executed. 
18) The FSN was declared to be a non-political umbrella organisation created to follow the interest of all anti-regime forces (Crowther 
2004: 366).
19) Reform communist, military representatives, and significant elements of former communist party administrative network joined 
the party (Crowther 2004: 366).
20) The FSN was labelled a neo-communist organisation – The Romanian Communist Party, a symbol of the regime, was abolished 
in January 1990. FSN’s declaration to run in the elections led to a new wave of street demonstrations in Bucharest that were 
ended by force (Crowther 2004: 369).
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its attitude towards running in the elections. Although the opposition parties 
were emerging slowly, usually building on the traditions and echoes from the 
interwar period,²¹ new parties were established as well; the Democratic Union 
of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) had already started operating in Transyl-
vania in January 1990 (Crowther 2004: 366). In March 1990, the Provisional 
Council of National Unity approved a law for electing a President and a bicam-
eral Parliament, consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate; May 20, 
1990 was set as a date of the elections.²² Th e FSN, enjoying the advantage of 
being a governing force, won the parliamentary as well as the presidential elec-
tions; Ion Iliescu, the FSN leader, became the ﬁ rst president, credited with 85 
of the votes; Petre Roman was appointed the Prime Minister.²³ After the elec-
tions, the anti-communist forces remained fragmented. Th e Parliament was 
charged with drafting a new constitution, which was enacted and approved in 
a referendum in December 1991. Th e new government initiated a programme 
of limited reforms; however, the public turned dissatisﬁ ed with some of the 
FSN’s steps, forcing PM Roman to resign in September 1991.²⁴ Consequently, 
the FSN fragmented in 1992, with president Iliescu’s splinter, the FDSN, repre-
senting the conservative left part of the former party, and ex-PM Roman’s FSN 
the reformist one. In the 1992 local elections, 14 liberal parties formed a coali-
tion to contest the ruling force. However, this coherence was not long-lived; 
the PNL (National Liberal Party) withdrew from the coalition just before the 
elections. Th e other impetus was a growing nationalist rhetoric, with two par-
ties – the Greater Romania Party (PRN) and the Romanian National Unity 
Party (PUNR) – embodying this trend; the UDMR withdrew from the coalition 
in order not to hamper the coalition’s electoral results (Crowther 2004: 370). 
Although the 1992 elections showed larger support for the opposition forces, 
President Iliescu was re-elected, paving the way for the FDSN to win elections 
to the both parliamentary chambers; the FDSN experienced a drop in its sup-
port with the lost votes distributed across the ideological spectrum (Crowther 
2004: 376). In July 1993, the FDSN united with three smaller parties and 
changed its name to the Party of Romania Social Democracy (PDSR). Th e 
PDSR governed with the support of the extremist parties; in 1994, the link 
became more explicit by inviting two ministers from the PUNR to the govern-
21) These included the so-called historic parties – the National Liberal Party (PNL), the National Peasant Party- Christian Democrats 
or the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR) (Crowther 2004: 366). 
22) More then 70 parties participated in the elections.
23) Number of votes declared invalid was abnormally high; foreign observers declared numerous irregularities on the polling day 
(Crowther 2004: 368).
24) Theodor Stolojan, unaffiliated at that time, was appointed PM. 
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ment of PM Nicolae Vacaroiu. A conclusion of an open agreement on coopera-
tion among the PDSR, the PUNR, the PRN, and the Socialist Labour Party 
followed in 1995 (Crowther 2004: 383). Th is move imposed a burden on the 
government, which strived to re-orient its foreign policy and gain acceptance 
of the West. To improve its image minority policy-wise, the parliament ratiﬁ ed 
the Charter for the Protection of National Minorities in February 1995 and 
improved its relations with Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Romania. 
Nevertheless, the alliance with the nationalistic parties became diﬃ  cult to 
manage; before the 1996 elections, the PDSR tried to distance itself from its 
allies (Crowther 2004: 383). Th e 1996 elections mark the ﬁ rst change of power 
after 1989, with the Democratic Convention (CDR) winning both Chambers 
and its candidate Emil Constantinescu succeeding in the presidential race. Th e 
CDR formed a government with the UDMR and the Social Democratic 
Union.²⁵ Th e changes allowed for the further transformation of the country’s 
foreign policy position and for pursuing a course towards accession into the 
Western structures.²⁶ However, due to several reasons (Crowther 2004: 387), 
the new government failed to deliver the reforms; the worsening economic 
situation, together with the intra-coalition disputes, resulted into the govern-
ment’s reshuﬄ  ing; PM Victor Ciorbea was replaced by Radu Vasile, who man-
aged to improve the economic situation but could not overcome the tensions 
in the government. In December 1999, another switch of the PMs occurred; 
the National Bank’s President, Mugur Isarescu, was installed into oﬃ  ce. In the 
next elections (November 2000), the disillusionment with the reformist centre-
right parties and their impotent campaign resulted in poor election results. Th e 
nationalist Greater Romania Party came in second after the PDSR in the par-
liamentary vote; its leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, gained 28.3 of the votes in 
the ﬁ rst round of the presidential elections. Such a result was a shock to the 
remaining moderate centre-right parties. Facing the prospect of an extremist 
President leading the country into international isolation, the centre-right par-
ties called on their electorate to support Ion Iliescu in the second round of the 
presidential race. In December 2000, Ion Iliescu won in the second round with 
66.8 voter support. Th e PDSR formed a government with the support of the 
UDMR. In June 2001, the PDSR merged with the Romanian Social Democratic 
Party and was renamed the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Adrian Năstase,²⁷ 
a former foreign minister, was appointed Prime Minister, supporting integra-
25) Composed of the PD, the former FSN – Petre Roman’s party and the Social Democratic Party.
26) Extensive changes were also implemented in the Defence Ministry and the intelligence services.
27) Adrian Năstase became the party chairman not long after being appointed PM. 
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tion to the Euro-Atlantic structures and further reforms. In the 2004 elections, 
the coalition of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Humanist Party of 
Romania (later the Conservative Party) won the highest number of votes; 
nevertheless, after the elections, this coalition split, causing the ruling coalition 
to be formed by its opponent – the Justice and Truth Alliance, consisting of 
the PNL and the PD, supported by the UDMR; a ruling coalition was formed 
with the former election coalition partner of the PSD – the Humanist Party of 
Romania. In the presidential elections, the Justice and Truth Alliance candidate, 
Chairman of the PD and Mayor of Bucharest, Traian Băsescu, succeeded. Due 
to the internal crisis of the ruling coalition, embodied in the clash between the 
PM, Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, and President Traian Băsescu, the PD was 
expelled from the government and the minority government of the PNL and 
the UDMR was formed in spring 2007. President Băsescu faced impeachment 
procedures; he was suspended by the Parliament for abusing his constitutional 
powers but re-instated into oﬃ  ce by a popular vote in May 2007.²⁸ Due to the 
2004 election result, the PSD experienced an internal crisis; however, thanks 
to the developments of the ruling coalition, the PSD, in fact, returned to power 
because the minority government of the PNL and the UDMR was dependent 
upon its support for crucial votes (including during the impeachment). In the 
elections to the European Parliament, which were held in November 2007, the 
PD won the highest number of seats (13), together with the PLD mandates (3); 
this development signalled the continuation of high public support of President 
Băsescu.²⁹
Left and Right
Th e positioning and doctrine of some Romanian political parties is not 
clear; their image and label can also diﬀ er when seen from the domestic and 
external perspective. Th e Greater Romania Party (PRM) has been labelled 
far right by many in the West. Truly, the alliance it forged in the European 
Parliament, resulting in the creation of the new group ‘Tradition, Identity, 
Sovereignty’³⁰ of extremist parties, would support such a claim. However, its 
self-deﬁ nition leans rather towards the left, although a clear statement deﬁ n-
28) In the meantime, while suspended, the presidential functions were fulfilled by the interim president; Nicolae Vacaroiu (PSD) was 
nominated for the post. 
29) The campaign before the EP election was dominated by the internal political scandals and echoed the spring developments in 
the ruling coalition. Voter turnout and public awareness of European issues was very low (SAR 2007).
30) The group was already dissolved in November 2007 after the PRM left it in protest against anti-Romanian remarks by Italian MEP 
Alessandra Mussolini
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ing where the party sees itself is hard to ﬁ nd – the key word in its representa-
tives’ discourse is the ‘national interest;’ in fact, this is not well articulated 
or deﬁ ned at all. According to experts, the Romanian public sees the PRM 
as a left wing party.³¹ Party positions in the parliamentary votes were always 
more aligned with the Social Democrats (PSD); according to experts, its 
representatives mostly acted as an opposition to the centre-right coalition. 
Th e PRM is not anti-EU and has been part of the foreign policy consensus 
among the political parties;³² it opposed all issues that were put forward by 
their European counterparts against the US presence in Europe. Th e party is 
also not opposing Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. Th e party was never 
in the government. According to some experts, its electorate is dropping. 
Th e PSD represents the social democratic left; it is a member of the 
Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists (PES) in the Euro-
pean Parliament; according to some, it displays a certain tendency towards 
adopting a modern left image. Compared to its European counterparts, the 
PSD is more pro-Atlanticist than the rest of the PES group in the European 
Parliament. Th e party representatives talk at length about the current confu-
sion in Romanian foreign policy – they argue that, after the country’s NATO 
and EU accession, a long-term goal is missing and that the country experi-
ences a loss of pretext; Romania is unable to articulate its own foreign policy 
concepts and interests.³³
Positioning of the Romanian Political Parties on the Right – Left Axis
 PRM³⁴ PSD CP³⁵ UDMR PD PNL PLD
left right
31) In the foreign policy field, the favourable party position towards the regime in Cuba would support such a claim. Otherwise, there 
are no specific positions on Cuba among the Romanian political parties; they would generally support the US stance and policy 
towards the island. 
32) ‘…they are rather internally populist.’ The PRM representatives have had a certain say in the field of foreign policy. For a long 
time, the party Chairman was a Vice-President of the Senate and, in this capacity, took part in international delegations; the 
party representatives sit in the important parliamentary Commissions on Foreign Policy and Security as well. 
33) PSD Chairman and former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană’s speech at the Military Club in Bucharest in May 2007 (personal record).
34) The Greater Romania Party – its position is unclear; for details, see above. 
35) The Conservative Party.
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Th e Conservative Party (CP, the former Humanist party of Romania³⁶) 
stood in the last general elections in alliance with the PSD; however, right 
after the elections, the coalition split, causing the CP to begin supporting the 
Justice and Truth Alliance. It is rather diﬃ  cult to assess its positioning on the 
left-right axis; the party has no clear self-identiﬁ cation value-wise. According 
to some experts, it is closest to the image and deﬁ nition of a centrist party. Its 
electorate consists mostly of SMEs owners and employees, plus a stress on 
issues like social protection can be found in their programme documents.³⁷ 
Its electorate dropped to 2–3; most likely, the party will not cross the 
threshold for entering the Parliament in the next elections. 
Th e UDMR seems to be a party without a clear political identity; some 
classify it as a neo-liberal entity (SAR 2007). Th e party still deﬁ nes itself 
as a representative of the Hungarian minority, resting on an ethnic-based 
electorate that is rather stable, oscillating around 7. It has a high coalition 
potential and has been in the government since 1996.³⁸ It mobilized itself 
before the European Parliament elections and, according to some (SAR 2007: 
3), was the best prepared party, oﬀ ering a common position on most of the 
issues in question. 
Th e Democratic Party (PD), party of President Băsescu, is a splinter of 
the Social Democrats (FSN). For a long time, the PD was pushing for its 
membership in Socialist International. In the last three years, it turned into 
a ‘people’s’ party and applied for membership in the EPP-ED group within the 
European Parliament; a redeﬁ nition from left to right took place; neverthe-
less, according to some experts, the public perception is that the party is still 
on the left; an unclear proﬁ le remains to be displayed in some respects. Its 
electorate is rising, namely due to the popularity of the President. 
36) There was a conservative party in Romania before WWII; it was a party of the old landowners who became one of the modernizing 
forces of Romanian society. ‘The new political landscape felt that some old labels are needed to suggest that there is some kind 
of continuity and that not everything was invented over night; but the CP is not a conservative party, but a pure invention,’ an 
expert states. 
37) The parliamentary commission, an entity that was set up in order to investigate alleged abuses of the Constitution by the president 
in spring 2007, was chaired by the head of the party, Dan Voiculescu; the report it produced was generally seen as containing 
absurd accusations. There were 19 alleged constitution violations on which the impeachment was based. The President was 
suspended by a majority of 322 lawmakers in April 2007. 
38) The UDMR was not supporting President Băsescu during the impeachment crisis and formed a minority government with the PNL. 
 The Case Studies: Romania – Věra Řiháčková
Th e National Liberal Party (PNL), the party of Prime Minister Tăriceanu, 
has been often labelled neo–liberal. In the Romanian perspective, the PNL is 
one of the ‘historical’ parties; in the interwar period, its position was rather 
centre-left. Its electorate is currently decreasing on behalf of the popularity 
of President Băsescu. 
Th e Liberal Democratic Party (PLD) is a splinter from the PNL, which 
emerged at the beginning of 2007. Its members were supporting President 
Băsescu³⁹ during the impeachment crisis. At ﬁ rst, the dissident group wanted 
to change the PNL leadership but did not succeed. At the time of this writing, 
the merger of the PD and the PLD was discussed in order to strengthen the 
right; however, some experts say that there is a reluctance to accept the PLD 
in the PD; the alliance is an option. Th e PLD won 3 seats in the European 
Parliament elections. According to some (SAR 2007: 4), the PLD is the most 
liberal and most eurosceptic of them. Th ere is, in fact, little ideological dif-
ference between the PNL, the PLD, and the PD; the UDMR is not far from 
their doctrine, either.
Th e New Generation party emerged as another populist party in Roma-
nia three years ago; its leader has scored as the second most popular politi-
cian in Romania for some time. Th e party has had no electoral credentials 
thus far. According to some experts, it could play a role in Romanian politics 
in the future. 
Th e ‘nature of transformation’ cleavage was decisive for the political parties’ 
preferences and alterations in Romania. Th e dissatisfaction with the perform-
ance of the ‘ideological’ parties, namely in the ﬁ eld of economic reforms, 
combined with an unclear deﬁ nition and self-deﬁ nition of the right, led in 
time to the advancement of populist parties like the Greater Romania Party 
or the New Generation Party. Th e semi-presidential political system, which 
distributes the executive power between the President and the Prime Minister 
without setting clear boundaries of competence, often resulted into govern-
ment reshuﬄ  ing and, in combination with a proportional electoral system 
that has delivered diminishing majorities in the last four electoral cycles (SAR 
2008: 1), produced weak majorities and unstable (minority) governments.⁴⁰ 
39) Also in his stance for troops withdrawal from Iraq, see below.
40) For example, President Băsescu and PM Tăriceanu clashed severely over the President’s wish to call early elections in order to get 
a larger majority in the Parliament. 
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Th e dominance of the PSD, combined with the absence of a unitary opposition, 
dominated the whole 2001–2004 period; the executive and administration was 
a key actor within the system. In spring 2007, the systemic problems resulted 
into a clash of institutions.⁴¹ Th e political scene became radicalized; however, 
not along the right-left (or any other socio-economic) cleavage – the divisive 
issue became a pro- or anti-Băsescu attitude of the political actors; this devel-
opment resulted into factional behaviour and cooperation on ad hoc utilitarian 
bases. Th e political system has become dominated by a strong President as the 
result of the crisis.⁴² 
As to the Europeanization of the political parties, the experts say that the 
parties will align with the positions of their political groups in the European 
Parliament, even though the process won’t go beyond this level for some time. 
Due to the lack of a foreign policy vision or programme, the internal inse-
curity and factional behaviour within the parties results only in playing the 
foreign alliances or EP political families’ membership card as a proof to the 
domestic audience that the parties are friendly with their EU counterparts 
and part of the developments on the EU level.⁴³ 
The ‘National Consensus’ and the 
Relevance of Foreign Policy
In the last years of communism, Romania took an isolationist stance in 
international relations. At the beginning of the 1990s, the country focused on 
its membership in the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
as it was perceived as the best guarantee against the possible threats posed 
by the still-existing Soviet Union, as well as the spectre of ethnic separatism. 
As the initial transition tensions gradually diminished, Romania started to 
look for a wider security framework. In order to move closer to the West and 
41) The cohabitation of the government and President was modelled according to the French example; President Băsescu was very 
active in order to assume a bigger executive role with PM Tăriceanu, rather than indulging his efforts during the first two years 
of the Băsescu mandate. 
42) On the course of this development, a problem with the representation of the country on the EU level emerged – according to the 
Constitution, the foreign policy issues are mostly the President’s responsibility; the government should only manage the policies. 
On the other hand, the PM has always had a stronger voice than the President in Brussels. The PNL stated that president Băsescu 
was unpopular with the EU leaders due his Atlanticist stances and became marginalized during the EU Councils; the issue became 
a divisive factor in the Romanian society.
43) Some experts suggest that there will be a substantive impact on the PSD (a changing level of Atlanticism) and the PNL, which 
is the only party in power among ALDE members. Some experts say that the PDS would not push for the prioritization of the EU 
agenda. Also, the influential party of foreign policy figures (MEP Adrian Severin) are not anti-American and would not give in to 
the anti-American attitudes in the PES or the European Parliament. 
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to join NATO and the EU, a strong consensus of all the political forces was 
developed as of 1996⁴⁴ (Ionescu 2004: 264; King 2003: 248). 
At beginning of the 1990’s, the FSN was reluctant to start the process of 
joining the Euro-Atlantic structures; all other parties were 100 committed 
to being pro–European and pro-American. In 1994–1995, the FDSN started 
to change its attitude towards the EU and NATO integration and became 
more engaged in achieving these foreign policy goals. NATO membership 
was considered a priority for political leaders since the Alliance and the 
US, in particular, were regarded as the best security providers.⁴⁵ During 
the accession process, numerous statements were issued by representatives 
from all political parties, expressing Romania’s aim to enter NATO (Ionescu 
2004). Public opinion seemed to have shared this attitude, ascribing great 
importance to NATO membership in the polls. Th e consensus became at 
risk when Romania was denied participation in the ﬁ rst wave of NATO’s 
enlargement; however, the perceived failure to move closer to the West was 
compensated by the bilateral agreement on privileged partnership with the 
US in 1997. In the 2000 elections, an elite change in the PSD took place; new 
leadership made NATO and EU accession a top priority (the ‘NATO ﬁ rst, 
EU second’ approach). Virtually all political parties, including the populists, 
were supportive towards this agenda; foreign policy was the only public 
policy that was consensual, enjoying a high amount of public support. EU 
membership was targeted concomitantly; given this strict accession criteria, 
the way into the EU took longer and proved to be more diﬃ  cult. In 1995, 
Romania announced its candidacy for membership and became an EU asso-
ciate member; the negotiation process started in 1999. After NATO accession, 
an enormous consensus emerged for focusing on the EU membership; the 
accession negotiations were concluded in 2004; the Accession agreement 
was signed on April 25, 2005; thus, Romania became an EU member as of 
January 1, 2007.⁴⁶ 
Th e Kosovo campaign in 1999 proved to be a serious test of the foreign 
policy consensus. President Emil Constantinescu (CDR) was ﬁ rm to put 
44) With the exception of some extremist political parties; on the other hand, the populist parties usually play a domestic card, rather 
than foreign policy one. 
45) Since 1994 Romania has participated in the Partnership for Peace activities, in 1999 it became part of Membership Action Plan, 
in 2002 was invited to join and in 2004 it finally joined NATO.
46) After the EU accession, the political crisis impacted the way Romania conducted its policies in the EU, according to some experts, 
the line ministries were not cooperating well and Romania was incapable of defending its interests effectively. As to the coalition 
building in the EU, the PDS would like to see Romania and Bulgaria in the V4, together with the Baltic countries this group should 
push for their policies. There is also an affinity towards the Mediterranean group – as some suggest, there are ‘natural cultural 
links’, economic interests and large Romanian minorities in Italy and France. 
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Romania on the side of the NATO countries. Th e support to the allies was 
an important part of his discourse and policy in support of Romanian NATO 
membership. Part of the Social Democratic party (the PDSR, at that time) – 
a group of politicians around Ion Iliescu – opposed NATO membership and 
embarked upon a rhetoric of blaming the US and NATO for infringing on 
a sovereign state, as well as accusations of international law violations. 
Th e terrorist attacks of 9/11 enhanced the possibilities of cooperation 
with the US. In order to gain NATO membership, Romanians put a lot of 
eﬀ ort into making the country a visible US ally; Romania sent troops to 
Afghanistan,⁴⁷ enhanced cooperation on intelligence matters and sharing, 
supported the Iraq war, and endorsed the US positions on issues such as 
the missile defence system and the US attitude towards the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)⁴⁸. 
Facing the rift in transatlantic relations during the Iraq crisis, the Roma-
nian political elites stressed commonalities between Europe and the US, 
insisting that there were no real conﬂ icts between the partners, but rather 
occasional disputes related to speciﬁ c interests. It was essential for Romania 
to have good relations with both partners; the Romanian stance was inter-
preted by some to be highly pro-American and anti-European; the bilateral 
relations with some European countries went cold, namely with France. Th e 
PSD-led government oﬀ ered troops and a Romanian military base in support 
to the operation of the US-led forces.⁴⁹ 
Th e priorities in the foreign policy ﬁ eld shifted a bit with the new govern-
ment in 2004; the main priorities were generally twofold – the ‘digniﬁ ed’ 
accession to the EU and the further strengthening of a privileged partner-
ship with the US and Great Britain. Playing a stronger role in the Balkans 
47) The participation of the Romanian troops was never disputed. 
48) Romania signed and ratified the Rome Statute on 11 April 2002; the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities was signed on 30 
June 2004 and ratified on 17 November 2005. In August 2002, Romania also concluded a bilateral agreement (Bilateral Immunity 
Agreement, BIA) with the US to give American officials and soldiers immunity from the International Criminal Court; at that time, 
Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană (PSD) said that Romania would not ratify the accord unless a common stand was accepted by the 
US and the EU. The Romanian Ambassador to Washington said that the BIA was a natural extension of the Agreement between 
Romania (PM Adrian Năstase, PSD) and the United States regarding the Status of United States Forces in Romania (SOFA) that 
was signed the previous year (October 2001). In the light of this EU criticism, Romania stated that it intended to change the BIA 
before submitting it to the Parliament. This stalled the process because Romania couldn’t amend the agreement unilaterally. 
Under EU pressure, the ratification of BIA was finally withheld. 
49) The decision to join the US-led operation was made in a closed circle of political actors – the President, the PM, and the ministers 
represented in the Council for foreign relations and security were involved. In February 2003, the Parliament approved a request made 
by President Ion Iliescu in a 351–2 vote. There were 74 abstentions from the nationalist Great Romania Party, which was against 
Romania taking part in any military intervention not approved by the United Nations. Romania deployed 278 troops and offered 
the Constanta and Fetesti airports in the eastern Black Sea region, plus the Timisoara airport in the western part of Romania.
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and the wider Black Sea region followed; furthermore, a need to improve 
relations with Ukraine and Russia was also mentioned in the government 
programme (Government programme 2005–2008). Th e country’s relation-
ship with Moldova was declared one of the special foreign policy priorities, 
as well as Romanian minorities abroad and ﬁ ght against terrorism. When 
taking oﬃ  ce in December 2004, President Băsescu talked about the focus of 
Romanian foreign policy, stating that the axis between Bucharest-London-
Washington was his prime interest. As the dispute between the President and 
the Prime Minister unfolded during the course of 2006 and 2007, the issue of 
Romanian troops’ presence in Iraq became salient. As the situation in Iraq 
became complicated and many European countries that, at the beginning, 
had supported the US, began to retreat,⁵⁰ a race started between the two 
main political opponents over who would be the ﬁ rst to pick up the subject. 
At ﬁ rst, President Băsescu suggested that there could be a policy change and, 
immediately after the PNL and PM Tăriceanu picked the subject, turned it 
into a political item on the agenda in June 2006. In the discussion that fol-
lowed between the government and the President, the President blocked the 
proposal; in the Parliament, the PNL proposed to withdraw troops from Iraq 
in March 2007.⁵¹ Th e PSD has been acting as a moderately pro-American 
party;⁵² during the dispute over the troops’ withdrawal from Iraq, the PSD’s 
position was ambiguous. In the end, the party Chairman proposed a timeta-
ble for the withdrawal, supporting the Prime Minister.⁵³
Th e possibility to set up US military bases on Romania’s territory was com-
monly seen as beneﬁ cial, since all political parties perceive the alliance with the 
US as a vital national interest; there was no dissenting voice against the bases 
even from the populist or extremist parties.⁵⁴ When president Băsescu was 
50) Namely, the withdrawal of Italian troops in September 2006 was mentioned. The Romanian troops in Iraq numbered up to 860; 
until the end of September 2007, the contingent suffered 3 casualties.
51) No in-depth discussion on the withdrawal of troops from Iraq took place, despite several deadlines made by the PNL; no 
consultations among the political parties were held, according to the experts. The principal argument behind the PNL move was 
that the withdrawal was discussed in the other countries as well. The experts largely agreed that the dispute was motivated by 
the inter-parties struggle, not by anti-US stance of the PNL, in the case of the Iraq campaign. The PM’s move was complemented 
by a change of the Foreign Minister. In February 2007, Foreign Minister Mihai Ungureanu (PNL) was asked to resign – coming 
from the same political party, the PM allegedly insisted on his resignation due to his close relations with President Băsescu. The 
official reason for his resignation was that he had failed to report to the government on the detention of two Romanian workers 
by coalition forces in Iraq. The President named him afterwards head of the Foreign Intelligence Service. 
52) Mircea Geoană, the PSD Chairman, is a former ambassador to the US with many personal links in Washington DC. Some experts 
say that the PSD is more pro-American than the Liberals.
53) At the time of this writing, Romanian troops remain in Iraq.
54) Those Romanian citizens opposing US troops on Romanian soil (or those who are against the EU) have not had a political 
voice so far. 
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elected in 2005, he took a very pro-Atlanticist approach; according to some 
experts, his attitude was not so much based on solid strategic considerations or 
realism, but rather on certain idealism and personal promises. It materialized 
in the agreement on having US military bases in Romania, with the President 
acting as a driving force and the Parliament rubber-stamping the agreement. 
Th e negotiations were concluded in October 2005 and signed by US Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice in Bucharest in December 2005. Th e agreement 
includes Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Constanta, Babadag in the Black Sea 
inland region, Cincu in central Romania, and Smardan in eastern Romania.
Romania is often raising its proﬁ le in foreign policy through the military;⁵⁵ 
although some major achievements were accomplished due to the military 
engagements, the country is still very much attached to the strategic part-
nership with the US; moreover, NATO’s future eﬀ ectiveness is seen as a key 
foreign policy goal. Th e concept of the ESDP is not resonating in Romania; it 
is not an issue; the parties display random answers without having an elabo-
rated a stance on ESDP development. Even though the EU is not seen as the 
important security provider, together with the US, it should play a role of the 
ultimate security guarantor in Europe. Th e EU missions are generally prefer-
able on the condition that they are complementary to NATO and suitable 
where, when NATO and the U.S cannot act, but EU wants to play a role. Th e 
EU battlegroups should not receive prioritization over NATO commitments. 
Th e idea of a European army receives neutral to negative reactions – the 
populists and nationalists would be against it because the army is considered 
a symbol of national identity.
Th e Balkans is of strategic interest to Romania. Due to internal turmoil, 
the informal dialogue on foreign policy issues among the political parties 
disappeared, according to the PDS; the Romanian policy towards the region 
lacked coherence. On the issue of the independence and recognition of Kos-
ovo, the PNL, the PD, and the PSD all followed the same anti-recognition 
line; the oﬃ  cial government position was to withhold recognition until 
Kosovo independence is declared to be in conformity with international law.⁵⁶ 
55) The Romanian military amounted to 400,000 soldiers under the communist regime; it was forced to reduce its numbers down to 
70,000; the whole structure of the military was changed – it was a radical and quick process for a country whose reform path was 
otherwise rather slow. The army reform has not finished yet; another two to three years is the limit estimated for the completion 
of the transition reforms. According to the interviews, the process of military reform was internally driven, the role and need of 
the external pressure was not as significant, as in the case of other post-communist countries like Bulgaria. 
56) The government also supported the idea of an EU mission to Kosovo, but on several conditions – only if there is a consensus on the 
mission and if the mission would be sent forth before the declaration of independence; sending a mission after the declaration 
of independence would mean an implicit recognition of Kosovo, which is something Romania has strived to avoid. 
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Th e PSD stated that the Ahtisaari plan has gone too far; however, to oppose 
it would be counterproductive; special rights to the Serbian minority should 
be guaranteed by the West.⁵⁷ Before the independence declaration, the PNL 
stated that the status of Kosovo should be resolved in the framework of the 
existing international law and that Romania would not recognize the unilat-
eral steps of Kosovo.⁵⁸ After independence was declared in February 2008, 
President Băsescu (PD) conﬁ rmed several times that Romania would not 
recognize Kosovo.⁵⁹ Th e main reason behind the Romanian position is the 
issue of the Transylvania region (Székely land), a section of the country with 
Hungarian majority of the population that demands territorial autonomy; 
Romanian politicians (with the exception of the UDMR) oppose autonomy 
based on ethnic considerations. Accepting Kosovo’s independence would, in 
the eyes of Romanian politicians, weaken the principle of territorial integrity. 
Another reason is the concern over Romania’s relations with Serbia, which 
are considered well-functioning in the problematic region. Th e UDMR was 
naturally not in line with the oﬃ  cial government stance, calling for the 
recognition of the former Serbian province and welcoming the declaration 
of independence.⁶⁰ In the case of Kosovo, a strong domestic interest and the 
imperative of territorial integrity overrode the Atlanticist foreign policy line 
of the state representation. 
All key political parties agree that Romania should play a greater role in 
the Black Sea region; however, the aspirations have remained largely on 
paper so far, despite the declared success of the Black Sea region strategy. 
Although Romania and Bulgaria succeeded in overcoming their mutual 
competition and became more cooperative after the EU accession, their 
joint approach to the region is missing as well as their advocacy eﬀ orts in the 
ﬁ eld of the EU’s Eastern Policy that was aimed at bringing more focus to the 
region.⁶¹ All Romanian parties are supportive towards Turkish EU aspirations 
57) PSD Chairman and former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană’s speech at the Military Club in Bucharest in May 2007 (personal record).
58) Foreign Minister Adrian Cioroianu stated that: “For Romania, the resolution of the Kosovo issue should be in accordance with 
international law that is currently in force. Romania will not recognize the independence of Kosovo if these principles are violated,” 
(B92 2008).
59) (Beta, Tanjug 2008); Romania has not recognized the independent Kosovo at the time of this writing. Together with Spain, Romania 
also blocked the Kosovo issue of inclusion on the agenda of the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008.
60) “Sooner or later, Romania will have to recognise Kosovo as a new independent state,” said Marko Bela, leader of the UDMR. The 
leaders of the Szeklers National Council (CNS) stated that Kosovo‘s independence signalled the EU’s support for autonomist 
movements (BalkanInsight.com 2008). 
61) In security terms, Romania considers the EU as ill-equipped to guarantee the peaceful development in the region; the idea 
was that lobbying NATO would engage others more effectively in the region; the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest was 
a disappointment in this sense, vis a vis the decision on Ukraine and Georgia –their request to join the MAP will be reviewed in 
December 2008. In this sense, the US bases in Romania are seen as a security guarantee.
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and see Turkey as a vital country for their national security. For historical 
reasons, Russia invites rather tense perceptions among the Romanian pub-
lic.⁶² Under the PSD government, the Treaty on friendly cooperation between 
Romania and the Russian Federation was signed by President Ion Iliescu and 
Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2003. Th e PSD sees relations with 
Russia as a key for the Black Sea region stability; a vicious circle of historical 
anti-Russian feelings and attitudes in Romania should be broken in order 
to rebalance bilateral ties with Moscow and not to damage the alliances of 
which Romania is a member.⁶³ After the 2004 elections, the government par-
ties adopted a pragmatic approach towards Russia; while keeping business 
interests high on the agenda, they criticized Russia for its energy policy⁶⁴ 
and its role in Moldova. Th e future of Ukraine is seen as crucial, namely for 
the development of Moldova; however, Romanian foreign policy displays an 
absence of a higher agenda regarding Ukraine. 
Although the interest of the public concerning the situation in Moldova 
is low,⁶⁵ the issue embodies a clash between the European and the US 
approach – two logics, stability and security vs. democratization are in 
tension here; the Romanian representation feels sceptical about the pos-
sibility to be able to inﬂ uence the issue if the transatlantic consensus is 
not in place. Generally, the parties have articulated no clear positions on 
Moldova, causing the discussion to be rather shallow; it is a matter of the 
individuals interested in the development. Th e issue was highly prioritized 
by the President; the other parties only reacted to it. According to the 
analysts, President Băsescu somehow rediscovered the topic of Moldova; 
hinting at some historical references, a possible uniﬁ cation was spelled out; 
however, the only tangible outcome of the discourse was an oﬀ er to grant 
Moldavians Romanian citizenship in December 2007, raising tensions with 
their problematic neighbour.⁶⁶ Besides the idea of citizenship and a state-
62) Unlike in Bulgaria, the views on Russia are unfavourable in Romania and rather centred around on emotional bases. Many people 
were, for example, persuaded that Russia was behind the impeachment against the popular President Băsescu and that only an 
accusation of cooperation with Russia could have ended this politician’s career. Security-wise, the perception is that only the US 
can stand up to Russia – the Europeans are too weak to lead and the EU does not have a sufficient voice in security matters. 
63) PSD Chairman and former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană’s speech at the Military Club in Bucharest in May 2007 (personal 
record).
64) Despite the fact that the country’s dependence on Russian energy imports is not extensive compared to other Central and Eastern 
European countries – Romania imports 30% of its gas from Russia; the rest is covered by domestic production. The current 
government is also a supporter of the Nabucco gas pipeline project. 
65) According to an expert, there has been no public debate in Romania on Moldova since 1996; also, the expert debate is not very 
extensive. Historically, Russia took over the eastern province of Romania in 1812; Romania regained Moldova in 1918 and lost it 
again to the Soviet Union in 1940–41.
66) Some experts say that the President’s move was playing into the hands of the pro-Russian forces in Moldova.
 The Case Studies: Romania – Věra Řiháčková
ment that Moldova should join the EU, there was no clear plan for how to 
help solve the problems in the country. Th e PSD resonates with the popular 
demand ‘to let Moldova be’. In the party’s view, Romania is not capable of 
putting the agenda through the iEU in a way in which the current policy 
goals would be reached. Th ere is a fundamental criticism of the government 
and, speciﬁ cally, of the President’s approach and policy towards Moldova. 
Th e PSD claims that Romania should put aside a notion that it is responsible 
for Moldova. 
Th e debate about the Guantanamo Bay base and the CIA ﬂ ights unfolded 
in Romania in connection to the European Parliament’s report on the CIA 
ﬂ ights. All political parties criticized the report, including the PSD and the 
liberals;⁶⁷ the parties stated that the report was not fair to Romania or the US. 
On a general level, the UDMR would be rather supportive to the arguments 
against the procedures carried out in the Guantanamo Bay base on the basis 
of legalistic arguments contained within the Geneva Conventions; however, 
all parties would be cautious to blame the US openly for unethical conduct 
of the imprisonments. 
Although the issue of establishing new US Radar and missile bases in 
Europe is neutral and not discussed, it would ﬁ nd general support in all 
parliamentary parties, with the exception of the National Initiative Party,⁶⁸ 
which supports a dialogue with Russia.
According to the survey ‘Public Perceptions on Foreign Aﬀ airs in Romania’ 
(Voinescu and Dobre 2005), the interest in foreign policy among the Roma-
nian public is rather low, with only defence matters attracting more attention. 
In this context, the level of the citizens’ knowledge on foreign policy issues 
is also claimed to be rather insuﬃ  cient. Both the political elites and the 
public favour balanced transatlantic relationships. Th e EU itself enjoys an 
overwhelmingly good image (70 of the population). However, according 
to ‘Transatlantic Trends,’ (GMF 2007) it should not address international 
threats independently (34), but only in partnership with the US (57). Th is 
is connected to the fact that the EU is seen mainly as an economic power, 
not as a security provider. Th e security arrangements must be made within 
the transatlantic space; the EU must gain greater military capabilities to be 
on equal footing with the US.⁶⁹ 
67) The report was drafted by Social Democrats and liberals within the EP. 
68) The National Initiative Party (PIN) is a small (two-man) party, established in 2006 as a splinter from the PD; it enjoys less than 
1% support. 
69) The capabilities of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy were described by the Romanian leaders as merely ‘wishful 
thinking’ rather than reality.
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NATO holds a good to very good image (64); however the public expresses 
contradicted opinions on the issue. Romania’s strongly pro-American stance is 
proved by its strong support for US leadership in world aﬀ airs, favouring the 
Iraq war by 49 of the population, in comparison to 42 of those against the 
invasion.⁷⁰ At the same time, only less than a half of the citizens believe that 
NATO membership generates more advantages than disadvantages. Although 
the presence of the US military bases on Romanian territory enjoys support, 
it is also considered as a factor that could increase the dangers of terrorist 
attacks in the country and turn the opponents of American policies against 
Romania as well. Romanians are also disappointed by the small economic 
involvement of the US in their country. Moreover, while the public states its 
willingness to send Romania’s troops to international missions and take part 
in solving international problems, the majority also opposes the presence of 
Romanian troops in the missions they are already engaged in (Iraq, Afghani-
stan, and Kosovo). 
After EU accession, the common goal of the political parties disappeared; 
there is a certain confusion in the ﬁ eld of foreign policy and internal inco-
herence, vis a vis issues like the Balkans. Th e state of political aﬀ airs in the 
country resulted into an incapacity of the top country elites to formulate 
a post-accession foreign policy agenda and interests, despite the country’s 
aspiration to play the role of regional leader, which largely rests on the paper 
of the political programmes. Th ere is also a lack of substantial debate on 
the foreign policy issues in Romania; due to foreign policy consensus, the 
Atlanticist orientation of the country has been a guiding principle beyond any 
discussion. Regardless of a party’s orientation on the right-left axis, the politi-
cal class has claimed that foreign policy will never be divided along US vs. EU 
or NATO vs. ESDP lines; in their view, there is no beneﬁ t in such an approach, 
the diﬀ ering views must be accommodated because there are no separate 
paths, but rather, two ways how to serve the national interest; therefore, one 
cannot be played against the other. Post-2004 election development and the 
diverging positions on particular foreign policy issues (i.e. the withdrawal of 
troops from Iraq) within the governing coalition are not based on ideological 
concepts or attitudes, but driven by the personalized clash of institutions (pro 
vs. anti-Băsescu cleavages) with a ‘pro-European’ Prime Minister opposing 
70) The response from the public to the PNL proposal to withdraw troops from Iraq was only timid. The experts say that it was due to 
several reasons: First, a lack of debate and a split of the public on the issues with a large group of those who would be undecided 
if asked whether they favor the withdrawal; Second, the number of Romanian casualties was very limited – out of three casualties 
suffered up until September 2007, one case was a suicide and only two fell victim to military operations and combat – the 
perception, thus far, is that the Romanian army is professional and that the soldiers are choosing their career voluntarily. 
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an Atlanticist President. Among the public policies, foreign policy is the 
most isolated in terms of being projected and conducted in Romania. Th ere 
is a clear gap between the political elite and the citizens. Th e only foreign 
policy issue that really comes to people’s minds is the issue of the country’s 
morals and its image in the international arena. Th is kind of preoccupation 
is somehow projected into the person of a President, adding to the existing 
clash of institutions and competition over the electorate.
Conclusion
After the EU accession, the common goal of the political parties’ disap-
peared and a certain confusion took over. Some say that foreign policy fell 
victim to two accessions and claim collective responsibility from all the 
political parties for not preparing for the post-accession phase. On many 
issues of Romanian interest, the political parties have not elaborated their 
positions or policies. 
Th e foreign policy making became problematic in Romania due to turmoil 
on the domestic scene; political elites were not able to articulate their foreign 
policy visions and aims; foreign policy is inﬂ uenced by internal political 
developments. Because foreign policy is highly personalized, some foreign 
policy issues become part of the internal political struggle. 
Atlanticism remains a constant of Romanian foreign policy that must be 
accommodated with the other foreign policy commitments (EU). A hypoth-
esis on the impact of positioning of the political parties along the right-left 
axis on the foreign policy attitudes does not hold water in Romania at the 
moment. Although the PNL plays the European card and adopts the dis-
course, it is not a matter of ideas or convictions, but rather of who is the 
president. 
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SLOVAKIA
Tomáš Weiss
Table 1: Parties in the Slovak Parliament
Term
Parties Represented in the Parliament 
(Number of Mandates)
Governing Coalition
1992 – 1994
HZDS (74)
SDĽ (29)
KDH (18)
SNS (15)
Coalition of Hungarian parties (14)
HZDS – SNS
1994 – 1998
HZDS (61) DÚ (15)
Common Choice (18) ZRS (13)
KDH (17) SNS (9)
MK (17)
HZDS – ZRS – SNS
1998 – 2002
HZDS (43) SNS (14)
SDK (42) SOP (12)
SDĽ (23)
SMK (14)
SDK – SDĽ – SMK – SOP
2002 – 2006
HZDS (36) KDH (15)
SDKÚ (28) ANO (15)
SMER (25) KSS (11)
SMK (20)
SDKÚ – SMK – KDH – ANO 
since 2006
SMER (50) ĽS-HZDS (15)
SDKÚ-DS(31) KDH (14)
SNS (20)
SMK (20)
SMER – SNS – ĽS-HZDS
Source: www.statistics.sk
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Parties in the Slovak Parliament:
ANO New Citizen Alliance
DÚ Democratic Union
(ĽS-) HZDS (People’s Party-) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
KDH Christian Democratic Movement
KSS Communist Party of Slovakia
MK Hungarian Coalition
SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition
SDKÚ (-DS) Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (-Democratic Party)
SDĽ Party of Democratic Left
SMER SMER – Social Democracy
SMK Hungarian Coalition Party
SNS Slovak National Party
SOP Party of Civic Understanding
ZRS Union of Slovak Workers.
Students of the Slovak party system cannot complain of a lack of substance. 
Since establishment of an independent Slovak state in 1993, there has hardly 
been a single year when a new political party would not be established or 
when few prominent representatives and/or MPs would not break away from 
one of the major parties. Sometimes, as in 2002, such splinters even had 
a signiﬁ cant impact on the general election results.
Th e semi-democratic character of the government until 1998 distorted 
party-building in Slovakia. General elections were, to a large extent, focused 
on a single issue in 1998 as well as in 2002 (whether Vladimír Mečiar should 
remain in the Prime Minister’s oﬃ  ce, and EU and NATO accession, respec-
tively). Ideology did not play as signiﬁ cant a role as interpersonal relations 
and power games. Some parties, such as former president Rudolf Schuster’s 
Party of Civic Understanding, were established as a lift to power for certain 
persons (or groups of persons) to work round the existing party system. Even 
if some of them could be very successful in the short term, only a few sur-
vived as relevant political forces. However, the political scene has now settled 
down following the last parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, although the 
parties seem to have gained their own distinctive proﬁ les, there is no guar-
antee that new splinters or parties will not emerge before the next elections.
It is, therefore, very diﬃ  cult to point out which parties are currently 
relevant and will remain relevant in Slovakia over the long-term. Th is study 
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follows the current distribution of power and investigates the positions of 
the parties that managed to get over the 5 hurdle necessary for entering 
Parliament in the last elections in 2006. Even though there were three other 
parties that obtained a signiﬁ cant share of votes – the Communist Party of 
Slovakia (Komunistická strana Slovenska, KSS), the Free Forum (Slobodné 
Fórum, SF), and the New Citizen Alliance (Aliancia nového občana, ANO) – 
and were represented in Parliament during the last term, one can argue 
that these parties will hardly become relevant in the future. Th e KSS were 
elected into the last Parliament only because of the complete breakdown of 
the Slovakian political system that was present before the 2002 elections. 
Since then, the political space on the left has been dominated and united 
by the SMER, causing the KSS to lose its temporary relevance. Th e Free 
Forum never gained access into the Parliament through elections – it came 
into existence as a splinter from the SDKÚ. Finally, ANO’s 2002 success can 
be ascribed to its freshness and its collection of protest votes. It failed in 
conﬁ rming its appeal in 2006 and, as it has never had any ideological space 
on its own and had lost its freshness, there is only a slight chance that it will 
resurrect its power in future.
Th us, the positions of the following parties are investigated in this study 
only: SMER – Social Democracy (SMER), the Slovak National Party (Sloven-
ská národná strana, SNS), the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, ĽS-HZDS, 
mainly referred to as HZDS only), the Slovak Democratic and Christian 
Union – Democratic Party (Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – 
Demokratická strana, SDKÚ-DS, mainly referred to as SDKÚ only), the Hun-
garian Coalition Party (Strana maďarskej koalície, SMK), and the Christian 
Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH).
Left and Right
Although the left-right division has always existed in post-communist 
Slovakia, it was overshadowed by other issues for the most of the country’s 
existence (Haughton and Rybář 2004: 117). Hloušek and Kopeček (2005) 
identify several cleavages in Slovak politics. Th ere is a socio-economic cleav-
age that most closely corresponds to the intuitive understanding of the left 
and right based on the West European party systems. Th ere is, however, also 
a national cleavage focused on ethnic or national identity, as well as a nature-
of-the-system cleavage. Th ese other cleavages (and some other minor ones) 
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can be found in some Western European countries as well. However, their 
inﬂ uence is not as strong as it has been in Slovakia.
It was the nature-of-the-system cleavage above all that shaped Slovak 
politics during the 1990s. Th e coalition of 1994–1998 led by Vladimír 
Mečiar’s HZDS, maybe the most stable coalition of the independent Slovakia, 
comprised an extreme right party (SNS) together with an extreme left party 
(ZRS). Similarly, the “anti-Mečiar” opposition that won the elections in 1998 
embraced the post-communist, socialist SDĽ, as well as the conservative and 
anticommunist KDH, among others. In the 2002 elections, Prime Minister 
Dzurinda won a second mandate (with a slightly altered coalition) on “anti-
Mečiarism” again. Th e main argument was the struggle for NATO and EU 
membership, which was seen impossible with Vladimír Mečiar, who was 
feared and denounced for his semi-democratic steps in the West.
Th e national cleavage played an important role in the early 1990s and 
towards the creation of an independent Slovakia. Mr. Mečiar, the champion 
of independence, used to disparage his opponents as “Czechoslovakists,” 
meaning “those who do not care for the Slovak nation.” Later, although the 
national cleavage gave way to the ﬁ ght over the nature-of-the-system argu-
ment, one could see the remnants of the former in the sheer existence of the 
ethnic-based Hungarian Coalition Party. Th e Hungarians became an integral 
part of the anti-Mečiar coalitions, but never lost their ethnic orientation. 
Recently, the national cleavage tends to be coming back to the fore. Whereas 
relations between Slovakia and Hungary are at their lowest in a long time, the 
SMK has found itself abandoned, even by its former coalition partners.
Due to the afore-mentioned reasons, the socio-economic cleavage (i.e. 
more or less the left-right cleavage) has been rather weak in Slovakia. So far, 
it reached its peak during the 2002–2006 period when the coalition was com-
pleting the reforms of the welfare state. Th us, Hloušek and Kopeček claimed 
that “Slovak politics headed towards the logic of right-left competition” 
(2005: 21). Yet, the picture has remained blurred (compare Rybář 2004: 40).
On the centre-right of the political spectrum, there are the parties from 
the former coalition – the SDKÚ, the SMK and the KDH. All of them are 
members of the EPP-ED group in the European Parliament; all of them 
champion conservative values. Whereas the SDKÚ and KDH have religion 
in their respective names, the SMK has had its base in ethnic Hungarian vil-
lages of Southern Slovakia. Th e level of conservatism, however, diﬀ ers. Th e 
KDH has been powerful in the countryside; its representatives describe the 
KDH as a right-wing party and display their religiousness on every occasion. 
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Th e party even left the coalition due to its refusal to accept a controversial 
treaty with the Vatican. 
Th e SDKÚ, on the other hand, has been strong mainly in cities. Mikuláš 
Dzurinda, the party chairman, calls the SDKÚ a “union of centre-right politi-
cal streams” (quoted in Mesežnikov 2000). As Prime Minister, Mr. Dzurinda 
advocated the label “centre-right” for the whole coalition of 2002–2006 
(Leška 2006: 280). Th e party crystallized into a union of conservatives and 
liberals (Mesežnikov 2006: 82). Th is is especially true after the fusion with 
the liberal Democratic Party in 2006.
Th e Hungarian Coalition Party also labels itself as a centre-right party 
comprised of a Christian and a liberal wing, or even a right-wing party 
appreciating conservative values (Mesežnikov 2000: 94). Scholars, however, 
pointed out that the SMK remained more leftist than its fellow centre-right 
parties. Although it also stood for traditional conservative values, it wanted 
more redistribution and state subsidies on economic issues than the other 
parties (Rybář 2006: 87). Th e SMK was established through the fusion of 
three Hungarian political parties in 1998 due to an ad hoc modiﬁ cation of 
election law by the Mečiar’s coalition. As such, the party has always won 
voters on ethnic proﬁ le rather than a coherent ideology.
Whereas we can put, more or less, all opposition parties under the head-
ing of centre-right, the situation is much shadier in the coalition. Power 
seemed to be more important for its creation than programme conformity. 
Th e way in which the newborn coalition appointed their people to important 
positions during their very ﬁ rst night in oﬃ  ce supports this reading of the 
situation.
As its very name suggests, the SMER – Social Democracy presents itself 
as a classical left-wing party. When the former vice-chairman of the post-
communist SDĽ, Robert Fico, established the party in 1999, the ideological 
direction of the new subject was far from clear, however. Mr. Fico kept 
refusing to label the party within any established categories. He described 
the SMER as a “non-ideological party” (Mesežnikov 2000: 119), or a third 
way – “a compromise between leftist and rightist solutions” (Mesežnikov 
2001: 69). Th is led some students of Slovak politics to categorize the SMER, 
beside several other Slovak parties, such as the SOP and the ANO, as centrist 
populists (Učeň 2004: 53). Others, however, argue that the inclination of the 
party to social democratic values has been clear from the very beginning 
(Leška 2006: 261). Whatever the original plans had been, with a centre-right 
government in power, Mr. Fico re-discovered the left-wing rhetoric rather 
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quickly. Th e SMER’s new goal was to become a “dominant centre-left subject” 
of the Slovak political scene (Mesežnikov 2003b: 90) and position the party to 
join the PES. After absorbing the remnants of the “classic” leftist parties (SDĽ, 
SDSS, and SDA), the SMER adopted a social democratic agenda and changed 
its name in 2004–5 to SMER – Social Democracy. Th e party has dominated 
the left side of the political spectrum in Slovakia uncontested ever since.
While in the height of its popularity and power during the 1990s, the 
HZDS retained a very broad, yet unclear, ideological proﬁ le with elements of 
populism, nationalism, and etatism. Th e party’s own representatives argued 
that, in the long term, they wanted to operate in the middle of the political 
spectrum (Mesežnikov 1998: 60). After its removal from government in 
1998, the party revised its position and started moving slowly to the right. 
In 2001, Mr. Mečiar deﬁ ned his party as a “centre-right subject” and called 
for cooperation with other centre-right parties (Mesežnikov 2003a: 92), but 
foreclosed any cooperation with the SMER. Th e present position of the party 
is far from being clear. On the one hand, the HZDS changed its name in 2003 
to the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ĽS-HZDS), 
which would suggest a further move to conservative values. At the same time, 
however, the party aspires to join the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe in the European Parliament (Mečiar 2007). Moreover, 
the party formed the government with the SMER, rather than with the 
centre-right parties of the former coalition after the 2006 elections.
Th e last of the parliamentary parties, the Slovak National Party, is also 
the most diﬃ  cult to classify. Th e party representatives label themselves 
as “national-Christian” or “right-wing” (Mesežnikov 1999: 105). Attributes 
such as “nationalist right” or “populist” ﬁ t, however, much better. Since the 
SNS remains the main representative of what Hloušek and Kopeček call the 
national cleavage, it is extremely diﬃ  cult to place that party on the right-left 
spectrum based on the socio-economic cleavage. Th e election programmes 
include a mix of traditionally leftist and rightist agendas, such as the refusal 
of “selling of national wealth” or criticism of welfare state reforms on the one 
hand, and an emphasis on a small and ﬂ exible state on the other (compare 
SNS 2006). Th e national tone predominates in the party’s rhetoric, as well as 
its documents. In total, the party can be classiﬁ ed as a far right party, but its 
position on the political spectrum is extremely contestable for the purpose 
of this research.
On the basis of the previous paragraphs, the spectrum for the purpose of 
this study can be drawn as follows:
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Positioning of the Slovak Political Parties on the Right – Left Axis
 SMER HZDS SMK SDKÚ KDH SNS
left right
Positions of the Slovak Political Parties
Although plentiful, few Slovak political parties have had an important 
role in foreign policy-making. Mostly, the Prime Minister’s party has also 
appointed the Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs. In other words, the HZDS, the 
SDKÚ (SDK in 1998–2000) and the SMER, respectively, have held the two 
most important foreign policy jobs during the whole existence of independ-
ent Slovakia. Th is is not to say that their coalition partners have not had 
any inﬂ uence on the country’s foreign policy. Th e junior parties have always 
nominated state secretaries. Some of them could be rather inﬂ uential, such as 
the position of the chief negotiator with the EU, Ján Figeľ of the KDH. It does, 
however, say a lot about the relevance of foreign aﬀ airs for Slovak domestic 
politics, where, unlike in most European countries, the junior partners opt 
for other positions in the government.
Before we take a closer look at the speciﬁ c positions of particular parties 
and their representatives, it is necessary to address a very speciﬁ c foreign 
policy issue that cuts across the political spectrum – the future of Kosovo. 
All Slovak political parties are against Kosovar independence with the sole 
exception of the Hungarian Coalition Party. In this particular question, it 
does not matter for them what the EU or the US prefer. Rather, their deci-
sions on the matter come with regard to the possible implications for Slovakia 
itself. Th e hostility towards an independent Kosovo follows the (possibly 
unfounded) anxiety about the future of Southern Slovakia, an area populated 
mainly by a Hungarian-speaking minority. Slovak politicians fear that Kosovo 
would constitute a precedent, on which political bases of Hungarians in 
Slovakia could attempt to break away and join Hungary in the future. It can 
be regarded as one of the manifestations of the extent to which the national 
cleavage is taking ground recently.
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Th e following foreign policy positions of the Slovak political parties are 
constructed on the basis of their election programmes, the media appear-
ances of their representatives, as well as on questionnaires and interviews 
with those responsible for the party’s foreign policy formulation. Th e party 
sections are further divided along research areas, i.e. US military presence 
in Europe, the relationship between NATO and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), Iraq in particular, external aspects of the war on ter-
ror, and other foreign policy issues.
SMER – Social Democracy
Th e SMER won the 2006 parliamentary elections by a big margin and 
managed to form a government. Th e party has appointed not only the Prime 
Minister, but also the Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs. Although the SMER has 
been the leading force on the Slovak left and has swallowed up most of the 
other, potentially signiﬁ cant, leftist parties in recent years, it was not able to 
ﬁ nd a suitable minister within their own ranks and opted for a professional 
diplomat, Ján Kubiš. Th is has left the Prime Minister and SMER chairman, 
Robert Fico, as a major inﬂ uence over the party’s foreign policy views. 
US Military Presence in Europe
Th e SMER’s position on the US military role in Europe can be described 
as slightly confused. Th e party has always supported both the country’s 
accession to NATO and the EU, but refrained from developing its stance any 
further. Th is corresponds with a general lack of concern for foreign policy 
in the party; the general election programme of 2002 contained no special 
section on foreign policy. It only listed the country’s accession to NATO and 
the EU as one of the two main tasks for the future government (together with 
ﬁ ghting unemployment) (SMER 2002).
Although the 2006 general election programme already contains a for-
eign policy section, its two paragraphs at the very end of the document are 
rather undersized compared to the 28 pages of the rest of the text (SMER 
2006). Th ose in the party responsible for foreign aﬀ airs do not oﬀ er a much 
clearer view. On one hand, they say that the planned US anti-ballistic missile 
defence bases should be built only if necessary (although not on Slovak soil!). 
On the other hand, they doubt whether the missile defence would enhance 
European security. Th e same dichotomy inﬂ uences oﬃ  cial declarations of 
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the Slovak administration. Whereas the foreign ministry has welcomed the 
missile defence plans as “centred on enhancing security in Europe,” the Prime 
Minister, at the same time, declared that the system “would not change the 
security situation” and that he would not agree with deploying parts of the 
system in Slovakia (SME 2007c).
A refusal to take a clear stance on foreign policy is reﬂ ected in the prin-
ciples of Slovak foreign policy as presented by Mr. Fico and his party. Mr. 
Fico’s statement that “Slovakia is in the centre of Europe, not of the United 
States” (Mesežnikov 2004: 105) would suggest a certain separation from the 
US. Th e idea of the “four points of the compass” that was included in the 
2006 election programme even hints to a certain separation from the West 
in general: “Th e compass has four points. Th erefore, the foreign policy of the 
SMER – Social Democracy will also be oriented to the West as well as to the 
East, North, and South.” (SMER 2006: 29). Moreover, Mr. Fico criticised the 
past government for its one-sided foreign policy orientation towards the US 
administration and gross disregard for the country’s relationship with Russia 
(Marušiak et al. 2006: 257). 
However, at the same time, other SMER representatives would welcome 
cutting down the US military presence in Europe, not because of any wish 
to limit US inﬂ uence in Europe, but on the basis of more necessary tasks 
elsewhere – a position that bears evidence of a rather positive interpretation 
of the role of the US throughout the world. 
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
When asked speciﬁ c questions, the SMER representatives responsible for 
foreign policy issues tend to regard the emerging ESDP cautiously. Th ey voice 
concern for the ESDP’s possible consequences for NATO and its future. Th ey 
believe that the EU and NATO, in close cooperation, should guarantee security 
in Europe. Nevertheless, they give precedence to the use of force within the 
Alliance. A European army is thinkable only if closely coordinated with NATO. 
Even if the European Union should be able to conduct its own, autonomous 
operations, these should be restricted to Europe and Africa only.
Oﬃ  cial documents of the party fully supported the accession to both 
NATO and the EU (SMER 2002: 1) and acknowledged the will to fulﬁ l obliga-
tions resulting from NATO membership (SMER 2006: 28).
When approaching their voters, however, the SMER delivers a slightly 
diﬀ erent image. As Mesežnikov reports, Robert Fico claimed that, “the basic 
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task for Slovakia was not as much to enter NATO as to join the European 
Union” (2000: 70). On the basis of Mr. Fico’s appearances in the pre-accession 
period, Leška also concludes that the SMER’s chairman “did not consider 
NATO accession a priority” (2006: 167). During the Iraq crisis, Mr. Fico called 
for a greater level of orientation towards France and Germany (Marušiak et al. 
2006: 257) and supported an heightened development of the CFSP (Marušiak 
et al. 2004: 352). Boris Zala, the vice-chairman of the party, suggested in 
2002 that Slovak foreign policy should be conducted in a “European, not an 
American way” in the future (SME 2002).
After forming the government, the SMER has not had many opportunities 
to present its relationship to NATO or the ESDP in deed. However, as the 
discussion about a transfer of the Slovak contingent in Afghanistan to a more 
dangerous area of Kandahar illustrates, the government is ready to support 
NATO operations, but is not overexcited and very careful about the condi-
tions (compare Marušiak et al. 2007: 291; Pravda 2007).
Iraq
Even if the SMER may be unclear and opaque on foreign policy direction 
in general, it was not so on the Iraq war in particular. Th e party opposed the 
military solution of the Iraqi crisis from the very beginning. All its repre-
sentatives criticised it in a very coherent way.
Th e SMER stigmatised the invasion in Iraq as a dangerous precedent 
violating international law (Hospodárské noviny 2003). Robert Fico, a lawyer 
by education, was also worried that the actions in Iraq would undermine the 
authority of the United Nations (Mesežnikov 2003b: 95), which has, accord-
ing to the party, an irreplaceable role in preserving stability in the world 
(SMER 2006: 28). Party representatives even criticise the current presence 
of US soldiers in Iraq and believe that democratisation should be conducted 
using other international structures. 
A big part of the opposition was directed against the government, which 
had supported the coalition of willing formed by the US through the so-called 
Vilnius letter. Th e government was described as “irresponsible, non-European, 
and bellicose” (Mesežnikov 2003b: 95). Withdrawal from Iraq was one of the 
promises that the SMER made in its 2006 election programme.
After assuming power, the SMER wanted to withdraw Slovak soldiers from 
Iraq immediately. However, all other political parties, as well as the President 
of the Republic, opposed such a decision. In its mission statement, thus, 
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the government promised only a clear schedule for the withdrawal, created 
after consultations with partners and the Iraqi government (Programové 
vyhlásenie vlády Slovenské republiky 2006: 52). Although the bulk of the 
Slovak contingent left Iraq in February 2007, some oﬃ  cers remained to serve 
in the headquarters and to train Iraqi soldiers, ultimately leaving later that 
year (compare at www.mosr.sk).
External Aspects of the War on Terror
Th e SMER keeps a low proﬁ le on all aspects of the war on terror. A dis-
cussion is missing from party members; party representatives do not issue 
strong statements. In contrast to the intense criticism of the US policy 
towards Iraq, SMER representatives do not pay much attention to the US 
base at Guantánamo Bay. Even if they would oppose the detention of any 
Slovak citizens, they seem to be rather unconcerned with the base’s existence. 
Although they would prefer a diﬀ erent setting for interning terrorist suspects, 
their animosity is not strong enough to provoke an active criticism. Even the 
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs supports the EU’s condemnation that the prison 
does not meet international standards, but admits that it is not a sensitive 
issue in Slovakia since the country has “just a small Muslim community” 
(SME 2007a).
Similarly, the SMER seems uninterested in the alleged CIA ﬂ ights in 
Europe. Although the party would not welcome any CIA bases on Slovak 
territory, it does not care much if other countries do. Beyond these particular 
cases, a general cooperation between the US and Slovak intelligence services 
is seen as desirable.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
On other foreign policy issues, the SMER keeps in line with the European 
Union. Th e party supports the International Criminal Court unambiguously. 
With regard to the EU position, it also criticises the US support of Israel dur-
ing the 2006 Lebanon crisis. Th e SMER does, however, admit that US diplo-
macy can have a positive impact on the Israeli-Arab peace process. SMER 
representatives would also like the EU to replace the US in the strategically 
important region of Central Asia. 
Even if these foreign policy questions do not attract much attention in the 
party, there is one issue, sensitive in transatlantic relations, that has received 
 The Case Studies: Slovakia – Tomáš Weiss
publicity during this term. On Cuba, the SMER takes the side of those Euro-
pean countries that call for a reappraisal of the current approach. Mr. Fico 
gave rise to a big upheaval on the Slovak political scene when he attended the 
anniversary party of the Cuban revolution at the Cuban Embassy in Bratislava 
in 2007 (Hospodárské noviny 2007a). However, the Foreign Minister tried 
to calm down the situation, insisting that, “the foreign policy orientation of 
Slovakia has not changed, which is also true regarding the position on Cuba” 
(Hospodárské noviny 2007b).
ĽS-HZDS – People’s Party – Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia
Before 2006, the HZDS won every single parliamentary election, even if 
with an ever-shrinking number of received votes. Although the party had 
a great inﬂ uence on Slovak foreign policy during the 1990s, it lost power due 
to a low level of coalition potential after 1998.
Th e HZDS has always oﬃ  cially supported Slovakia’s accession to both 
NATO and the EU. However, even if NATO accession was one of the priori-
ties of the HZDS election programmes as well as its government missions, 
the party was much more reserved in practical policy. Before the referendum 
on NATO membership that was held in 1997, the HZDS supported a posi-
tive answer oﬃ  cially, but did not communicate this backing to the voters. 
Moreover, on their initiative, additional questions on nuclear weapons had 
been added to the poll that should have inﬂ uenced the voters to say no 
(Mesežnikov 1998: 62). In 1997, Mesežnikov argued that the party had kept to 
an “anti-integration policy and displays of isolationism and anti-Westernism” 
(1998: 61). Marušiak considers the HZDS government after the Madrid sum-
mit to be overtly anti-American (1999: 280). In 1999, several MPs from the 
HZDS criticised the NATO operation against Yugoslavia as an “overt aggres-
sion against a sovereign country” and condemned the decision of the govern-
ment to provide Slovak air space to NATO forces (Mesežnikov 1999: 102).
A profound change in the party’s approach marked the adoption of the 
Political declaration at the HZDS congress in Trnava in 2000. Th e declara-
tion points out that the country’s NATO and EU accession as in the “national 
interest and the highest foreign policy priority of the Slovak Republic” (HZDS 
2000). In 2007, Mr. Mečiar declared that the HZDS was the “guarantee of 
stable pro-European and pro-Euroatlantic developments” (Mečiar 2007). 
Mere words would not persuade a sea change, however. Th e oﬃ  cial support 
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of membership had been in all previous party documents as well. It was 
the actions that followed that persuaded students of Slovak politics that it 
was a real possibility. Th e HZDS interrupted its cooperation with the SNS 
because it could not work together with a party that did not want to enter 
into NATO, attempting to persuade the voters to support the membership 
(Leška 2006: 256 ﬀ .). Th e party also agreed with the Slovak government’s 
decision to grant overﬂ ight rights to the allied forces during the Afghanistan 
operation in 2001. In 2007, Mesežnikov described the HZDS as “clearly pro-
integrationist and pro-atlantic” (2007: 81).
At the same time, however, the new position has not kept HZDS politi-
cians from making the passing of necessary acts diﬃ  cult in the Slovak parlia-
ment during their terms in opposition (Leška 2006: 258). Nor did it stop them 
from entering the Fico government shoulder to shoulder with the SNS.
US Military Presence in Europe
After Slovakia had dropped out from the accession negotiations due to 
concerns about the level of democracy in the country, Mr. Mečiar (then 
Prime Minister) declared that if they were not wanted in the West, they 
would turn towards the East (Malová et al. 2005: 96). Today, the picture is 
completely diﬀ erent: the HZDS, as the only member of the coalition, sup-
ports the establishment of the US ABM defence bases in Europe and would 
even support one of the bases in Slovakia. According to the vice-chairman of 
the party, Milan Urbányi, Slovakia needs long-term protection – and a base 
would provide it (SME 2007b).
It is questionable, however, whether the enthusiasm for the radar and 
interceptor bases is part of an elaborate and keen pro-Americanism or just 
a position on the particular issue. When ask more generally on the US mili-
tary presence in Europe, the party representatives refrain from answering 
clearly whether it should be strengthened or diminished.
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
Th e HZDS position on the relationship between NATO and the ESDP is 
similarly careful. Th e party declares a profound support for the European 
integration project that includes deepening, in addition to widening, the 
initiative (Vyhlásenie ĽS-HZDS… 2006). Mr. Mečiar even supports progress 
towards a federal model and hopes to live to see the United States of Europe 
 The Case Studies: Slovakia – Tomáš Weiss
(Mesežnikov 2006: 101). Th e party voted for the European Constitution in 
the Slovak Parliament.
At the same time, HZDS politicians accentuate NATO membership and 
the role NATO plays in providing European security. Th ey support EU 
autonomous missions, but only in Europe and Africa. Th ey believe that the 
development of the ESDP must not undermine the activities of NATO, which 
should be, together with the EU, the basic guarantor of security in Europe. 
Th ey refrain from declaring a clear position on the military issues, such as 
the creation of a European army, the question of precedence of the NATO 
Reaction Force, or EU battlegroups. In the government, the HZDS supported 
the redeployment of Slovak soldiers in Afghanistan to the more dangerous 
area around Kandahar on the basis of the country’s obligations to NATO 
(Pravda 2007).
Iraq
On Iraq, the HZDS was again the most open-minded among the members 
of the current coalition. Although a part of the party’s MPs voted against 
the deployment of Slovak soldiers, another part supported it. During the 
2006 debate on withdrawal, the HZDS was ready to take the contingent 
back home; however, unlike the SMER politicians who wanted to withdraw 
immediately, the HZDS argued that the political situation in Iraq must be 
the determining factor (Mesežnikov 2004: 2007: 81). Th e party also believes 
that, at the moment, the US presence in Iraq is necessary for a democratic 
transformation of the country. 
External Aspects of the War on Terror
As with other foreign policy issues, the HZDS keeps a low proﬁ le on the 
war on terror and is not very much involved in a public discussion. In general, 
the Movement is interested in and supports a cooperation between US and 
Slovak intelligence services. It recognises that “all countries must keep an eye 
on terrorism” (SME 2007b).
At the same time, however, the party expresses doubts whether the US 
base at Guantánamo Bay is the right way of detaining terrorist suspects. It 
would strongly disagree if a Slovak citizen was to be kept there and would not 
be in favour of CIA or other US agencies interrogating suspects on Slovak 
territory.
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Other Foreign Policy Issues
After looking at HZDS foreign policy positions, one can almost get the 
impression that the party produces statements on particular topics only after 
they become widely-discussed issues in Slovak politics. Th e party representa-
tives had to have an opinion on the war in Iraq, US bases in Central Europe, 
or the EU Constitutional Treaty because they were either supposed to vote on 
them in Parliament or their position was requested by a ﬁ erce public debate. 
Th e same is true for the party’s position on the Cuban embargo, which made it 
into the headlines after Mr. Fico’s visit to the embassy. Th e HZDS, as on most 
of the above-mentioned issues, disagrees with the SMER and supports the 
US embargo against the Cuban regime, although it concedes that the future 
political development of Cuba will be the determining factor.
On other questions, such as the International Criminal Court or the US 
role in the Israeli-Arab peace process, the party representatives keep silent 
and refuse to present a clear opinion.
SNS – Slovak National Party¹
Foreign policy has never been an area of key importance for the Slovak 
National Party. Even though it has been part of the governing coalition for 
a signiﬁ cant part of the Slovakia’s independent existence, the SNS has never 
appointed a Foreign Minister. Although quite clear in its visions of Slova-
kia’s interests and desirable policies, the main consequences of the SNS’s 
participation in the coalition are visible in Slovak-Hungarian relations and, 
to a lesser extent, in the West’s initial mistrust in the new government. Th is 
mistrust became evident when the Party of European Socialists suspended 
the SMER’s membership due to its cooperation with the SNS after the gov-
ernment had been formed.
US Military Presence in Europe
Th e SNS clearly opposes any signiﬁ cant US presence in Europe. From the 
very beginning, the party promoted neutrality as the best option for Slovak 
security policy. Th is neutrality should be anchored in a pan-European secu-
rity system, binding both the West and the East (SNS 1998). With this in mind, 
1) Unlike other parties’ representatives, the SNS refused to answer standard set of questions that form one of the main sources of this 
paper. The positions of the party have thus been put together using party documents, daily press, and secondary literature only.
 The Case Studies: Slovakia – Tomáš Weiss
the party refused NATO accession and regarded the Alliance as a “Cold War 
product” (Mesežnikov 2001: 102). Such a pan-European project would allow 
for taking in Russia, which is seen as the most important strategic partner of 
Slovakia due to its Slavic ethnicity and membership in the UNSC. Th e United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France, all members of the UNSC, come 
only in second place along with Germany as world powers (SNS 2006: 41).
Th e pan-Slavism of the SNS, which should serve as a “protection against 
Anglo-Saxon and Islamic culture” (Marušiak 2007: 285), was also displayed 
in the debate on the US radar and missile bases in Central Europe. Th e SNS 
opposed the necessity of such installations. According to SNS chairman Ján 
Slota, the bases would solve nothing because “in Europe, there is no enemy” 
(SME 2007b). Th is can be interpreted as a clear reﬂ ection of the Russian criti-
cism of the US plans.
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
When pushed to choose between NATO and the EU, Slovak nationalists 
ﬁ nd themselves between a rock and a hard place. Whereas the rock of NATO 
remains very solid at any occasion, the hardness of the EU may be unbear-
able at times. From the very beginning, the SNS has accepted the economic 
necessity of EU membership, but warned that one had to be careful to enter 
too early. Th e political integration, on the other hand, has been considered 
evil. Th e party declines federal principles in the EU, accentuates national 
sovereignty, and even criticises the supremacy of EU law (sic!) (SNS 2002: 8). 
Mr. Slota argued at one public rally that the ideas of Maastricht are “perverse” 
(Mesežnikov 1998: 70). Another leading ﬁ gure of the party said that the “dic-
tate of Brussels was becoming worse than the dictate of Moscow used to be” 
(Malová et al 2005: 95).
Sometimes, however, even perverse ideas may be the better option. In 2006, 
the party’s election programme argued for the creation and strengthening of 
a military-political identity within the EU (SNS 2006: 3). Th e worse option 
is clearly the country’s continuing membership in NATO. Mr. Slota argued 
in December 2007 that NATO should be dismantled the same way as the 
Warsaw Pact had been and that Slovakia should not take part in any NATO 
missions in the future. At the same time, he argued again for European own 
security and defence structures, including military forces (Extra plus 2007). 
Even the SNS is, however, able to conform to governmental responsibility. 
Whereas the party was against the operation in Afghanistan in 2001, it sup-
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ported extending the Slovak military presence there in 2007 and presented 
NATO obligations as the reason (SME 2007d).
Iraq and Other Foreign Policy Issues
Slovak nationalists have been against the military intervention in Iraq. 
Th ey called for an instant withdrawal in 2004 after 3 Slovak soldiers had 
died, and again in 2006. Other policy issues have not been paid continual 
attention, with several exceptions only. Th e party’s position is strongly anti-
Israeli (Mesežnikov 2003a: 77) in general, which inﬂ uences interventions on 
Middle-Eastern issues.
Some of the statements on the war on terror have been rather provocative. 
Before the nationalists opposed the operation in Afghanistan, their current 
vice-chairman, Anna Malíková, claimed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were 
a result of the US foreign policy during the past few decades. Mr. Slota has 
further criticised the practice in Kosovo, where, as he believes, the EU, NATO, 
and the US support Islamist terrorists, unlike on other continents where they 
shoot them (Extra plus 2007).
SDKÚ-DS – Slovak Democratic and 
Christian Union – Democratic Party
To some extent, the SDKÚ was established only as a result of external 
pressure. Due to the change of election rules shortly before the 1998 elections, 
the anti-Mečiar opposition had to form a single party (the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition, SDK) in order not to be disadvantaged by the new law. Since then, 
although the ways of the partners parted, former Prime Minister Dzurinda, 
who sprang from the KDH originally, appeared with a brand new party, the 
SDKÚ, established independently in 2000, which has managed to beat all the 
SDK founding parties in both subsequent elections.
Th e party (or better to say, the politicians who later moved into it) held 
both key foreign policy positions, the oﬃ  ces of Prime Minister as well as For-
eign Minister, in both terms 1998–2006. It is, therefore, understandable that 
the party sees foreign policy as one of the ﬂ agships of the party programme 
and regards itself as the representative of the ideas of integration. Th is, in 
turn, may explain both the party’s success in 1998 and 2002 elections, as well 
as its defeat in 2006 when foreign policy, plus EU and NATO membership, 
ceased to be the key election topic.
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US Military Presence in Europe
SDKÚ clearly counts on the US for security issues. In its election 
programme in 2002, the party stressed the importance of a “permanent 
American engagement in the European security architecture” (SDKÚ 
2002: 4) because the US will always be seen as Europe’s partner, not an enemy 
(Ondrejcsák 2004: 53). Similarly, already as a member of the EU, the SDKÚ 
supported a high level of cooperation with “the strategic partner, the United 
States of America” (SDKÚ 2006: 42).
Th e party wants to keep the bond between US and the European secu-
rity; however, at the same time, its representatives support the deepening 
of European integration, even if with unanimous decision-making (SDKÚ 
2003). Th ey also believe that the US military presence in Europe should be 
diminished and that the EU should gradually take over European defence. 
Th is defence should also include operations on the European continent. Yet, 
the creation of a common European political area should not endanger the 
US role in Europe (Mesežnikov 2003b: 70).
It is not surprising that the SDKÚ supports the planned anti-ballistic 
missile defence in Central Europe that the US has negotiated with the Czech 
Republic and Poland. In addition, the party’s politicians are convinced that 
the system will enhance security in Europe. 
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
In short, the SDKÚ is enthusiastic about both NATO and the ESDP. NATO 
is seen as the “most important pillar of European security and the guarantee 
of economic stability” (SDKÚ 2002: 3). NATO activities should, in this view, 
be broadened and include humanitarian operations (SDKÚ 2006: 42) and 
NATO’s protection of the interests of its member states everywhere in the 
world (SME 2004). 
At the same time, the party supports the further development of the Europe-
an Security and Defence Policy (SDKÚ 2002: 3). In Europe’s immediate neigh-
bourhood, ESDP operations should even have precedence over NATO-led 
missions (even if NATO should be the option everywhere else). Moreover, the 
SDKÚ is also very supportive of the idea of a European army, which, as some 
add, should be established only if all member states agree on its creation.
Cooperation is the keyword for the SDKÚ. NATO and the EU should be 
responsible together for European security. NATO should be responsible in 
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the broader sense of global issues and general defence; the ESDP should be 
responsible (complementarily, in particular) for operations in the European 
neighbourhood and where all actors agree that the EU is more suitable for 
such a task. In such cooperation, the emphasis should be put on capacity-
building and the reduction of duplications within the Berlin Plus system.
Iraq
Prime Minister Dzurinda was one of the signatories of the so-called 
Vilnius letter that expressed conﬁ dence in US evidence presented to the UN 
Security Council and backed a military action against Iraq. Later on, SDKÚ 
initiated a deployment of more than 100 soldiers to the Multinational Force 
in Iraq; all MPs elected for the party voted in its support. Th e party has 
stuck to the decision and continued to refuse any withdrawal (Mesežnikov 
2004: 80). Currently, the SDKÚ also appreciates the endeavour, although its 
representatives admit that it was a diﬃ  cult undertaking.
When asked about the present US military presence in Iraq, all SDKÚ 
representatives agree that it should be maintained because it is necessary for 
the democratic transition of the country.
External Aspects of the War on Terror
Although the SDKÚ is very supportive of the US and regard it as a strate-
gic partner and a key factor for European security, it does not automatically 
mean that it agrees to everything that the US undertakes. In particular, the 
Guantánamo Bay detention base has not won support from SDKÚ politicians. 
Some regard it as a violation of human rights; some doubt whether it has 
been necessary at all. Even if some do not believe that closing down the base 
would solve the problem, it is rather a call for a deeper, systemic response to 
such practices than a support of the methods used. Nor would they support 
the detention of any Slovak citizens on the base.
An opinion of the alleged CIA ﬂ ights is not very strong within the party; 
it is rather seen as a bare necessity that could not be avoided. In general, 
however, the SDKÚ strongly supports bilateral cooperation between Slovak 
and US intelligence services. In addition to this, some members of the party 
would agree to special CIA or US military bases on Slovak territory that 
would be used for the interrogation of terrorist suspects. In this case, a strong 
supervision from the Slovak side would be a precondition, however.
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Other Foreign Policy Issues
Whereas the positions of the party are rather uniﬁ ed on issues such as Iraq 
or the relationship between NATO and the ESDP, if we look at other, more 
peripheral foreign policy issues, we can spot slight diﬀ erences. Th is is, to 
some extent, true in the case of US support of the 2006 Israeli intervention 
in Southern Lebanon. Some SDKÚ representatives understand the support 
because they believe that Israel simply responded to terrorist activities. For 
others, however, Israel went further than a pure defence operation, causing, 
as such, the US support to be rather unfortunate.
Diﬀ erences in the interpretation of the particular political situation on the 
spot also cause a diﬀ erent evaluation of US policy in the case of Cuba. Some 
believe that the Cuban regime has not changed a bit and that the US embargo 
is, therefore, fully justiﬁ able. Others, however, see the situation in Cuba as 
changing and would support a reassessment of the US position as well.
In general, SDKÚ representatives support the establishment of the Inter-
national Criminal Court; but again, some of them would feel better if the US 
also ratiﬁ ed the charter and became part of the system.
Th e party also presents its full support for the presence of the US in Cen-
tral Asia. Th e SDKÚ would welcome an increased US presence in the region 
because it could have a positive eﬀ ect on energy security in Europe.
SMK – Hungarian Coalition Party
Th e Hungarian Coalition Party considers foreign policy to be an impor-
tant issue. It has also had experience, to some extent, because its present 
chairman, Pál Csáky, used to be the vice-premier responsible for European 
aﬀ airs in the second Dzurinda government. Moreover, the SMK’s József 
Berényi served during the same term as State Secretary at the Ministry of 
Foreign Aﬀ airs.
As a party based on an ethnic principal, it is only logical that the SMK 
puts emphasis on national minority issues and measures for the protection 
of minorities. With the experience of Slovak nationalists’ participation in 
the government during the 1990s, the SMK developed a general enthusiasm 
for Western institutions, i.e. both the EU and NATO, which had been seen 
as parts of a single package. Having considered accession the best tool 
for promoting minority rights, the party has always been its prominent 
advocate.
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US Military Presence in Europe
To a large extent, the SMK’s views of the US role in Europe are similar to 
those of the SDKÚ, as described above. Th e party believes that the US has 
a role to play in Europe and would like to see the American political, as well 
as military, presence in Europe maintained (SMK 2006: 62). At the same time, 
however, party representatives argue that this US presence should be reduced 
because the EU should gradually take over European defence.
One of the cases where the SMK supports the maintenance, and even the 
strengthening, of the US presence in Europe is the issue of ballistic missile 
defence. Th e party agrees to the plans to establish radar and interceptor bases 
in Central Europe and believes that they would probably improve Europe’s 
security.
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
Th e Hungarian Coalition Party combines vivid Europeanism with strong reli-
ance on NATO. Party representatives support the further development of the 
ESDP, which should be, together with NATO, a guarantor of European security, 
and even believe that the EU should create a European army. Th e EU should 
conduct its own independent missions in Europe and Africa; in these missions, 
the European battle groups should take precedence over NATO troops.
On the other hand, in areas other than the EU’s immediate neighbourhood 
(Europe and Africa), NATO or US-led missions are considered more appro-
priate for the task. It must also be said that, even though the SMK supports 
the EU military dimension, the party considers NATO the only organisation 
that can guarantee international security (SMK 2002). Moreover, it ﬁ nds 
European security without an active participation of NATO to be beyond 
imagination (SMK 2006: 61). When thinking about tasks for Slovak security 
forces, the party regards NATO obligations as the only source, a position 
without reference to an EU level of commitment (SMK 2006: 57).
In their mutual relationship, both sides of the Atlantic should perform 
better, according to the SMK. Whereas the US should learn how to listen 
to its allies more, the Europeans should deliver more in terms of military 
eﬃ  ciency (SMK 2006: 62).
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Iraq
All parliamentarians elected for the SMK voted in favour of the deploy-
ment of Slovak forces in Iraq. Th e reasons why they supported the war may 
vary within the party. Some did so because it was a coalition operation led by 
the United States; others believed that it was correct to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein’s regime (Pravda 2004). 
Likewise, the SMK supports the present US military presence in Iraq 
because it is seen as necessary for the democratic transition of the country.
External Aspects of the War on Terror
Similarly to the SDKÚ, the Hungarian Coalition Party seems to be critical 
of some methods used by the US in the war on terror, despite the fact that 
the party supported the invasion of Iraq. Party representatives would prefer 
if the US had used a diﬀ erent arrangement for the detention of terrorist 
suspects and would deﬁ nitely oppose any detention of Slovak citizens at 
Guantanamo Bay.
A slight caution can be noted also in possible cooperation with US intel-
ligence services. Although the SMK would support bilateral intelligence 
cooperation between Slovakia and the US within the framework of the 
war on terror, a certain level of supervision would be a precondition. If not 
entirely necessary, the SMK would also oppose any special US establishments 
for interrogating terrorist suspects built on Slovak territory.
Other Foreign Policy Issues
US policies in the world are considered as correct within the SMK. Th e 
party appreciated the US support of Israel during the intervention in Leba-
non in 2006 because it believes that the intervention was a just reaction to 
an escalation of terrorist activities. Similarly, it backs the US embargo against 
Cuba, although the party accepts that the political situation on the island may 
change in the future and could require a reassessment of the current sanc-
tions. It also considers the US role in Central Asia as a contribution to energy 
security in Europe. Th e SMK backs the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court without any preconditions.
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KDH – Christian Democratic Movement
Th e Christian Democrats have been a stable part of the Slovak political 
scene since the change of the regime. Th e party was established as early as 
February 1990. Whereas it has always been very successful in municipal elec-
tions, relative to other parties, it has never been overly strong in the run for 
seats in the Slovak Parliament (compare election results at www.statistics.sk). 
Th is is the consequence of the party’s strong conservatism and religiousness, 
which appeals more in the countryside where there are more municipalities 
than in the cities, where general elections are decided.
Th e KDH was the main author of the Slovak Democratic Coalition; one of 
its members, Mikuláš Dzurinda, also became the chairman of the SDK. Later, 
although the KDH left the Coalition, it has always been defeated in general 
elections by the newly-formed SDKÚ. In 2006, as a reaction to the refusal of 
a treaty with the Vatican, the KDH left the governing coalition as well, which 
led to early elections.
Although never occupying the highest jobs in foreign policy-making, the 
KDH appointee for Foreign Ministry State Secretary, Ján Figeľ, was respon-
sible for the EU accession negotiations. 
US Military Presence in Europe and the 
Relations between NATO and the ESDP
Th e Christian Democratic Movement is probably the most fractionalized 
Slovak party regarding the approach to NATO and the EU. Although the 
party always supported the accession to both organizations in general terms 
(Mesežnikov 2001: 81), some of its top representatives have been reluctant, 
critical, or even completely hostile. As a result, some of them would support 
the reduction of the US military presence in Europe because such forces 
are needed somewhere else and that the Europeans should bear part of the 
responsibility for common defence. Others, such as Vladimír Palko, former 
chairman of the Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee, suggest 
strengthening the European dimension (through the ESDI!), which would 
lead to the gradual abolishment of US dominance in Europe and result in 
the transformation of the Alliance into a two-block of North America and 
Europe without any US military presence in the latter (Mesežnikov 2001: 
82). Finally, some in the KDH, such as long-time chairman, Ján Čarnogurský, 
have been against NATO membership all along (Marušiak et al. 2006: 257). 
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Mr. Čarnogurský has declared that the Alliance does not have any future 
(Mesežnikov 2007: 96). As a member of the government, he voted against 
ﬂ yover permission to NATO aircrafts during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 
(Mesežnikov 2000: 21).
Similarly, some in the KDH refrain from commenting on the US plans for 
ballistic missile defence bases in Central Europe. Others, however, criticise 
them right away as provoking Russia and would not support any such bases 
in Slovakia (Th e Slovak Spectator 2007).
Nevertheless, the KDH still considers the transatlantic cooperation deci-
sive for European security and NATO the most important security pillar of 
the transatlantic area (KDH 2004; KDH 2006: 11). Th e cohesion of the EU 
security and defence policy should be reached within the conditions and 
structures of NATO and the ESDI (KDH 2004). A European army should 
be avoided because it could undermine NATO. Again, some in the party 
support an evolution of the ESDP and even believe that the ESDP should 
guarantee security in Europe; however, all this is considered suitable only 
in Europe and its neighbourhood. NATO should take care of the rest of 
the world.
Th e KDH calls for preventing duplications with NATO in the EU’s defence 
policy (KDH 2002) and even labels the ESDP a “supplement” in tasks that 
NATO is supposed to deal with (KDH 2006: 11). Th e EU should engage only 
where NATO does not act. 
Th e apparent love/hate relationship with NATO can partly be explained 
by the same view of the European Union. Th e KDH does not see the ESDP 
as a possible alternative to NATO, even if it is not very happy with the Alli-
ance, because parts of the party are very reluctant or even sceptical towards 
the EU. Th e whole party has been against deepening European integration 
(Mesežnikov 2007: 97) and has presented many red lines, such as taxes 
or the asylum policy (compare KDH 2006). In the second pillar, the KDH 
admits that the EU should speak with one voice in the world (Šťastný and 
Gábelová 2004: 16–17), but also insists on preserving unanimous decision-
making (KDH 2004). Th e party opposed the Constitutional Treaty and 
is now against the Lisbon Treaty as well because it argues that the treaty 
established a new state (Hospodárské noviny 2007c). Mr. Čarnogurský 
went one step further again when he labelled the whole EU as an “artiﬁ cial 
product” (Mesežnikov 2007: 96).
To sum up, the KDH is neither very enthusiastic about NATO nor the EU 
and seeks ways on how to balance them out against each other in order to 
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provide Slovakia with the most autonomy and sovereignty in foreign policy. 
Except for extreme individuals, however, it does not go as far as to refuse 
NATO or the European integration. When put together, the KDH clearly 
chooses NATO before the ESDP.
Iraq
Th e KDH was the only government party that criticised the US decision to 
invade Iraq and opposed the deployment of Slovak forces. Th e party argued 
that it was a mistake, a war fought for the wrong reasons. In Iraq, the West 
lost its moral superiority acquired after the 9/11 terrorist attacks necessary for 
the victory in the war on terror (Palko 2004). In the government, KDH min-
isters voted against granting the coalition permits to ﬂ y over Slovak territory 
(Marušiak et al. 2003: 280). In the Slovak parliament, the MPs were not given 
any advice on how to vote, with two of them supporting the deployment 
of Slovak soldiers. Ten others, however, voted against this measure, which 
Mesežnikov accredits to the opposition by the Pope and the Conference of 
Slovak Bishops (2003b: 80).
Later on, the KDH argued for a withdrawal of Slovak troops, but never took 
any active steps (Mesežnikov 2004: 91). In the 2006 election programme, the 
party promised a withdrawal by the end of the term, i.e. 2010 (KDH 2006: 12).
Th e current US presence in Iraq is regarded as unfortunate because 
the democratic transition of Iraq should be carried out by other interna-
tional structures. It is not believed to have inﬂ uenced the Slovak relationship 
towards the US, however.
External Aspects of the War on Terror
Th e KDH does not see any need to have establishments and procedures 
such as those at the base at Guantánamo Bay. Remarkably, however, its 
representatives, as the only such ones in Slovakia, admit that Slovak citizens 
could be held in the base in exceptional cases. Such a necessity led, in their 
opinion, to the decision made by some European countries to allow for CIA 
ﬂ ights over their territories. Only if not possible otherwise, they would also 
agree to the establishment of an US interrogation base in Slovakia. In general 
terms, however, cooperation between Slovak and US intelligence services is 
considered as necessary.
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Other Foreign Policy Issues
Th e Christian Democratic Movement was the loudest critic of the cur-
rent government’s moderate position on Cuba and the Prime Minister’s 
participation at a Cuban embassy banquet (KDH 2007). Th e party believes 
that the sanctions against the Cuban regime should remain in place until all 
prisoners of consciousness are set free. Th erefore, it also considered the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and some EU member 
states to be an “unfortunate and wrong step” (Hospodárské noviny 2005). 
Th e US role in the Middle East is seen as potentially positive, but some-
times wrong, such as during the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, which went 
too far for a defensive war. In Central Asia, on the other hand, it is the EU 
who should play a more active role. 
Th e KDH also supports the establishment of the International Criminal 
Courts, but would prefer if the US took part as well.
Conclusion
Th e Slovak political scene has been rather unsettled since the establishment 
of an independent Slovakia. Moreover, other cleavages than the left-right (or 
socio-economic) cleavage have been important most of the time. Lining the 
parties up along the left-right axis is, thus, easily contestable. However, if we 
accept the classiﬁ cation of the Slovak parties as made and discussed in this 
paper, we can draw several conclusions with regard to the relationship between 
the position on the left-right axis and the foreign policy preferences.
Firstly, for the segment of the axis marked by the SMER on the left and 
the SDKÚ on the right, it can be argued that, the more to the left the party 
stands, the more sceptical of the policies of the US it will be. Th e SMER has 
been very critical of many US eﬀ orts in the last years, starting with the Iraq 
war and ending with the ballistic missile defence. Th e rest of the parties have 
been supportive on most issues, or, in the case of the HZDS, supportive on 
some issues and silent on others.
Secondly, with the same parties, the more left the party stands, the more 
Europeanist it is in regard to its rhetoric. It is, however, questionable whether 
this rhetoric is positively pro-European or just a way of criticising the US. All 
parties, without exception, have formulated the preservation of the NATO’s 
exclusive role in the European security system as the main prerequisite of the 
further development of the ESDP.
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Th irdly, the right-wing parties have been heavily inﬂ uenced by the nation-
alist cleavage. Th is is deﬁ nitely true for the SNS, but to a large extent also 
for the KDH. Th is nationalism leads to a pan-Slavic rhetoric and distrust of 
the US, and sometimes of the West in general. For these parties, or at least 
a signiﬁ cant and loud part in the case of the KDH, both NATO and the EU 
are suspicious organisations. It must be said, however, that unlike the SNS, 
the mainstream KDH has always accepted the necessity of the accession to 
both organisations despite the criticism. On security issues, the KDH also 
clearly prioritises the Alliance before the EU.
Unlike in some other Central and East European countries, Slovak political 
parties do not change their positions much once they enter the government. 
Although there is some pragmatism present, the bulk of the rhetoric and the 
main points remain in place. In this context, we can understand the voting 
of KDH ministers against the Kosovo and Iraq wars as well as the eﬀ ort of 
the SMER to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible. Th is is what students 
of Central Europe may appreciate with the Slovak political scene, which is 
not very transparent in many other terms.
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